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Abstract 
Unique to nineteenth-century Spain and Central America, the pronunciamiento can be 
interpreted as an act of insubordination against ruling authorities, which included a written 
document with a list of complaints or demands. The practice was almost always carried out 
by members of the army, but usually involved heavy participation by political and civilian 
sectors of society as well. The pronunciamiento more often than not contained a threat of 
military violence if the grievances of the pronunciados were not listened to; as a result, it 
carried with it the implicit consequence of armed revolt.  
The pronunciamiento was responsible for major political changes in early nineteenth-
century Mexico and Yucatán, and was also one of the most powerful forces of political and 
societal destabilisation during this period. Indeed, the pronunciamiento was responsible for 
the establishment of federalist and centralist systems, changes of constitutions, and constant 
overthrows of presidents. This was also true on a smaller scale in Yucatán, as the 
pronunciamiento was not only used to depose governors and administrations, but was the key 
negotiatory mechanism between the Yucatecan and Mexican administrations; yucatecos 
resorted to the pronunciamiento to realise their secessions from and reunifications to Mexico 
throughout the early nineteenth century. 
The aim of this thesis is to expose the dynamic of the Yucatecan pronunciamiento. It 
will challenge the present depiction of the pronunciamiento as military exercise of 
destabilization, and will instead concentrate on exposing it as a highly intricate process of 
political representation and negotiation, at both local and national levels. This will not only 
contribute toward a greater understanding of pronunciamiento culture on a local and more 
general scale, but will also reveal a more comprehensive analysis of the socio-political and 
economic circumstances of nineteenth-century Yucatán. This in turn will aid in re-defining 
early nineteenth-century Mexico, questioning its traditional depiction as an age of “chaos”, 
iii 
 
and instead exposing it as one dominated by political and ideological forces and factions, 
who used the pronunciamiento to express their beliefs and to negotiate for change.  
1 
 
Introduction 
The early independent years of nineteenth-century Mexico (from independence in 
1821 to the beginning of the Porfirio Díaz administration in 1876) were plagued by 
instability, factionalism, civil conflict, insurrections, and wars, as powerful sectors of society 
in Mexico City along with those of its regions struggled with the novelties of self-
governance, the definition of their political identities, and the understanding and formation of 
the political system of the nation. Despite inheriting a land ravaged by the War of 
Independence with stalled economic development, Mexicans still had hopes for a peaceful 
new nation. Nevertheless, at almost all levels Mexicans were inexperienced with self-rule, 
and despite the high expectations brought with freedom, it cannot be denied that Mexicans 
were inheriting a land which had been profoundly conditioned by a colonial structure, with a 
powerful defined elite above the popular classes. Additionally, there was a severe lack of 
agreement on the political system which the nascent nation should take. Some – in particular 
the elite sectors of the regions – preferred a federalist organisation which allowed provinces 
significant administrative and economic power over their realms; but others believed in a 
centralist system with Mexico City in main control of resources and administration, and 
which also preserved the two bastions of colonialism: the Church and the Army (in Terry 
Rugeley‟s words, “a kind of Spain without the Spaniards: regal, mercantilist, and above all 
Catholic.”)1 The inexperienced and internally divided society was consequently constituted of 
several clashing political factions with each believing that it had the solution for creating a 
stable political system which would bring peace and development to the country.   
There were different strategies used to express the political ideals of these groups; 
lawful methods such as elections and constitutions were a constant in the nascent nation. 
                                                          
1
 Terry Rugeley, “The Compass Points of Unrest: Pronunciamientos from Within, Without, Above, and Below 
in Southeast Mexico, 1821-1876” in Will Fowler (ed.), Malcontents, rebels and pronunciados: The Politics of 
Insurrection in Nineteenth-Century Mexico (Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press, in press).  
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Then there were other means: revolts, civil wars, insurrections, and above all, 
pronunciamientos. Pronunciamientos inundated the country as the military constantly 
intervened and mixed with political affairs at both local and national levels, consequently 
provoking endemic political, social, and economic instability. Mexico‟s political actors and 
military officers continually used the exercise to express their political beliefs and identities, 
establish, uphold, or call for the end of existing authorities and institutions, and above all, 
negotiate for political change. The aim of this thesis is to explore the dynamic, purpose, and 
fundamental impact of the pronunciamiento in one region of nineteenth-century Mexico: the 
Yucatecan peninsula, concentrating on the period from the first to the second independence 
of the region (1821-1840).  
Why focus on such a specific practice, in such a defined region, and within this time 
frame? It is undeniable that the early independent years of Mexico still deserve extensive 
political investigation; the advent of independence and the struggles to build the political 
system of the nation not only released political, social, and economic pressures which had 
been building throughout the colonial era, but understanding the period is, in Timothy Anna‟s 
words, “fundamental to all that came after”.2 It is impossible to understand the years of the 
Reform, or even the build-up to the Mexican Revolution of 1910 without first comprehending 
what came before. This period constituted the formation of issues such as the establishment 
of distinct political ideologies; the Church-State relationship; the attitude of the criollos 
towards the Spaniards; the relations between Mexico City and the regions; and the tendency 
of the military to mix in politics. Yet, until recently (the past twenty years or so), the period 
had largely been ignored in terms of political analysis. In 1960, Robert Potash wrote, “the 
historical period [of Mexico] that is least understood and the one to which the greatest 
                                                          
2
 Timothy E. Anna, “Demystifying Early Nineteenth-Century Mexico”, Mexican Studies/Estudios Mexicanos, 
Vol.9, No.1 (Winter, 1993), p.122.  
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contributions can be made is that between 1821 and 1867”.3 More than twenty years later 
Eric Van Young continued to assert that the period in question remains “one of the great 
unexplored territories of Mexican history,”4 with Michael Costeloe agreeing that “The 
Revolution in particular has been subjected to intense scrutiny [...] The colonial period has 
been equally, if not even better, served [...] There remains, however, one substantial gap in 
the historiography [:] the nineteenth century.”5 Indeed, it has only been during the past twenty 
years or so that Mexican historians have started to challenge the generalised view of this 
period as one of caudillos and revolts, starting to pay attention to its political complexities, 
with comprehensive examination and synthesis of political ideas and ideals, systems, 
governments and figures. Nevertheless, Will Fowler stated as late as 1998 that, “the 
nineteenth century remains, to this day, one of the least-studied and one of the most-
misrepresented periods of Mexican history” and still “continues to suffer from gross 
simplifications.”6  
The previous over-generalised historical reports on the era which concentrated on 
instability and insurrection emanated primarily from the “chaos” school of thought, a school 
which the liberal historians such as Vicente Riva Palacios of the 1880s established, as they 
interpreted the years of 1821 to about 1854 as a period plagued with conflict, instability and 
anarchy; this was mainly done in order to stress the importance of the triumph of the liberal 
Reform under President Benito Juárez of 1855 to 1867.
7
 Contemporary conservative 
historians such as Lucas Alamán also had biased perspectives, as they gave partisan reports 
which emphasised the violent reputation of this period, in order to exalt the glory of the 
                                                          
3
 Robert A. Potash, “Historiography of Mexico since 1821”, The Hispanic American Historical Review, Vol.40, 
No.3 (Aug. 1960), p.423.   
4
 Eric Van Young, “Recent Anglophone Scholarship on Mexico and Central America in the Age of Revolution 
(1750-1850)”, The Hispanic American Historical Review, Vol.65, No.4 (Nov., 1985), p.731. 
5
 Michael P. Costeloe, The Central Republic in Mexico, 1835-1846: hombres de bien in the Age of Santa Anna 
(Cambridge [England]: New York, NY, USA: Cambridge University Press, 1993), p.1.  
6
 Will Fowler, Mexico in the Age of Proposals: 1821-153 (Westport: Greenwood. Press, 1998), p.2. 
7
 These historians include figures such as Ignacio Altamirano, Historia y política de México, 1821-1882 
(México: 1947), and Vicente Riva Palacio, México a través de los siglos (5 vols., México: 1887-1889). 
4 
 
colonial era.
8
 Writers during the porfiriato (1876-1910) such as Justo Sierra,
9
 also 
emphasised the chaos perspective of the early independent years, so as to emphasize the 
success of President Porfirio Díaz.
10
 Consequently, as Anna has stated, “we have been too 
dependent on the classic eyewitness accounts of Mexican authors who were themselves 
partisan participants in early republican affairs – Mora, Mier, Bustamante, Zavala, 
Bocanegra, Alamán, Tornel.”11  
Donald Stevens has also pointed out that this tendency to concentrate on epic chaos 
(based on the actions of military heroes and villains) has arisen because “historians have 
preferred military to civilian subjects”.12 Simplistic studies of the activities of caudillos (and 
one in particular, by the name of Antonio López de Santa Anna), revolutions and 
dictatorships have dominated the so-called “Age of Santa Anna” (a tendency which Josefina 
Vázquez has also noted).
13
 Indeed, until recently historians have ignored the complex 
political themes and ideals of the time, tending to stress that “the issues and ideas in conflict 
[...] are assumed to be personal rather than political in any usual sense.”14 In Anna‟s words, 
historians have consequently painted a picture “of chaos unparalleled in Mexican history; a 
dreary landscape taken to be populated by self-serving dictators and military nabobs: a 
whirlpool of political disintegration, economic decay and general backwardness.”15  
 During approximately the last twenty years or so, historians have been striving to 
challenge this view of “chaos”, with recent analysis on political activities, ideologies, 
                                                          
8
 Lucas Alamán, Historia de México desde los primeros movimientos que prepararon su independencia en el 
año de 1808, hasta la época presente (México, D.F: Instituto Cultural Helénico, Fondo de Cultura Económica, 
1985). 
9
 Justo Sierra, Evolución política del pueblo mexicano (México: 1900-1902). 
10
 Josefina Zoraida Vázquez, “Los años olvidados”, Mexican Studies/Estudios Mexicanos, Vol.5, No.2 
(Summer, 1989), p.313.  
11
 Anna, “Demystifying”, p.120. 
12
 Donald F. Stevens, “Autonomists, Nativists, Republicans, and Monarchists: Conspiracy and Political History 
in Nineteenth-Century Mexico”, Mexican Studies/Estudios Mexicanos, Vol.10, No.2 (Winter, 1994), p.257. 
13
 Josefina Zoraida Vázquez, "Un viejo tema: el federalismo y el centralismo", Historia Mexicana XLII: 3 
(1993), p.626. 
14
 Stevens, “Autonomists”, p.248. 
15
 Anna, “Demystifying”, p.120.  
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factions, and figures beginning to mushroom. Political historians such as Timothy Anna, 
Christian Archer, David Brading, Michael Costeloe, Will Fowler, Brian Hamnett, Jaime E. 
Rodriguez O. and Vázquez are but a few of those
16
 who, according to Alan Knight, are 
contributing to rectifying the “black hole of Mexican historiography,”17 with it now 
beginning to fade to a “light grey”.18 In Stevens‟ words, historians have finally begun to take 
“political differences seriously”,19 with Anna agreeing that we are beginning to grant 
“nineteenth-century political leaders the simple respect of recognizing that they may have 
held genuine political principles.”20 Historians have now begun to cease interpreting the 
events involving, for example, pronunciamientos, revolts, civil wars, the federalist-centralist 
divide, the conservative-liberal struggle, caudillos like Santa Anna, and foreign invasions as 
“some giant exercise in futility that left all the great questions to be settled all over again in 
the twentieth century”.21 Instead, they have started justifying and exposing these events for 
what they really were, as “the process, imperfect as always, of defining, creating, building 
nationhood.”22 This is not to say that historians are claiming that the period is one of stability; 
between 1821-1852, 23 different presidents ruled, with more than a thousand 
pronunciamientos and several civil wars occurring, along with caudillos who came to power 
with the War of Independence, relishing and refusing to relinquish their rule. With the 
exception of the presidencies of Guadalupe Victoria (1824-1828) and José Joaquín de Herrera 
(1848-1851), no government or president during this period fulfilled their full terms of 
                                                          
16
 For a full list of historians who deal with the political analysis of nineteenth-century Mexico, see the 
bibliography. 
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 Anna, “Demystifying”, p.119. 
18
 Alan Knight, “Subalterns, Signifiers and Statistics: Perspectives on Mexican Historiography”, Latin American 
Research Review, Vol.37. No.2 (Feb 2005), p.144. 
19
 Donald Fithian Stevens, Origins of Instability in Early Republican Mexico (Durham and London: Duke 
University Press, 1991), p.27. 
20
 Anna, “Demystifying”, p.137. 
21
 Ibid., p.122. 
22
 Ibid. 
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office.
23
 Instead, historians are attempting to unravel the political and social complexities 
behind these events, concentrating on the compositions of social sectors, developments in 
political economy, the fluid and evolving dynamic of political factions and coalitions, and the 
analysis of political ideologies.  
One of the most recent subcategories of this political analysis has been that of the 
pronunciamiento.
24
 Perhaps it is because of the large-scale changes which pronunciamientos 
have brought about in Mexican politics (such as independence, federalism, centralism, the 
establishment and overthrow of presidents) that historians have lost perspective on its more 
intimate dynamics (i.e. specific and detailed origins, actors, practice, and comprehensive 
consequences). Generally, historical texts have only mentioned the practice (until very 
recently) in the context of stressing the tumultuous change of presidents, governors and/or 
constitutions; as a simple means to an end, with concentration mainly on its national (and 
destabilizing) impact. In other words, historical literature has depicted the pronunciamiento 
as a brief measure to achieving national objectives, leading to the neglect of its more complex 
workings. As Vázquez has rightly noted, "The study of the political reality behind the foreign 
interventions and the pronunciamientos has been avoided.”25  
What exactly was a pronunciamiento? The pronunciamiento was essentially a type of 
revolt and an act of insubordination; most dictionaries and encyclopaedias define it as a 
military uprising or coup. The Diccionario Usual de la Real Academia Española states it to 
be an “Alzamiento militar contra el Gobierno, promovido por un jefe del Ejército u otro 
caudillo,”26 with the Enciclopedia Microsoft Encarta Online defining it as a: 
                                                          
23
 Will Fowler, “Dreams of Stability: Mexican Political Thought during the 'Forgotten Years'. An Analysis of 
the Beliefs of the Creole Intelligentsia (1821-1853)”, Bulletin of Latin American Research, Vol.14, No.3 (Sep., 
1995), p.305. 
24
 Professor Will Fowler at the University of St. Andrews has initiated a project (2007-2010) concerned with the 
extensive analysis of the origins and actors, process, and memory of the pronunciamiento in nineteenth-century 
Mexico. Although this thesis is not officially part of this project, it has been completed under the supervision of 
Professor Fowler.  
25
 Vázquez, "Un viejo tema”, p.626.  
26
 This can be found online at: http://buscon.rae.es/drael/SrvltGUIBusUsual 
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sublevación militar cuyo objeto es la consecución del poder o, cuando menos, la 
presión que obligue a la sustitución de la política gubernamental. Lo que busca de 
inmediato es el apoyo castrense y por supuesto político, mediante una acción militar 
puntual normalmente de carácter incruento.
27
   
 
Bearing in mind that the majority of significant and successful pronunciamientos were 
carried out by army officers, it is understandable that official references associate and even 
equate the practice with other forms of (mainly armed) insurrection, such as local and 
national coup attempts, barrack uprisings, mutinies, insurrections, conspiracies, rebellions, 
and civil wars.  
As part of the recent trend of studies attempting to rectify the chaos theory of the 
period, this work will prove that the pronunciamiento was not a simple act of armed 
insurrection which was used to take over local and national power, and thus provoking 
instability in the process (as it has traditionally been defined). Instead, this thesis will 
demonstrate that the pronunciamiento was in fact a complex exercise in expressing political 
identity and attempting to achieve political change. Admittedly, several significant 
pronunciamientos did end up in replacing governments (such as La Acordada of 1828 in 
Mexico City which overthrew President Manuel Gómez Pedraza, and in the Yucatecan 
context, the pronunciamiento of 1829 which replaced the entire governing administration 
headed by José Tiburcio López), but this was not the sole aim of the practice, and on most 
occasions the pronunciados did not even state it to be an objective of their pronunciamiento. 
Indeed, pronunciamientos were also used to disobey or contest political and economic 
decrees, demand that a government change its policies (fiscal, economic, moral), manifest the 
removal of support for a particular governing body or political system, demand a new 
political model to run the country, and even demonstrate support for an existing government 
and political system (such as the Yucatecan pronunciamiento of 1833 headed by Francisco de 
Paula Toro, which supported his brother-in-law President Antonio López de Santa Anna and 
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 This can be found online at: http://es.encarta.msn.com/text_76515854580/Pronunciamiento.html 
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the federal system which was then in place). The pronunciamiento‟s main purpose was thus 
not to overthrow, but was a method of political representation and moreover was an exercise 
of negotiation for political change. Indeed, as shall be discovered, while the majority of 
significant pronunciamientos in Yucatán did result in local coups, or had intentions to replace 
the ruling authorities (such as those in 1821, 1829, 1831, 1833 and 1834), nationally they 
were a completely different exercise altogether: attempts at negotiation with the national 
government (this was the case in 1821, 1823, 1829, 1831, 1832, 1834 and 1835).  
This study will also challenge the traditional view that a pronunciamiento (like a 
revolt or a coup) only succeeded because of armed insurrection. The intention of the 
pronunciamiento was not military action, but to threaten the use of armed force in order to 
intimidate those targeted by the pronunciamiento to attend to the demands of the 
pronunciados. The pronunciados included this threat in written form in the pronunciamiento 
plan, a standard accompanying text which outlined the complaints and demands of the 
pronunciados. The pronunciamiento was thus not an outright rebellion, but to use Miguel 
Alonso Báquer‟s phrase, it was a “gesto de rebeldía.”28 Indeed, the only pronunciamientos in 
Yucatán to actually result in violence during the period discussed were those of 1834 and 
1836-1840. Additionally, pronunciamientos not only succeeded because of the threat of 
military force, but through support manifested in pronunciamientos de adhesión 
(pronunciamientos of support) by other communities. These adherences were essential not 
only for the intimidation of governing authorities, but to manifest the liberal belief that the 
will of the people (manifested through the practice of the pronunciamiento) had the 
legitimate right to political representation and contestation.  
This brings yet another debatable point into light. While one should not underestimate 
the role of the military in leading and realising pronunciamientos (indeed, they were the ones 
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 Miguel Alonso Báquer, El modelo español de pronunciamiento (Madrid: Rialp, 1983), p.40. 
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with the men and the resources available to intimidate opposition into listening to their 
demands, and to also pressure lesser powers into producing pronunciamientos de adhesión), 
the pronunciamiento on most occasions was not a strictly military practice. Firstly, evident 
collaboration between civilians and officers existed in most pronunciamientos, with either the 
military being coopted by civilians to realise a pronunciamiento, or because soldiers needed 
the participation of civilians to legitimize their movement and supply resources. As shall be 
discovered, every significant pronunciamiento in Yucatán in the period discussed involved 
not only military officers, but political elite, merchants, clergy, vecinos, landowners, 
campesinos, and even the Maya. Thus, to a major extent, the pronunciamiento was 
undeniably an expression of political ideology and civilian worries. In Fowler‟s words, “To 
argue that Mexican politicians had no serious political ideas or ideals would be superficial as 
well as absurd”, and it will be argued here that the pronunciamiento was one of the most 
graphic ways of demonstrating political ideology.
29
 Moreover, many pronunciamientos de 
adhesión were issued not only by garrisons, but by civilian groups: ayuntamiento officials, 
the business and political elite, and vecinos, who not only seconded the main 
pronunciamiento, but in their pronunciamiento de adhesión text would address their own 
concrete civilian concerns.  
 Consequently, although the pronunciamiento was clearly an extra-constitutional 
practice, this did not mean that it was automatically a vehicle of military and political 
instability as historians have traditionally and generally defined it to be. It was a phenomenon 
which clearly emerged in a context where the constituted political institutions and nascent 
state bureaucracy were, if not non-existent, weak and lacking in authority. In a country which 
had no experience and no faith in constitutional elections, the pronunciamiento seemed like 
the appropriate instrument at the right time to ensure that the voice of the people was 
                                                          
29
 Fowler, Mexico in the Age, p.4. 
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represented. Additionally, since the creation of an independent nation, the pronunciamiento 
was not seen as an out of the ordinary political practice, but simply the common way to 
express political belief. Indeed, it was through a pronunciamiento (the Plan of Iguala) that the 
nation was created; subsequently, the accomplishment of a federal republic in 1823-1824 
through pronunciamientos only sealed the belief in the power of the people and the 
pronunciamiento to form and change the political system of the country. 
Moreover, Mexicans had never experienced self-government before; with a 
pronunciamiento jump-starting the very independent political life of the nation, it is not 
surprising that its pulse would continue to beat throughout the greater part of the nineteenth 
century. Pronunciamientos were responsible for declaring Mexican independence from Spain 
(1821), demanding the empowerment of the provinces and subsequently federalism (1823), 
successfully calling for independence of states from Mexico (such as Texas in 1836 and 
Yucatán in 1840), establishing centralism (1835) and deposing several presidents (such as 
Vicente Guerrero in 1829, Anastasio Bustamante in 1832 and then again in 1841, and 
Antonio López de Santa Anna in 1844). It was consequently not an abnormal practice of 
instability, but a norm of political representation. Indeed, from the 1821 Plan of Iguala to the 
1876 Plan of Tuxtepec which brought about the Porfirio Díaz administration, more than 
1,500 pronunciamientos erupted throughout Mexico. There were constant attempts to 
establish the political system of the nation through legal avenues such as elections and 
constitutions, but it was the pronunciamiento which continued to surface and alter the 
administrative order of the nation. In basic terms, it was simply seen as the way to do politics 
in the early years of independence, as constitutions, elections, decrees, governors, presidents, 
and vice-presidents were frequently both established and overthrown by pronunciamientos. 
In this aspect, Fowler has rightly stated that pronunciamientos were so endemic in the 
nineteenth century that they became “an integral part of Mexican political culture during its 
11 
 
early national period,”30 with François-Xavier Guerra asserting that that the pronunciamiento 
deserves to be viewed as one of the most fundamental political phenomena of nineteenth-
century Mexico because of the fact that “todos los cambios políticos importantes de este 
período, incluidos los constitucionales, tienen su origen en pronunciamientos, empezando por 
la propia independencia.”31   
In particular, the regional aspects of the pronunciamiento deserve special attention. 
As Vázquez has pointed out, the majority of pronunciamientos in nineteenth-century Mexico 
began not in Mexico City, but in the country‟s regions. In her words, “los movimientos 
políticos se generaron siempre en la periferia pero se decidieron en el centro, donde se 
consolidaban los acuerdos.”32 The reasons for this will be discussed in the following chapter, 
but it is important to note here that in spite of the regional element of pronunciamientos, 
historians have continued to concentrate on the way in which they impacted politics in 
Mexico City, disregarding their regional and local dynamic. 
 In more general terms, nineteenth-century political analysis of the regions until 
recently has been ignored. In 1944 Harry Bernstein criticized the tendency for Mexican 
historians to follow the trend of “centralist historiography”, which constituted the habit of 
focusing exclusively on political events in Mexico City and “the Core”, or interpreting events 
of the regions solely in the context of and from the perspective of the centre.
33
 In 1982 Luis 
González called for more regional-based analyses of Mexican history in his works Invitación 
a la microhistoria and Nueva invitación a la microhistoria, with Van Young recently 
advancing this necessity of the re-examination of history through the micro- and local lens 
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rather than interpreting it in terms of macro- and nationally-based perspectives.
34
 As late as 
1998, Allan Wells was also calling for the end of historical analysis desde afuera, asserting 
that what was needed was a view desde adentro.
35
 This propensity towards emphasis on the 
centre was once more due to over-reliance on the nineteenth-century authors mentioned 
above, who were all based in Mexico City and thus related events from the perspective of the 
centre towards the periphery. There was also consequently the natural assumption that 
significant political ideologies and factions were based solely in the centre and not in the 
regions. Historians have consequently depicted political identity during the early independent 
years as, according to Anna, an “artificial construct that suppressed other identities”, with 
works “highly centralist in orientation, patriotic or nationalistic in inspiration”36 taking 
precedence in our interpretation of Mexican history.  
 The current generation of historians has reacted against this traditional centralist 
approach and the “institutional superstructure”37 image, and they are beginning to derail what 
Anna refers to as the “regionalism makes things too murky for words school”.38 According to 
Knight, this new discipline (referred to by Wells as the historia matria)
39
 has made “perhaps 
the biggest contribution in sheer volume of knowledge”40 during the past twenty years or so. 
The focus on regionalism is extremely significant; firstly, as Anna has pointed out, “The 
history of Mexico is a history of its states; its identity is an identity based on states and 
regions.”41 Many tend to forget that “Mexico” was not Mexico City plus many dissident 
states who were only serving to make extra trouble while those in the centre struggled to form 
the political system of the nation. Mexico was – and continues to be – its regions: we cannot 
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understand its early nineteenth-century period without being aware of the political and 
economic objectives and concerns of regions such as Yucatán, Zacatecas, or Veracruz, for 
example. Every region had (and still has) its own particular socio-political, historical, and 
economic context and history; and to use Raymond Buve‟s phrase Mexico was (and is) “an 
archipelago of local societies.”42 Consequently, in order to effectively appreciate nineteenth-
century Mexico, one has to understand the complex realities, differences and similarities of 
its regions during this period.
43
 As Anna highlights, the mexicanidad (Mexican identity) that 
then existed theoretically, was not present in reality in immense parts of the country: Yucatán 
itself had been a province entirely separate from New Spain during the colonial era. A real 
and genuine study of Mexico must there include the examination of its “constituent parts and 
arriving at the whole, rather than looking back from the whole to define the parts.”44  
In terms of regional study, the pronunciamiento until very recently (the past two years 
to be precise) has not been examined. Pronunciamientos which were started in the regions are 
still generally being viewed through the lens of the national administration and how they 
affected national politics, rather than historians concentrating on their local origins, dynamic, 
and consequences. This is indeed surprising as, Peter Guardino has pointed out, “most of the 
pronunciamientos that resulted in changes of government in Mexico from around 1820-1855 
originated in areas other than Mexico City.”45 The powerful capital of the early nineteenth 
century housed an administration which sought to control and impose its will on far-off 
regions (such as Texas, Yucatán and Zacatecas), many of which had previously enjoyed 
relative levels of administrative and economic autonomy during the colonial era. Increased 
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economic demands from the centre and debilitating trade and tariff decrees, along with 
centrally-imposed authorities were among the principal factors which infringed on the 
economic and political power of the elite of these regions, causing significant resentment. 
The desire for a certain level of independence from the Mexican administration combined 
with the constant discontent and disappointment with national administrations led to regional 
power holders forming ideals as to what system optimally benefitted the situation in their 
homeland. These ideals almost always involved a federal system of government, and on some 
occasions, even secession (at which Texas was permanently successful, and Yucatán 
temporarily so). In Anna‟s words, federalism (i.e. increased autonomy from Mexico City) 
was thus “a response by regional oligarchies to assure that their economic power would be 
complemented by political power.”46 The pronunciamientos issued by the regions contesting 
national policies or administrations were consequently traditionally viewed by those of the 
centre as disobedient practices, provoking unnecessary instability and unrest. As a result, 
historians have either ignored or disregarded the local historical and sociopolitical 
circumstances which inspired these pronunciamientos with regard to their regional actors, 
origins, and motivations, along with the consequences which they had on their respective 
territories. For example, while existing historiography has highlighted that the 1829 
Campechean pronunciamiento in its surprising call for centralism had no impact at a national 
level (except to cause condemnation from the centre followed by numerous efforts to 
reincorporate Yucatán into the Mexican fold), we are not informed of what local motivations 
were behind this mystifying demand.   
Yucatán‟s pronunciamientos especially have been slotted into this category of 
dismissal and negativity, due to the region‟s reputation as one of the more peripheral and pro-
autonomous areas of Mexico. Situated more than a 1,000 km from Mexico City and on the 
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south-eastern tip of the country (see Map 1), Yucatán has traditionally been “regarded as 
more marked in its regional identity than any other entity within the republic.”47 It was an 
entirely different province from that of New Spain during the colonial era, possessing its own 
political and economic agendas and administrations.
48
 Indeed, it was not until the end of 
World War II that the region was even connected by land with the rest of Mexico. 
Yucatecans had also petitioned on more than one occasion (1847 and 1914) to become a 
protectorate of the United States, arguing that they had more in common geographically and 
economically with the North Americans than they did with the Mexican republic.
49
 It is of no 
surprise then that Yucatán‟s traditional isolation has been extended to and has biased the 
academic realm as well.
50
 Political history on the region concentrating on post-independent 
years has stressed the constant clashes of authority between the Yucatecan elites and the 
Mexican administration over the dictation of the peninsula‟s policies with regard to 
administration and trade. The desire of the region‟s elites to possess a relative level of local 
power (meaning freedom from interference and potentially harmful decrees from Mexico 
City) versus severe dependence on financial aid from and trade relations with Mexico 
dominates the political history of the region. The region‟s remote location and its numerous 
secessions from Mexico (1823, 1829 and 1840) have thus led to a one-dimensional 
perspective of the region in the historian‟s mind: as a territory forever seeking to be 
autonomous, and making no effort at negotiation to unite with Mexico.   
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Map 1 – Mexico Source: Mark Wasserman, 
Everyday Life and Politics in 
Nineteenth Century Mexico. 
Men, Women, and War 
(Albuquerque: The University 
of New Mexico Press, 2000). 
  
The marginal location of Yucatán did not make it any exception to pronunciamientos; 
from 1821-1840, there were more than 50 pronunciamientos realised in the region, with the 
most significant pronunciamientos occurring in either Yucatán‟s capital of Mérida, or its 
sister city Campeche (with the exception of the Santiago Imán pronunciamiento of 1836-
1840 which was issued in the eastern city of Valladolid).
51
 Viewed from the traditional 
perspective of nineteenth-century inhabitants of Mexico City, Yucatán‟s pronunciamientos 
have generally been categorized as national forces of dissent and instability, demonstrating a 
general Yucatecan lack of desire to unite with Mexico. While the pronunciamiento of 1821 
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(carried out in both Mérida and Campeche) seconded Agustín Iturbide‟s Plan of Iguala for 
independence, Yucatecans initially hesitated on joining Mexico, giving those of the centre the 
impression of their instinct for a separate Yucatecan independence. The 1823 
pronunciamientos (also carried out in the two principal cities of Yucatán) seconding the Plan 
of Casa Mata (which called for the empowerment of the Provincial Deputations) and 
subsequently demanding federalism were also seen by the politicians of Mexico City as 
forces of Yucatecan autonomy. The isolated and unsuccessful 1829 pronunciamiento of 
Campeche calling for centralism mystified those in the centre, who saw it as a nuisance and 
inconvenience, with the consequences being Yucatán‟s partial secession from Mexico for 
almost three years. The 1836-1840 Santiago Imán revolt which resulted in Yucatán´s 
independence from Mexico was seen by Mexicans as the epitome of the unstable relations 
which had existed between Mexico and Yucatán since their unification in 1821, with the 
Santa Anna administration subsequently directing the Mexican invasion of Yucatán of 1842-
1843 to reclaim the land. If Yucatán did follow the general trend of seconding national 
pronunciamientos, its pronunciados were simply seen as adhering to a greater movement; 
indeed the 1832 pronunciamiento of Mérida calling for federalism, and the 1834-1835 
pronunciamientos of Campeche supporting centralism were interpreted by the Mexicans of 
the centre as practices simply seconding larger national pronunciamientos, without any local 
motivations of their own.  
This study will, however, analyse the pronunciamiento from the perspective of the 
Yucatecan pronunciados (the region‟s elites),52 altering its traditional depiction from the 
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national angle and from the viewpoint of the centre. This work will discover that in their 
majority, Yucatecan pronunciamientos were not secessionist attempts by regional caudillos, 
but were instead politically-based efforts by its elites to negotiate with Mexico in order to 
achieve political change. Indeed, the 1821, 1823, 1829 and 1840 pronunciamientos all used 
secession as a direct or indirect threat if the national administrations did not attend to their 
demands of beneficial trade terms (as in 1821), or federalism (1823 and 1840), or centralism 
(1829). This work will consequently argue that secession was in reality a tool of negotiation 
in the Yucatecan pronunciamiento practice, not a tangible desire when it came to the political 
ideology of the majority of the Yucatecan elite.
53
 In this vein, the Yucatecan 
pronunciamiento will be viewed not as an instrument of dissent, but as a tool used in national 
political negotiation, motivated by local political ideologies and social concerns, as part of 
the process of – to use Anna‟s phraseology – the attempts to “forge” the new nation. The 
subsequent chapters will thus justify regional elites‟ actions towards the centre as legitimate 
aims and demands, not as negative forces of dissent. Prime examples of this validation are the 
motivations of the Yucatecan merchants; inhabiting a land which was poor in resources, a 
healthy trade was vital for the economic and material survival of those in the region. The 
pronunciamientos of 1821, 1823, 1824, 1829 and 1840 were as a result all motivated in some 
way by the wishes of Yucatecan merchants for improved trade tariffs and the maintenance of 
trade between Yucatán and its principal commercial partner Cuba.   
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This analysis will in turn contribute towards dismantling the “disintegration” theory of 
early nineteenth-century Mexican history, which has traditionally blamed disobedient and 
self-seeking regional elites for threatening the centre and provoking unnecessary instability 
during this period. Original information will be provided on how events in Mexico City were 
perceived by and affected the periphery, in a territory with its own political and economic 
objectives (what Anna refers to as the “provincial patria, [(] which often took precedence 
over those of the national patria[)].)”54 It will follow the line of Nettie Lee Benson‟s proposal 
that the tendency of Mexico City to constantly impose its desires on the regions was the real 
cause of instability, not vice versa, as has traditionally been seen. In her words: 
When historians awake to the fact that much is yet to be learned about what actually 
occurred during the period of 1810-1857, perhaps someone will investigate the 
overwhelming desire of Mexico City and its immediate area to control all of Mexico 
and will see this desire as a significant factor in the chaos of the period.
55
  
 
In fact, Vázquez points out that what should be focused on is the fact that Mexico remained 
united in the most part after independence: 
a pesar de varias crisis profundas, sin seguir el patrón que afectó a otras colonias, 
fragmentadas a lo largo de las líneas de las audiencias o de las intendencias. El caso es 
sorprendente dado que el enorme territorio novohispano había propiciado un 
regionalismo que fortaleció el establecimiento de las intendencias y de las 
diputaciones provinciales más como la lucha independentista, pero que pudo sortear la 
fórmula federalista de 1824.
56
  
 
This unified state was in part due to Yucatán‟s constant attempts to remain united with 
Mexico with terms beneficial to its elites, not to secede from it and become independent 
(indeed, Yucatán united with Mexico in 1821, and reunited with it in 1824, 1832 and 1843). 
Not only have the region‟s pronunciamientos simply been viewed as exercises in 
autonomy, but their local character, impulses, practice and consequences have been heavily 
ignored. This has led to little knowledge available of the pronunciamiento as a local political 
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tool rather than one of simple national political change. The fact that the majority of 
Yucatecan pronunciamientos were “home-grown” (that is to say their impulses stemmed 
almost always from within rather than without) implies that local factors had an extremely 
significant part to play in the inspiration and realization of these practices, which naturally 
also had significant local consequences. Despite being influenced by Mexican politics and 
economic decrees, Yucatán‟s peripheral location still allowed for the development of a strong 
local political society. This community had its own internal political divisions, and a majority 
of Yucatecan elites also possessed economic agendas distinct from those in Mexico. Indeed, 
independence in 1821 brought with it the opportunities for criollos (in Yucatán and Mexico) 
to occupy positions of substantial political power, and it soon became evident that the way to 
obtain this power was not through elections, but through pronunciamientos. Consequently, 
endless factional bickering in peninsular politics (or the state‟s “political carousel” as Wells 
prefers to call it)
57
 led to factions continually using the pronunciamiento to gain governing 
and military positions in the region, in order to implement their own political agendas. By the 
mid 1820s the two main opposing factions in Yucatán were the radical and federal Liga, and 
the moderate liberal Camarilla; by the 1830s, the ligados and some camarilleros then formed 
the federalist party, with their opposition being the centralists (constituted of the rest of the 
camarilleros and many Campecheans who had remained staunchly centralist throughout the 
early independent years). Almost all significant pronunciamientos which occurred between 
1821-1840 (with the exception of the pronunciamientos of 1823) in some way targeted the 
opposing political faction of the pronunciados, be it to overthrow them (1821, 1829, 1831, 
1832, 1833, 1834, 1840), or to protest against their governance of the region (1824); indeed 
local congresses, ayuntamientos, governors and comandantes generales were constantly 
replaced through the pronunciamiento. To ignore the local factors behind these 
                                                          
57
 Wells, “Forgotten Chapters”, p.216. 
21 
 
pronunciamientos would evidently risk neglecting the comprehension of the more complex 
uses, actors, consequences, and dynamic of this practice in a specifically Yucatecan context.  
The primary aim of this thesis is to therefore expose the true dynamic of the 
Yucatecan pronunciamiento, viewing it simultaneously as a force of national negotiation, and 
as a practice in which deep-rooted local issues were resolved. It is essential to study these 
elements together, as in many cases local issues (such as trade, economy, and political 
ideologies) intricately interweaved with the national political momentum and circumstances 
of the time, consequently producing a pronunciamiento. In this manner, this study will 
enhance one‟s understanding of the exercise of the pronunciamiento with regard to its 
dynamic (origins, actors, process, consequences, and memory) in a specific Yucatecan 
context. This work will consequently expose the Yucatecan pronunciamiento not just as a 
national exercise, but as a local practice, having, in Anna‟s words, a “dual identity.”58 The 
results gathered from this examination can in turn be applied to more universal questions 
about the regional pronunciamiento, contributing to the revision of current theories which 
perceive regional pronunciamientos as simply practices of dissent from states to centre. It 
will prompt the reinterpretation of regional pronunciamientos as subjects which deserve to be 
examined as processes and products of intimate local ambitions, with their own idiosyncratic 
dynamic and particular regional flavour and repertoire. While stressing the Yucatecan 
singularity and exceptionality in this case, and keeping in mind that the context in every 
region would have been different, this study will nevertheless inspire an attempt of 
establishment of the typology of the pronunciamiento in other regions of Mexico.   
Additionally, a detailed examination of the pronunciamiento in this context will 
contribute to an only recently opened window of understanding into Yucatecan political 
mentalities and events during this period (such as pronunciamientos, the sentiment towards 
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the centre, inter-regional conflict, and indigenous participation in insurrection). The 
pronunciamiento occurred at every time of significant political change of the region during 
this period (including independence in 1821, federalism in 1823-1824, secession in 1829, 
federalism in 1832, centralism in 1834-1835, and independence in 1840), and thus it can be 
used to attempt to comprehend the burning issues in Yucatán at the time. As Wells has 
highlighted, “the study of regional society in times of crisis provides a valuable opportunity 
to probe power relationships within the dominant class.”59 This work will thus expose that 
real ideologies of federalism, secession, and even centralism existed in the region, with 
factions having serious ideals, objectives and aims, with all of them desiring Yucatecan 
development, and the majority wanting beneficial relations with Mexico.  
Finally, it is useful to note what has already been written about Yucatecan politics 
during this period. As Gilbert Joseph has stated, it is an area which has in major part been 
ignored; the rejection of “elitist” Yucatecan political history has been generally due to 
extensive socio-ethnic study of the Yucatecan Maya which began in the 1940s. Howard Cline 
began this trend with his groundbreaking 700-page thesis on the origins of the Caste War,
60
 
prompting a goldrush of sorts to examine the history of the indigenous “people without 
history,” with authors such as Robert Redfield, Alfonso Villa Rojas, Victoria Bricker, Nelson 
Reed, and Grant D. Jones being a few of the many who have concentrated on the history and 
culture of the Maya during the nineteenth century.
61
 In this socio-cultural obsession with the 
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Maya, according to Wells, “Cline and his progeny” have almost thrown “the baby out with 
the bathwater”.62 Gilbert Joseph has thus significantly called for: 
alternative theoretical and conceptual strategies for reinterpreting the study of political 
history in Yucatán from 1800 to 1876; to meld political history with what we have 
learned over the last fifty years about the region‟s social and economic history, and to 
compare what happened in the peninsula to what we now know transpired in the 
national political arena and in other regions.
63
  
 
Indeed, it should be remembered that the Maya still inhabited a region which was deeply 
politically fragmented and unstable, and economically weak, and it would be the ultimate 
failure of regional elites to agree on a common vision for the future which would in large part 
contribute to engendering the Caste War of 1847. Additionally, one should recall that 
Yucatán was not an entity onto itself, but part of and inescapably linked to Mexico; the 
connection between the state and the nation was through its political and military elites, as 
these were the men who were sent to national congress, and who were responsible for 
implementing national decrees (and were also those who developed opposition to those 
decrees). Indeed, as Guardino has pointed out, “the state, although national in conception, 
was (and is) experienced historically through the actions of individual local officials.”64 
There have been a handful of political studies of nineteenth-century Yucatán over the 
past two decades which demonstrate that elite politics now needs to emerge from its long 
hibernation;
65
 and in the words of Wells, it is rightly time “to gently swing the pendulum 
back” to political study.66   
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Chapter One will attempt to comprehensively review the general theories which 
already exist on the pronunciamiento in terms of its nature and dynamics. It will also explain 
how this thesis‟ definition of the pronunciamiento differs from the generally established 
view, with emphasis on its origins, its main actors and motivations, its process and 
development, and its consequences. Additionally, the typology of the Yucatecan 
pronunciamiento will be introduced and compared to that of the general pronunciamiento 
theory which exists. The salient characteristics of the Yucatecan pronunciamiento (which will 
be expanded throughout this thesis) will also be exposed. This chapter will also outline how 
the pronunciamiento became established in Mexico, and also how, and more importantly why 
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it became such a popular instrument to accomplish political change and express political 
beliefs.  
The following chapters will follow a chronological outline and analysis of the 
pronunciamientos in Yucatán from the year of 1821 (Yucatán‟s first independence) to 1840 
(its second independence). This chronological approach has been adopted for several reasons. 
The Yucatecan pronunciamientos evolve throughout the period discussed in terms of 
motivations, actors, and practice. While in the early 1820s, it was part of a national call for 
change of the Mexican political system, in the late 1820s and the early 1830s, its aims 
became increasingly focused on the occupation of local political and military positions. 
Additionally, there is a constant and growing presence of the military and military force in 
the exercise, which can only be effectively illustrated through a chronological approach. 
Finally, the divide between political and regional factions in Yucatán becomes increasingly 
stark and violent in these early independent years, once more meriting an evolutionary 
approach. It is thus more useful to employ the chronological approach in order to highlight 
most effectively how the practice was adopted and changed throughout the period discussed, 
rather than concentrating on individual aspects and themes. 
Chapter Two focuses on the forging of the pronunciamiento ideology in Yucatán, 
along with the first Yucatecan pronunciamiento to occur: that of independence in 1821. This 
chapter serves to demonstrate how insurrection ideology was introduced to the region, and 
how it applied to the majority of sectors in their bid for independence from Spain. The 1821 
pronunciamiento was notably part of a larger movement occurring throughout Mexico, thus 
illustrating the initially national influence on the inspiration of the practice in Yucatán. It also 
serves to highlight the presence of political ideologies behind the practice from the very 
beginning, fortifying the argument that the pronunciamiento was above all a political 
expression.  
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Chapter Three demonstrates the first shift in the phase of the pronunciamiento, with it 
gradually becoming a more regionally than nationally based exercise. It concentrates on the 
pronunciamientos of 1823 (which originated in the regions in protest to the centralist Iturbide 
administration) which eventually resulted in the establishment of a federal system 
(emphasizing the presence of a serious and heavy federalist ideology in Yucatán). The section 
dedicated to the pronunciamiento of 1824 (also concentrated on in this chapter) analyses an 
even deeper sub-level of the pronunciamiento, as it became transferred from a regional 
practice to a more local practice. In this experience, the Campecheans pronounced 
specifically against the Meridians for refusing to obey Mexican law; so while the reasons 
behind the pronunciamiento were set in the national context of relations between Yucatán 
and Mexico, the target and demands of the pronunciamiento were local.   
Chapter Four concentrates on the Campechean-inspired centralist pronunciamiento of 
1829. Being one of the most extraordinary pronunciamientos of early nineteenth-century 
Yucatán, it signified one of the most significant developments of the pronunciamiento with 
regard to origins, actors, methods to guarantee success, and consequences; hence, it deserves 
a chapter all unto itself. This chapter will demonstrate that this was the first Yucatecan 
pronunciamiento to not only call for centralism nationally (something undeniably distinct in 
the Yucatecan case, and the reason behind this will be examined in detail), but it was the first 
pronunciamiento to overthrow the Yucatecan governing administration. It thus indicated the 
beginning of the dual use of the pronunciamiento to simultaneously lobby for national 
political change, while calling for the dismissal of local authorities. This chapter moreover 
demonstrates the increasing importance which military force held in this practice, as the 
military were the main instigators of the pronunciamiento, and used their rank and power in 
order to ensure its success. Nevertheless, the image of the pronunciamiento as an exercise led 
by military caudillos will not be defended, as it will be stressed that the majority of these 
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army officers were also politicians and merchants. It will be demonstrated that the 
pronunciamiento also involved significant civilian participation, as it was initially heavily 
motivated by the ideology of the small centralist party in Yucatán.  
The illustration of the significance of localism and military force in the 
pronunciamiento provided by Chapter Four then leads naturally to another evolutionary 
phase of the practice. Chapters Five and Six concentrate on the pronunciamientos of 1831 
and 1832 (Chapter Five) and on those of 1833, 1834 and 1835 (Chapter Six). These 
pronunciamientos degenerated into predominantly local battles for political power between 
the federalists and the centralists, as the Meridian pronunciamientos of 1831 and 1832 (with 
the latter successfully demanding federalism) called for the dismissal of the authorities in 
power. The centralists consequently retaliated, with the Campechean-based pronunciamientos 
of 1833 and 1834 (with that of 1834 attaining victory) having as their objectives the 
overthrow of the federalists ruling the peninsula, and the establishment of the centralists in 
their place. Despite the presence of local factionalism, these pronunciamientos were all 
intimately linked to national ideologies of federalism and centralism permeating throughout 
Mexico (indeed, the pronunciamiento of 1835 was part of a larger movement to cement the 
centralist system in Mexico). Furthermore, rather than depicting these factions as power-
hungry and violent, it will become apparent that they had justifiable protection of their 
interests in mind, along with a steadfast belief in their political ideologies. 
This is not to say that the military influence in the pronunciamiento will be 
downplayed; in fact the successful pronunciamientos of this period were only victorious 
because of the power of the military in enforcing the pronunciamiento. The pronunciamiento 
of 1834 actually resulted in civil war between the federalist and centralist military. These 
pronunciamientos consequently illustrate the weakness of the governing institutions in the 
face of powerful military pronunciados, as ruling authorities were overthrown in 1829, 1832 
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and 1834 in the face of powerful military threats or violence. Additionally, while local factors 
were behind the support for the pronunciamientos of 1832 and 1834, their actual instigation 
depended on powers from without, as they only succeeded because Commander General 
Francisco de Paula Toro was following orders from brother-in-law President Santa Anna to 
pronounce. This highlights that while these two pronunciamientos were motivated by local 
factors, their success was still intimately linked with dependence on national ideology and 
movements (indeed, the pronunciamiento of 1829 had failed in its call for centralism as an 
isolated Yucatecan pronunciamiento).  
Chapters Two to Six thus illustrate that these pronunciamientos were concerned with 
elite politicking, contained in the major cities of Mérida and Campeche as their politicians, 
businessmen, and military struggled to retain control of the region. The opinions, ideology, 
ideas and motivations of an outspoken elite minority dominated these exercises, excluding 
the lower classes from political practices in the principal cities. Without a doubt, the majority 
of the population (the Maya) were not educated in political ideologies, and the ayuntamientos 
of the smaller towns were simply there to provide passive support through their 
pronunciamientos de adhesión (indeed, they possessed little fiscal and military resources and 
were consequently powerless to contest a pronunciamiento issued by a major city). Until the 
mid-1830s, the Yucatecan pronunciamiento was thus in large part a strictly elite practice.  
This was to change in the final pronunciamiento discussed in this work and which 
occupies Chapter Seven: the Santiago Imán revolt of 1836-1840. This was the most 
outstanding Yucatecan pronunciamiento for several reasons; although the Imán revolt began 
as an elite pronunciamiento by the eastern landowner and military figure Santiago Imán (who 
was protesting against his workers and soldiers being sent to Texas to fight against the 
secessionist state), it quickly evolved into a popular movement. Imán‟s protest had also 
appealed to the soldiers of the east – who in their majority belonged to the campesino class – 
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who themselves did not want to go to Texas. Additionally, Imán coopted the Maya into his 
movement in order to gain manpower, consequently including their demands in the 
pronunciamiento text. Aside from being the only popularly-motivated pronunciamiento to 
occur in Yucatán during this period, and the only pronunciamiento to originate in the east 
(i.e. not in the major cities of Mérida and Campeche), the Imán revolt was the sole movement 
to result in Yucatán‟s complete independence from Mexico, with the region establishing its 
own constitution for several years. This chapter thus highlights several novel elements 
concerning the case of exceptionality of the Yucatecan pronunciamiento in terms of place 
and purpose of origins, actors, and demands. It also demonstrates that this exceptionality was 
not to be admitted in Yucatán, as Imán‟s popular movement would be hijacked by the 
Meridian federalist political elite, to be used as their own political tool to regain local power 
from the centralists and secede from Mexico. This pronunciamiento finally illustrates the 
climax of the fragile relations between Yucatán and Mexico which had been developing since 
independence.  
This work will thus reveal the Yucatecan pronunciamiento not as a national practice 
engendering instability, but an intensive exercise in political negotiation and representation. 
Additionally, it will be discovered that the Yucatecan pronunciamiento was a heavily local 
practice; pronunciados not only used it to lobby for their ideologies of federalism or 
centralism (with secession as a threat), but used it as an instrument in elite politicking. 
Indeed, elites used the practice to gain local political power, to control the state treasury, and 
to implement their own political ideologies and commercial interests. The increasing 
dominance of the military and military violence in the origin, exercise, and consequences of 
the practice throughout the period discussed will also emerge, but this work will discourage 
the traditional definition of the pronunciamiento as a military practice, as it will demonstrate 
that not only was the political-military dichotomy severely blurred, but civilians also had 
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their own significant parts to play in the practice. Finally, the Yucatecan pronunciamientos‟ 
dependence on and links with Mexican politics and pronunciamientos will demonstrate the 
permeable and enduring influence of the “mainland” on the peninsula. This will contribute to 
challenging the theory that Yucatán was one of the more pro-autonomous regions in 
nineteenth-century Mexico. All these factors will hopefully not only contribute to our 
definition of what constituted the Yucatecan pronunciamiento, but will aid in the 
understanding of Yucatecan politics, ultimately contributing to one‟s comprehension of that 
constantly elusive, fascinating, and maddeningly intriguing picture, which one refers to as 
nineteenth-century Mexico.  
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1 
Understanding the Pronunciamiento 
 
Los pueblos se gobiernan más por costumbres  
que por leyes; así entre nosotros los 
 pronunciamientos y los gritos 
 van siendo nuestra ley fundamental.
67
 
 
The pronunciamiento was one of the most powerful yet destabilizing political 
practices of early nineteenth-century Mexico. Through the power of the written word 
combined with the threatened use of military violence, the pronunciamiento was used to 
address local and national political, economic, and societal grievances, and in so doing, 
achieve political change (sometimes successful, other times not). It was a fluid and varied 
practice, which evolved throughout the early nineteenth century, as sectors from across the 
spectrum of society used and exploited the pronunciamiento to represent their voices and 
opinions, and to negotiate for the changes which they desired. It is thus difficult to establish 
concrete features and purposes of the pronunciamiento in Mexico. Nevertheless, this chapter 
will attempt to establish a general typology of this phenomenon. Firstly, a systematic critical 
review of what has been said about the pronunciamiento to-date will be provided. This 
work‟s interpretation of the pronunciamiento will follow, with emphasis on how the exercise 
conforms with and differs from its traditional historiography. Finally, the particular 
characteristics of the Yucatecan pronunciamiento will be established, with stress on how it 
fits into the typology established, and the ways in which it is distinct from the existing 
perspectives on the characteristics and purposes of this exercise. 
The majority of official dictionary and encyclopaedic sources maintain a standard 
definition of the pronunciamiento: as a military coup. The Real Academia Española for 
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example cites it as an “Alzamiento militar contra el Gobierno, promovido por un jefe del 
Ejército u otro caudillo,”68 while the Diccionario de historia de España states it to be a:  
Sublevación de un jefe del ejército, que prevalido del mando que ejerce, saca sus 
tropas a la calle, con objeto de cambiar mediante la violencia o la simple amenaza, la 
política del Gobierno existente o incluso derribarlo para sustituirlo por otro, 
generalmente el del propio sublevado.
69
  
Granted that the most successful pronunciamientos in Spain and Mexico were realised 
and headed by members of the military, it is understandable that traditional definitions have 
specified the practice as a military one (or more specifically as one where army officers 
overpower governing administrations through force in order to gain power). Moreover, with 
the armed forces being the only institutions that had the means (men and weapons) to present 
a tangible threat of force if their demands were not attended to, it was only logical that the 
most successful pronunciamientos were realised by the military. This led François-Xavier 
Guerra to declare that “El documento primigenio de todo pronunciamiento, el “plan”, es 
siempre de origen militar,”70 a view which Vázquez has also supported, as she states that 
Mexican pronunciamientos “were, almost in their entirety, launched by the army.”71 
Traditional pronunciamiento definitions have also highlighted the intervention of the army in 
political realms, as the Diccionario de Historia de España states the pronunciamiento to be 
an “Injerencia franca y violenta del Ejército o una parte de él en la política interior de la 
nación empleando la fuerza nacional en beneficio de un partido, un bando, un grupo, un 
individuo.”72 The Diccionario de la Lengua upholds this political importance as it explains 
the pronunciamiento to be “Una forma de golpe militar asestado contra el poder para 
                                                          
68
Real Academia Española, Diccionario de la lengua española, vigésima segunda edición, Online, 
http://buscon.rae.es/draeI/SrvltGUIBusUsual?TIPO_HTML=2&TIPO_BUS=3&LEMA=pronunciamiento. 
69
 Vázquez, “Political Plans and Collaboration between Civilians and the Military, 1821-1846”, Bulletin of Latin 
American Research, Vol.15, No.1, Special Issue: Mexican Politics in the Nineteenth Century (1996), p.20. 
70
 Guerra, “El pronunciamiento”, p.17.  
71
 Vázquez, “Political Plans”, p.24.   
72
 Báquer, El modelo español, p.33.  
33 
 
introducir en él reformas políticas, propia de la Historia española del siglo XIX.”73 Báquer 
has also inferred that in this sense the pronunciamiento is interpreted as a “Rebeldía de 
mandos profesionales, propugnada por grupos políticos convencidos de que el gesto de los 
oficiales, al contar con la adhesión de opinión pública, conducirá, sin daños ni riesgos, a la 
paz social y a la reforma política”.74   
This highly militaristic interpretation of pronunciamientos has led to historians 
traditionally classifying it as one of the main causes of political turbulence in nineteenth-
century Mexico, as they link and equate it to local and national coup attempts, barrack 
uprisings, mutinies, insurrections, conspiracies, rebellions, and civil wars. The heavy military 
presence in Mexican politics and pronunciamientos was indeed undeniable; the decade-long 
War of Independence from 1810-1821 had resulted not only in a militarised society, but a 
politicised military; military individuals who had been granted powerful titles such as the 
rank of generals during the war also had significant political control over their territories 
during that period.
75
 By the time of independence in 1821, military officers had thus become 
accustomed to exerting their political influence over their regions, using force on several 
occasions to solve political disputes. Independence was no reason to stop this trend; on the 
contrary, with the army accomplishing independence through a pronunciamiento, they 
became convinced that this was the standard way to do politics. Consequently, throughout the 
nineteenth century, the military would become a principal political actor, using the 
pronunciamiento as their main (and only) method to intervene in and direct politics. As 
Vázquez has noted:  
El ejército se atribuyó a la independencia y se autoconstituyó en su garante y, por 
tanto, con derecho a expresar “la voluntad de la nación.” El prestigio que logró y el 
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poder que le daba el monopolio del uso de la violencia, hizo que las facciones 
acudieran a él para promover los cambios políticos ambicionados para proteger sus 
intereses o sus posiciones ideológicas.
76
  
Mexican historians have consequently traditionally perceived the pronunciamiento practice to 
be a widespread and negative military exercise of instability, which toppled and challenged 
constitutional and lawful authorities, resulting in armed violence, looting, and even civil war.  
This chapter will, however, challenge the traditional view that the Mexican 
pronunciamiento was a purely militaristic and unstable practice. While in some cases a 
pronunciamiento indeed did result in a coup (such as in 1828 in Mexico where Vicente 
Guerrero replaced President Manuel Gómez Pedraza, and in 1829 in Yucatán, where 
Commander of Arms José Segundo Carvajal overthrew President José Tiburcio López), and 
the military realised almost all successful pronunciamientos (provoking instability on a few 
occasions, such as the civil wars in Mexico in 1832 and in 1834 in Yucatán), the following 
arguments will be made here: that the pronunciamiento was a. An extremely ritualistic and 
planned exercise, not a spontaneous revolt, b. Not a coup, but a practice of political and 
forceful negotiation, c. Not a purely military practice, but involved heavy and significant 
civilian support (with some pronunciamientos even being purely civilian practices), and d. It 
was consequently an instrument demonstrating political representation and the desire for 
political change from many varied sectors; in this sense it was seen as liberal i.e a tangible 
form of expressing the “will of the people”. It is necessary to establish these ways in which 
the pronunciamiento differed from its traditional definitions and associations in order to 
discover its true dynamic which has been misrepresented for decades. Moreover, it is 
essential to do this in order to explain why both military officers and civilians used the 
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practice so profusely to effect political change and represent political identity throughout 
early nineteenth-century Mexico.   
The pronunciamiento differed from spontaneous levantamientos and insurrections 
primarily in the fact that it was a strikingly ritualistic exercise; the pronunciamiento had to 
follow a specific set of procedures and steps in order to be classified as “a pronunciamiento”. 
Admittedly, although there were slight variations of pattern and process, the procedural steps 
from start to finish were generally as follows. Disgruntled members of a sector or sectors 
would seek out support from other individuals in the first and conspiratorial stage known as 
the trabajos. This support could be financially, ideologically, or militarily oriented, and was 
necessary in order to give the pronunciamiento the greatest possible chance at success. 
Pronunciados incorporated potential supporters through underhanded bribery or overt 
cooption, usually involving promises of personal gain and rewards, often referred to as 
compromisos. Once it was believed that sufficient support had been obtained, all those 
involved attended a meeting (usually held in a garrison or ayuntamiento) where the issues and 
grievances could be addressed. A secretary was appointed to take the minutes of the meeting, 
which would constitute the Acta of the pronunciamiento once it was launched.
77
  
 The pronunciamiento was then written, outlining the conclusions which arose from 
the meeting, and justifying why it had become necessary to pronounce. It usually claimed that 
it represented the popular will of the people, and then proceeded to list the demands proposed 
to rectify the problematic situation. An explicit or veiled threat of more drastic action was 
typically included, if the requested demands were not met. The signatures of the 
pronunciados then followed, lending an air of potent legitimacy as the text tangibly 
represented the will of the people. The grito was then launched, as the pronunciamiento was 
called out to crowds in the place where it had been formulated, with copies of the plan 
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circulated to important political and military bodies such as state and national 
administrations, ayuntamientos, and garrisons. It was usually published in the press or in 
pamphlets which were distributed among the public.
78
 This was to ensure that the institution 
against which the pronunciados were protesting would become aware of the 
pronunciamiento, and also in order to gather support from other communities through 
pronunciamientos de adhesión (pronunciamientos pledging allegiance to the main 
pronunciamiento). Depending on the strength of support which the pronunciamiento was able 
to gather (in terms of military, political, or ideological support), or its power to intimidate the 
body to which it was directed, the pronunciamiento either triumphed or failed.
79
 A quote 
from German botanist Karl Heller who was travelling through Yucatán in the 1840s, in the 
thick of pronunciamientos, will support this impression of ritual. In his words, it constituted 
of: 
a procession in the street, which proclaims the change of administration and to which, 
as everywhere, a mob of the lowest rabble attaches itself. The city, whether it wanted 
to or not, had to adhere to the new plan, since the revolution emanated from the real 
ruler, the military.
80
 
 
In a more general definition, Jaime Balmes describes the ritual of pronunciamiento as 
follows:  
Se da un grito en un punto cualquiera, se constituye una Junta, se formula un 
programa, se declara independiente la población pronunciada, y se exhorta a la nación 
a que imite el ejemplo. La noticia circula, los ánimos se agitan, se pronuncia otra 
ciudad, y luego otra, y después otra, y al cabo de pocos días se halla el gobierno 
supremo circunscrito al breve espacio donde puede alcanzar su vista. Obligado a 
capitular, a abandonar el puesto, suben al poder otros hombres, sale a la luz un 
manifiesto, las juntas felicitan, el nuevo gobierno les manda que se disuelvan y ellas 
obedecen, y la función se ha concluido.
81
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These procedures and lengthy preparations constitute one of the aspects which would 
differentiate the pronunciamiento from an otherwise spontaneous and potentially violent 
asonada (protest) or revolt. They also mimicked the prolonged constitutional procedures of 
parliaments and congress, giving the pronunciamiento that semblance of legality and 
legitimacy which it needed to negotiate with the ruling authorities.   
It is important here to highlight the significance of the presence of the 
pronunciamiento text. A pronunciamiento was not a pronunciamiento without a text; one 
cannot underestimate the necessity to tangibly imitate constitutional bureaucratic procedures, 
in order give a sense of validity to the practice. Furthermore, the text served to make the 
pronunciamiento‟s ideals and demands seem as impersonal as possible; the more vague the 
connection with the pronunciados, the better. Consequently, when supporters adhered to the 
pronunciamiento they claimed to second the ideals and demands outlined in the text. 
Moreover, the text was one of the features which signalled that the practice was not a revolt, 
but a pronunciamiento. It consequently demonstrated to all authorities that they were dealing 
with legitimate negotiating bodies, not unruly rebels. The text thus served to justify an 
unlawful act. As Fowler has stated, these “formulistic and formulaic procedures, and easily 
recognizable generic-driven texts” meant that although the pronunciamiento could result in, 
or be part of any one of the insurrectionary tactics listed above, the practice itself was distinct 
and different because it “followed the prescriptive meta-institutional mould” which came into 
being in Mexico.
82
  
Additionally, while the pronunciamiento was a rebellious act, whether it transformed 
into rebellion itself is another matter. While some pronunciamientos resulted in coups, 
looting, and civil war, the fact remains that the majority of pronunciamientos did not result in 
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any of these events and did not provoke extensive violence. The objective of the 
pronunciados was not to outrightly revolt and overthrow the government, but instead to state 
in their texts the threat of rebellion unless their grievances were heard and rectified. These 
grievances were not always concerned with toppling the government either; while they could 
consist of calling for the president or governor to resign from office, they also were 
complaints about specific administrative or economic policies of the ruling administration, or 
petitions for a change of political system itself (federalist or centralist). Indeed, the Plans of 
Casa Mata (1823), Jalapa (1829), and Veracruz (January 1832) did not initially threaten the 
ruling president, but asked for demands more concerned with the change of the political 
system. Additionally, they all directly or indirectly threatened the use of force if the ruling 
authorities did not attend to their requests. The Plan of Veracruz in 1832 only resulted in 
year-long civil war because the national administration refused to grant the pronunciados‟ 
stipulations (on the contrary, the national army was sent to crush the pronunciados). To use 
Fowler‟s phrase, the pronunciamiento was thus a tool of “forceful negotiation”,83 and not 
outright revolt. Its objective was to instead pressure the government into listening to the 
pronunciados‟ demands and negotiating with the challengers. In this sense, as Báquer has 
pointed out, it was a “manifiesto intimidador”, a practice of negotiating under intimidation.84  
The pronunciamiento was also not a strictly military practice. Scholars have recently 
begun to reveal that the Mexican pronunciamiento involved not only military participation, 
but heavy and significant civilian support. Perhaps the most useful study to look at here is 
that of Vázquez, who stated that pronunciamientos:  
distaron de ser un fenómeno solo atribuible a los militares, pues casi todos fueron 
inducidos por civiles, ya fueran comerciantes-usureros extranjeros cosecheros de 
tabaco y algodón o cónsules-comerciantes extranjeros, que pretendían la eliminación 
de impuestos o medidas restrictivas, y por políticos e ideólogos que favorecían un 
cambio de gobierno. Pero como los movimientos fueron siempre encabezados por un 
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jefe militar y como éstos para legitimarlas lanzaron manifiestos y planes políticos, 
solemos atribuirlos erróneamente toda su autoría.
85
  
She also adds that pronunciamientos were “successful only in the context of a general 
feeling of unrest amongst the population and, particularly, when they corresponded to civilian 
initiatives and involved various social groups.”86 Pronunciamientos – just like elections – did 
not come cheap; financial backing from civilian actors was essential. The military 
consequently constantly coopted civilians in order to support their movement. Civilians 
(politicians and merchants) who also wanted to start a pronunciamiento had to incorporate 
the military in order to realise it. Guerra thus states that a pronunciamiento involved:  
una diversidad extraordinaria de actores de todo tipo, algunos individuales y la 
mayoría colectivos, civiles o militares, que van desde los más altos – Congresos de los 
estados, jefes militares – a los más bajos – ciudades, pueblos de indios, barrios, 
guarniciones, milicias cívicas, u otros colectivos para la circunstancia.
87
  
 
Other civilian classes such as campesinos, barrio inhabitants, and even indigenous 
groups used the pronunciamiento. As Costeloe has stated: 
it was used by leading politicians of all parties to demand change at the national 
political level but it also provided the opportunity for ambitious military officers to 
achieve promotion, dissatisfied merchants to obtain the repeal of laws, the poor to 
augment their income with loot, and bandits to legitimize their trade.
88
  
 
These lower classes usually took part in the practice by issuing their own smaller 
pronunciamientos in support of a larger pronunciamiento; indeed, one of the chief motives of 
an original pronunciamiento was to garner support manifested in pronunciamientos de 
adhesión. Only when a pronunciamiento inspired substantial support through secondary 
pronunciamientos was it considered forceful enough in order to present a valid contestation 
to the recognised authority. Pronunciamientos thus included proclamations of vague, broad, 
all-encompassing ideals which could appeal to all. When smaller bodies such as 
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ayuntamientos, barrios, or merchant groups adhered to the larger pronunciamiento, they not 
only supported its demands, but tacked on their own immediate and concrete concerns to be 
addressed, thus reshaping it to be a civilian practice in this sense.  
Brian Hamnett has also pointed out the importance of collaboration between the 
military and politicians in the Mexican pronunciamiento. He actually asserts that the military 
was the instrument of political actors, as they (politicians) used the military to realise 
pronunciamientos in order to accomplish political change (instead of carrying out legal and 
lengthy constitutional procedures). In his words, “La intervención de políticos militares no 
fue motivada para promover los objetivos del ejército, sino que fue determinada por la 
naturaleza del conflicto constitucional entre los civiles.”89 Fowler is quick to agree in this 
sense, as he states that the “numerous military interventions that characterized this period 
were, on the whole, inspired by the constitutional debates and disagreements of the civilians 
rather than by the alleged predatory praetorianism of the over-rated warring caudillo.”90 
Jaime E. Rodríguez O. also supports this view, as he believes that in the context of the 
pronunciamiento, “los militares devinieron con frecuencia el instrumento de los grupos 
políticos civiles.”91 It is consequently important for one to recognise that even if the 
pronunciamiento was carried out strictly by the army, its demands were not restricted to 
purely military concerns, but more often than not constituted of political and/or economic 
demands. Indeed, Juan Ortiz Escamilla has declared that: 
The moment the army came to have political and military control of the republic, 
including control of the state governments, and the different regional political 
chieftainships/prefectures, it claimed to be the sole owner of national representation 
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by way of the pronunciamiento as a response to the lack of social order that was 
perceived to have resulted from popular participation.
92
 
 This has led Fowler to insist that in this sense, “No hubo pronunciamientos militaristas.”93  
Additionally, one has to keep in mind the extremely blurred dichotomy between what 
one defines as nineteenth-century Mexican “military” and “civilians”. As Costeloe and 
Fowler have highlighted, not all military officials were members of a permanent army or 
lived in barracks; in other words, this was not their only career. There were obviously some 
who were experienced veterans who entered the profession as cadets and gained rank over the 
years. As for the rest, they had attained their titles commanding military units during the War 
of Independence. Many of these figures kept no official attachment to the army subsequent to 
independence; instead they cultivated their professions as hacendados, merchants, and of 
course, politicians. In Fowler‟s words, “many generals were essentially civilians in 
uniform”94; with Costeloe noting that “the military-civilian distinction at this time was 
blurred, and many senior army officers devoted most of their time and energies to political 
intrigue rather than military manoeuvres.”95 Vázquez also agrees that “la división de civiles y 
militares no era clara; en casi todas las alianzas, el ejército ponía la fuerza y lo civiles los 
objetivos y los recursos.”96 When it is realized that it was these figures which participated in 
the pronunciamiento, it obliges the re-analysis of the pronunciamiento as “a military 
practice”.  
Because the pronunciamiento resulted in representing a wide range of interests 
(political, civil, economic) across the spectrum of society, many regarded it as a truly 
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representative practice at the time, not as a power grabbing coup d‟état by a military 
minority. Indeed, one of the main bases of the pronunciamiento‟s legitimacy, equality with, 
and sometimes superiority to constitutional and governing institutions was its self-
proclaiming purpose to represent the genuine “will of the people.” This representation was 
perceived to be more than sufficient reason in order to question and challenge the power of 
the established authorities in a legitimate manner. According to Vázquez, in this context “Los 
gobernantes son cuestionados o rechazados porque son “personajes que condena la opinión 
pública,” with Guerra highlighting that the text of the pronunciamiento contained “un registro 
dramático, lleno de superlativos para designar la opresión, los abusos, los peligros.”97 When a 
pronunciamiento had military involvement, the army officers thus justified their actions by 
claiming to be taking a necessary intervention in order to save the people of its patria from a 
tyrannical or unjust ruling institution. This has led Raymond Carr to comment that the 
“officer corps (was) the ultimate repository of a general will [...] salvaged by the heroic 
gesture of a general,”98 with Guerra adding that “El pronunciamiento es una forma de 
reacción a un poder opresor o la manifestación última del poder constituyente de la nación.”99 
José Luis Comellas has also agreed that a pronunciamiento is a practice whereby “se alza 
contra una tiranía insoportable, oprobiosa.”100 One should note that this tangible duty of the 
pronunciados voicing the will of the people was necessary to justify the act of challenging 
authorities; it transformed the pronunciamiento into a self-sacrificing necessary action which 
the pronunciados had to take in order to ensure the happiness of the people. According to 
Guerra, the pronunciados thus evoked “la verdadera voluntad de los pueblos” in order to 
“justificar la acción,”101 with Báquer adding that “en el pronunciamiento, a diferencia del 
simple golpe de Estado, una apelación a la opinión pública” was needed “para justificar el 
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acto con supuestas aspiraciones.”102 Vázquez has also asserted that “el pronunciamiento no es 
un golpe de Estado, ya que busca legitimarse como expresión de la voluntad pública.”103  
While Fowler does not deny that one of the main elements needed for a 
pronunciamiento to arise was an oppressive administration, he is more inclined to think that a 
fragile and weak ruling institution was the main basis for “the will of the people” to be able to 
effectively challenge it. According to him, the ruling administrations had to manifest some 
sign of weakness or vulnerability, in order for pronunciados to capitalize on this fragility. He 
sees this exemplified in the very first successful Spanish pronunciamiento of Rafael de Riego 
in 1820. The overthrow of Ferdinand VII by the Napoleonic army had led to the exposure of 
the extreme vulnerability of the monarchy, and Spain was consequently plunged into 
instability, crisis of authority and opposition to the French King Joseph Bonaparte (and 
subsequently to Ferdinand himself); this was the time when pronunciamientos arose. These 
circumstances not only legitimised pronunciados‟ actions, but made it more possible for them 
to issue a successful pronunciamiento, as it was easier to target a weak institution which they 
could overpower through the “right to insurrection”,104 in order to “save the patria.”105 It was 
thus seen as the army taking the necessary (and heroic) steps to manage a country effectively 
where political institutions could not. In Fowler‟s words:  
the constitutional crisis unleashed by the Napoleonic occupation of the Iberian 
peninsula in 1808 and the usurpation of the Spanish crown [...] undoubtedly created a 
context of upheaval and disputed authority, raising fundamental questions about the 
ruling bodies‟ legitimacy [...] [it] highlighted the extent to which authority was 
actually an incredibly fragile construct [...] Authority was now in the eye of the 
beholder. It could be questioned, challenged, overcome, and ultimately 
appropriated.
106
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For many historians, these liberal origins of the pronunciamiento lie within the 
creation of the Masonic lodges in Spain during the 1810s and 20s.
107
 The Napoleonic 
invasion of Spain in 1808, and the subsequent replacement of King Ferdinand VII by Joseph 
Bonaparte inspired the formation of Masonic lodges and juntas by the majority of the liberals 
who were in opposition not only to the French king, but more importantly, to absolutism. 
This liberal agenda was furthermore manifested in the Constitution of Cádiz of 1812-1814, 
which empowered the provincial juntas to represent their self-government and representation 
against Joseph, fostering the legitimacy of the voluntad popular; the written and spoken form 
of the people as a valid contestation to authority was thus formed. The expression of the 
voluntad del pueblo and the belief that they had the right to insurrection and to contest the 
official authority of the nation consequently has deep-rooted connections to this period in 
Spain. In this aspect, Comellas maintains that all Spanish pronunciamientos were 
significantly liberal,
108
 a perspective which is supported by Carr who believes that “The 
[Spanish] pronunciamiento was the instrument of liberal revolution in the nineteenth 
century.”109  
With Ferdinand‟s return to the throne in 1814 and his subsequent harsh repression of 
liberal activity (including the abolishment of the Constitution of Cádiz), liberal opposition to 
his tyranny increased substantially. Resistance to the crown occurred within another 
important sector: the Spanish militias. Indeed, many military officers were not happy with 
measures taken by Ferdinand from 1814-1820. While ancien régime guards who had battled 
against the French had been awarded promotions, the young officers who had also dedicated 
their efforts in the war had not been recognised for their efforts, and as a result they began 
plotting against the throne. Indeed, it had been realised through the French invasion that if a 
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foreign army could so easily overtake the kingdom, then why could not a home-grown army 
do the same? The fragility of the throne had been exposed, and the military would be quick to 
capitalise on it. Authority was, in Fowler‟s words, “there for the taking.”110 Uprisings by 
General Francisco Espoz y Mina in Pamplona (1814), of Marshal Juan Díaz Porlier in La 
Coruña (1815), the Conspiración del Triángulo in Madrid (1816), of General Luis Lacy in 
Barcelona (1817) and of Colonel Joaquín Vidal in Valencia (1819) all demonstrated the 
rising questioning and contestation of the legitimacy and power of the king, as liberals and 
military worked together in these protestations.
111
 
These revolts paved the way for the pronunciamiento which would triumph above 
them all: that of Lieutenant Colonel Rafael de Riego on 1 January 1820. It has been widely 
agreed that Riego was the originator of the pronunciamiento. It was he who first used the 
term “pronunciamiento”112 and it was he who set the highly specific model and ritual of 
events which would begin the characterization of the practice of this phenomenon. Riego and 
his men had extremely immediate concerns: they were destined to be sent to the Americas to 
battle the raging insurgency there; none of them wanted to go.
113
 Riego and his followers thus 
pronounced in the town of Cabezas de San Juan, in the province of Seville at the beginning of 
1820. With the support of the military and the liberal juntas based throughout the country, 
Riego‟s pronunciamiento was a resounding success, as the pronunciados demanded the 
reestablishment of the 1812 Constitution and the re-assemblance of the Cortes, which the 
King eventually granted.
114
  
                                                          
110
 Fowler, “Introduction”, p.xxv. 
111
 Roberto L. Blanco Valdés, “Paisanos y soldados en los orígenes de la España liberal: Sobre revoluciones, 
golpes de estado y pronunciamientos militares” in Jaime E. Rodríguez O. (ed.), Las nuevas naciones: España y 
México 1800-1850 (Madrid: Fundación Mapfre, 2008), p.270. 
112
 Comellas, Los primeros pronunciamientos, p.21.  
113
 Eric Christiansen, The Origins of Military Power in Spain (London : Oxford U.P., 1967), p.2.  
114
 Ivana Frasquet and Manuel Chust, “Agustín de Iturbide: From the Pronunciamiento of Iguala to the Coup of 
1822”, in Fowler (ed.), Forceful Negotiations, pp.24-26.  
46 
 
The ways in which the pronunciamiento differs from its traditional definitions and 
associations have been established. Fowler sums it up well, as according to him “in reality it 
was not always a military action, it was generally not concerned with overthrowing the 
government, and, quite frequently, it was not a response to a development in national 
politics.”115 The extent and significance of the role of the pronunciamiento with regard to 
moulding the socio-political system in Mexico and in Yucatán will now be determined. How 
popular and how significant was this practice in early nineteenth-century Mexico, and more 
importantly, why? Additionally the specific characteristics of the Yucatecan pronunciamiento 
will be established, in order to determine how it conformed with or differed from this newly 
established framework. 
According to Guerra, the pronunciamiento is “un fenómeno que, por su recurrencia, 
tiene que ser considerado como una de las prácticas políticas más importantes del siglo 
XIX.”116 Indeed, between independence in 1821 and the 1876 Plan of Tuxtepec which 
brought Porfirio Díaz into power, more than 1500 pronunciamientos erupted throughout the 
newly born Mexican nation, making it “la norma y no la excepción.”117 All sectors and 
classes of society used the practice to such an extent that it rapidly became the most popular 
and accepted form of expressing opinion and discontent, as well as negotiating for political 
change. Yucatán was no exception to this pronunciamiento mania, as during the years 1821 
to 1840 alone, more than 50 pronunciamientos occurred in the south-eastern peninsula. 
Not only was the nation gripped by pronunciamiento fever during this period, but 
pronunciamientos were also responsible for bringing about the most significant political 
changes in Mexico and Yucatán. Although the majority of pronunciamientos did not succeed 
on a national (and often even regional) level,
118 
those that did were responsible for the most 
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significant changes in politics in Mexico and Yucatán. Mexico became independent through 
Agustín de Iturbide‟s pronunciamiento of the Plan of Iguala in 1821. The pronunciamientos 
of the Plans of Veracruz and Casa Mata of 1822 and 1823 respectively were responsible for 
terminating Iturbide‟s Empire, which ushered in the federal republic. Pronunciamientos also 
ended the administrations of Manuel Gómez Pedraza (1828), Vicente Guerrero (1829), 
Anastasio Bustamante (1832 and 1841), Valentín Gómez Farías (1834), and Antonio López 
de Santa Anna (1844).
119
 Furthermore, the independence of states from Mexico (such as 
Texas in 1836 and Yucatán in 1840) was declared through pronunciamientos. It is therefore 
obvious that while there were constantly legal procedures which attempted to establish the 
political system of the nation (such as elections and constitutions), the pronunciamiento was 
the practice which continued to interrupt lawful rule, and ultimately dominated the face of 
regional and national politics.  
How did this Mexican pronunciamiento mania come about? One cannot 
underestimate the importance and impact which Riego‟s pronunciamiento of 1820 in Spain 
had on Mexican politics. Riego‟s triumph firstly proved that this kind of dynamic worked in 
these circumstances; not only did Mexicans eagerly reinstitute the 1812 Constitution of Cádiz 
in 1820, but they became highly aware of what an extreme degree of success and political 
change a pronunciamiento could bring about. Elections of those of New Spain to attend the 
liberal Cortes in Spain, along with the establishment of the Provincial Deputations and the 
ayuntamientos (both also created by the Constitution of Cádiz) had all awakened the desire 
for self-rule.
120
 Indeed, the Mexican War of Independence had been raging since Miguel 
Hidalgo‟s grito de libertad in 1810. So far, Mexicans had copied and instigated every 
political practice that had been present in their motherland Spain. Why not do the same for 
the pronunciamiento? Those impatient for home rule would thus imitate Riego‟s example 
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with their own pronunciamiento: the Plan of Iguala of 24 February 1821. Led by former 
royalist officer Agustín de Iturbide, the plan would lead to the independence of the nation. 
With the proclamation of the three guarantees of religion, independence and unity, the 
extensively thought-out document managed to unite vast territories in the name of a Mexican 
Empire. From Texas in the north to Guatemala in the south, provinces adhered with startling 
rapidity to the Plan. It is nothing short of remarkable that one pronunciamiento brought about 
what a decade-long war could not.  
The influence of the very first pronunciamiento in Spanish America, on such a grand 
scale, and with such a magnitude of success, needs to be highlighted. This was something of 
a trendsetting event which pronunciados would follow hundreds of times on the national and 
regional levels throughout the following decades in Mexico. Riego‟s and Iturbide‟s 
pronunciamientos had demonstrated that a pronunciamiento could not only force a King to 
change his policies, but could lead to independence. The success of the latter had also 
demonstrated to all the importance of the pronunciamiento‟s ritual with regard to 
guaranteeing success. Iturbide had conspired with and gathered support from strategic army 
officers before issuing his plan, in order to ensure that he would have their support. The 
pronunciados had recorded the minutes of the pronunciamiento meeting in the town of Iguala 
in Guerrero, subsequent to which they wrote and signed the pronunciamiento. They then 
issued the grito, circulating copies of the pronunciamiento text to all the key authorities of the 
nation.
121
   
The success of these first and groundbreaking pronunciamientos not only revealed the 
particular steps which a pronunciamiento should follow, but also demonstrated that many 
more personal gains were to be had through this practice. Not only could it result in political 
change on a grand scale, but it could considerably heighten the status and position of the 
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pronunciados. Riego was converted from a young discontented officer to a national hero after 
the success of his pronunciamiento, eventually being elected president of the Cortes.
122
 
Through the Plan of Iguala, Iturbide eventually became Emperor of the largest nation on the 
planet at the time.
123
 The military thus took note; not only could they use a pronunciamiento 
to effect change in their favour, but they could use it for extreme personal benefit. In 
Fowler‟s words: 
The heady mix of liberal causes such as constitutionalism, freedom, and 
independence, paired with the adrenaline rush of the grito and the hope of an outcome 
that could include personal aggrandizement as well as military and political 
promotion, made the experience of the pronunciamiento into an irresistible and 
addictive practice for most politically-minded nineteenth-century Mexican soldiers.
124
  
Many were thus eager to share the fruits of this novel practice of the 
pronunciamiento; members of the military who had been denied promotion during Iturbide‟s 
reign, as well as the regional elites did not intend to be excluded. Indeed, during the period 
1822-1823, powerful regional circles became increasingly discontented with the policies of 
Iturbide‟s centralist empire, as the constant interference by the government in their provincial 
affairs (political and economic) was disrupting their first taste at independent home rule. The 
cluster of pronunciamientos by Antonio López de Santa Anna in Veracruz (1822) paved the 
way for General José Antonio Echávarri‟s Plan de Casa Mata, which was a resounding 
success as the regions seconded it, or more specifically, seconded Article Nine, which 
empowered the Provincial Deputations, meaning temporary home rule for the provinces.
125
 
These pronunciamientos set the example for the first time in Mexico that pronunciamientos 
did not have to be against a regal power, but could entail negotiation for political change 
between the regions and Mexico City. The widespread success of Echávarri‟s 
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pronunciamiento led to Iturbide‟s abdication and the eventual creation of the first federal 
republic in Mexico.  
The regional pronunciamientos of 1822 and 1823 sealed the practice of the 
pronunciamiento as a firm and dominant element of political practice in nineteenth-century 
Mexico. The pronunciamiento was now responsible for independence, the end of the empire, 
and ultimately the establishment of federalism. In the words of Anna, “The reason the 
pronunciamiento became the preferred instrument for fundamental political change is that it 
worked, at least the first ones did.”126 There was now no question that there could be a more 
successful mechanism for political negotiation and change, especially for the regions. Anna 
also makes the important observation that by 1823, Mexicans now had more experience in 
the practice of the pronunciamiento than they had ever had in direct elections.
127
 
Additionally, the regional powers awoke to the realisation that the pronunciamiento was an 
effective mechanism which could (successfully) be used concerning representation towards 
and forceful negotiation with the centre. Yucatecan elites would pay attention to these early 
events very closely, and learn well.    
According to Fowler, the Mexican pronunciamiento was “first and foremost, a 
regional-led practice [and] [...] became the favourite political practice of the provincial 
elites.”128 Yucatecan pronunciados were no exception to this statement. The particular 
relationship between Yucatán and Mexico is of great importance regarding the motivations 
behind the Yucatecan pronunciamiento. Throughout the colonial era, the Yucatecan 
peninsula traditionally had a distant relationship with New Spain. Yucatán‟s inhabitants and 
authorities implemented their own political and economic agendas without outside 
interference, and the only political connection that Yucatán had with New Spain was its 
dependence on the latter‟s judicial court. The political decrees of the Bourbon reforms and 
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the Constitution of Cádiz (which made Yucatán into a diputación provincial completely 
separate from those in New Spain) empowered the Yucatecan regional powers even further. 
With the advent of independence and the subsequent union with Mexico, regional elites had 
no intention of releasing their political and financial control in their territories. It was 
consequently difficult for yucatecos to become used to the idea that they now had a national 
administration to which they had to answer. Nevertheless, the centralist Iturbide Empire, 
along with subsequent Mexican administrations, would constantly try to reassert their 
agendas and decrees on the authorities of the peninsula.  
This clash of attitudes would trigger fluctuating relations between the periphery and 
mainland Mexico for decades to come. With the firm establishment of the pronunciamiento 
trend (and especially the regional pronunciamiento trend) by 1823, Yucatecans would follow 
this practice in their dealings, protests, support, and negotiations with Mexican 
administrations. It is undeniable that political and economic decisions in Mexico heavily 
affected the Yucatecan elite. Thus, every single major Yucatecan pronunciamiento during 
this era heavily concentrated on the distinctly local effects which the Mexican 
administration‟s decisions and decrees had on various sectors in the peninsula (mainly the 
political and economic elite and the military). This is precisely why the Yucatecan case is so 
interesting. It is a novelty to analyse how the influential figures in this initially peripheral 
territory responded to a centre which suddenly claimed possession over it and all its internal 
workings, using the pronunciamiento to defend their local interests and concerns.  
One of the primary uses of the Yucatecan pronunciamiento was to change the nature 
of the peninsula‟s relationship with Mexico throughout the early nineteenth century. Indeed, 
during this era the Yucatecan pronunciamientos became the signposts of relations between 
these two regions. The administrative bodies in Yucatán seconded the Plan of Iguala and 
Independence (1821), and they were one of the first bodies in the Mexican nation to second 
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the plan of Casa Mata, subsequently pressuring the temporary congress to establish a 
federalist system (1823), which occurred in 1824. The 1829 pronunciamiento was originally 
motivated by a small centralist faction in the region, thus calling for the change from a 
federal to centralist political system. In 1832, Francisco de Paula Toro and his military 
followers seconded Santa Anna‟s pronunciamiento of Veracruz, one of a series of 
pronunciamientos throughout Mexico which would lead to the end of the elitist 
administration of Anastasio Bustamante. The 1834 pronunciamiento led by Toro and his 
supporters once more, demanded the end of the radical Valentín Gómez Farías 
administration, with the same pronunciados demanding a centralist administration in 1835 (it 
should be noted that these pronunciamientos, while containing some Yucatecan sentiment, 
were in large part only implemented because Toro was following orders from his brother-in-
law and President Santa Anna). The largest Yucatecan pronunciamiento of the century, the 
Santiago Imán revolt (1836-1840) was launched throughout the eastern populations of the 
peninsula (mainly the towns of Tizimín, Espita, Sotuta, and the city of Valladolid), and was 
seconded by both Meridians and Campecheans, demanding federalism, and resulting in 
Yucatán‟s independence from Mexico.   
These pronunciamientos are perfect exemplifications of the typical regional 
pronunciamiento: the assertion and defence of regional necessities, identities, and demands 
are clear.
129
 They also can be classed as regional pronunciamientos in more explicit ways. 
Firstly, although it seems from the summary above that the Yucatecan pronunciamiento was 
exploited as a quick method of “legitimately” proclaiming secession from Mexico, (according 
to the political conditions at the time), this was not the case. In almost every 
pronunciamiento, the Yucatecan pronunciados sought to negotiate with Mexico for a change 
of national administration. This is an essential element of not only the regional 
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pronunciamiento, but of the pronunciamiento in general. It was not a revolt or uprising 
seeking quick means: it was a tool of forceful negotiation which was used to try and reason 
with powers in order to reach a compromise and achieve change. Thus, the 1823 
pronunciamientos threatened Yucatecan separation until a federalist administration was in 
place. The 1829 pronunciamiento declared that Yucatán was seceding from Mexico and that 
reunification would not occur until the establishment of a national centralist administration 
(as will be suggested in Chapter Three, this was the one instance of pretence at negotiation, as 
there were real secessionist desires by a small faction at hand, but it was present in the 
pronunciamiento text nevertheless). The 1840 pronunciamiento included the condition that 
Yucatán was separating from Mexico until federalism was implemented once more. It was 
only due to the refusal of the governing Mexican administrations to recognise these demands 
that the pronunciados were left with the only option of secession for a much longer period of 
time than intended (from 1829-1832 and then from 1840-1843). In other words, all the 
attempts of the Yucatecan elite to bargain with the Mexican government did not succeed, and 
these pronunciamientos became examples of threats which were not meant to go this far, but 
which were eventually forced to be taken. 
This failure at Yucatecan negotiation was in part because the state was poor in 
resources and arms; it did not have the significant power needed to convincingly bargain with 
the Mexican administration (and Mexico City did not have the resources to go to Yucatán, 
fight, and be victorious as well, as would be demonstrated in the failure of the Mexican 
invasion of Yucatán in 1843). Usually pronunciamientos were accompanied by a threat of 
violence if their demands were not listened to; yucatecos could not do this, simply because 
they did not have the resources or the men, and also because of the vast geographical distance 
from the centre. It was not logical for a peripheral state to militarily threaten a centre more 
than 1,000 kilometres away. It was, however, logical for an isolated state to use the threat of 
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secession, perhaps its only weapon. Additionally, because Yucatecans‟ demands were so 
localised, and because of the solitary nature of the region itself, it was highly unlikely that 
any pronunciamientos de adhesión from any other regions of Mexico would lend support, 
strength, and legitimacy to the cause of the yucatecos.  
What needs to be noted here is that in most cases, Yucatecans were thus not looking 
to secede, but to unite with Mexico under terms and conditions favourable to them. The 
region was simply too poor in resources to exist on its own; financial dependence made 
unification with Mexico a necessity. This is not to say that the secessionist dream did not 
exist among an elite minority; as will be discovered, some of the elite merchants of Yucatán 
(and of Mérida in particular) harboured dreams of reuniting with Spain and thus re-
establishing trade relations with Cuba (demonstrated in the planned pronunciamiento of 
December 1823, and the pronunciamiento of 1829, with separatists hijacking the centralist 
pronunciamiento and using it for their own secessionist desires). Nevertheless, in several 
cases, such as in the pronunciamientos of April 1823 and the Imán revolt of 1840, 
secessionism was used as a negotiating tool, with federalism being the real desire of the 
pronunciados.  
The struggle between political ideologies is more than apparent in these Yucatecan 
pronunciamientos. The 1823, 1832 and 1836-1840 pronunciamientos were all motivated by 
federalist desires, and the 1829 and 1835 pronunciamientos were centralist. This was only a 
microcosm of the ideological split which was dividing Mexico. The political vacuum left by 
the end of Spanish rule and Iturbide‟s Empire led to attempts to establish the “appropriate” 
Mexican political system throughout the early nineteenth century, whether it be federalist or 
centralist. In Yucatán, the liberal Liga and elite Camarilla coalitions were mainly federalist 
(and a small faction of camarilleros were even secessionist at times) throughout the 1820s. 
The centralist faction was formed in 1829 among the Campechean elite (in response to the 
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regionalist desires which marked the Meridian political class) in order to preserve the 
peninsula‟s relationship with Mexico (and thus the essential trade links which Campechean 
merchants had with Mexican ports). In the early 1830s, this centralist coalition would expand 
to include many hombres de bien of the Camarilla who were uneasy about the radicalism of 
the Gómez Farías administration. With the central government of Anastasio Bustamante of 
1836, however, the majority of the Yucatecan political and merchant class reverted to 
federalism in response to the centralist intrusion in terms of politics and economy.  
The majority of regional pronunciamientos throughout Mexico thus demanded either 
a federalist or centralist system according to the actors and political circumstances and 
momentum at the time. Federalist desires dominated; one of the distinguishing features of 
Yucatán was its elites‟ pursuit of relative autonomy in order to mainly issue beneficial trade 
terms, as well as gain control over state revenues. This is not to say that Yucatecans were 
pro-autonomous; the fact that in the majority of Yucatecan pronunciamientos (1823, 1832 
and 1846), the Mexican theme dominated, with demands for a federalist system (and not 
Yucatecan autonomy), disproves this theory. Sometimes, some actors switched ideals 
according to their views and responses to changing circumstances, so that the same people 
were found pronouncing for both federalism and then centralism. Indeed, José Ortega y 
Gasset has argued that the pronunciados always fully believed in the political ideals which 
they proclaimed (or in his words “estaban convencidos de su „idea‟, no como está convencido 
un hombre normal, sino como suelen los locos y los imbéciles.”).130 There is no doubt that a 
small number of these pronunciados were chaqueteros or turncoats, who flitted from one side 
to another in order to ensure that they were included in the winning pronunciamiento (as shall 
later be discovered), but the majority seemed to genuinely uphold their political ideals. 
Whatever the case may be, in the more general picture, Fowler was right to observe that “the 
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great majority of the pronunciamientos that surfaced during this period were inspired either 
by the centralising or the federalising shifts of the different governments that came to power 
between 1821 and 1857.”131 It seems that Yucatán was no exception to this.   
The Yucatecan pronunciamientos were nevertheless not solely state-level expressions 
of discontent or exercises of negotiation. While indeed national issues did have a significant 
influence on the formation and character of the Yucatecan pronunciamientos, there were also 
many more local forces and objectives at hand. It will be suggested that the more significant 
dividing line in these pronunciamientos was the inter-regional struggle for governing 
positions in the peninsula. This is not to say that political ideologies were not present; each 
faction desiring power in the peninsula had its own concrete ideas and ideals of what would 
bring stability to the peninsula and beneficial relations with Mexico; thus the 
pronunciamiento was indeed still the embodiment of “la lucha de ideologías”.132 Yucatecan 
political ideologies were connected to those of Mexico, and Yucatecans were also financially 
dependent on Mexican markets and economic aid to sponsor their coastal defences (indeed, 
Yucatán was prone to pirate attacks due to their extensive coastline, and would constantly 
need financial support to assist in its defence). Nevertheless, Yucatecans also needed to 
preserve their beneficial economic and political practices to which they had become 
accustomed after centuries of almost independent rule. What dominated the push behind the 
pronunciamiento was thus the local need for power by these factions in order to implement 
the measures and decrees benefitting their specific elite group. It is necessary to illustrate this 
point by analyzing the major pronunciamientos during this period even further. 
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From the very first pronunciamiento to occur in Yucatán – the 1821 pronunciamiento 
de adhesión for independence – this inter-state battle was apparent. Although the Yucatecans 
seconded the Mexican Plan of Iguala, the elite Camarilla faction (which issued the 
pronunciamiento after military mutiny arose in Campeche) which dominated the Provincial 
Deputation subsequently made no move to unite with Mexico, in order to maintain their 
economic and administrative autonomy. The camarilleros thus designed this 
pronunciamiento to serve their local needs. The 1823 pronunciamiento de adhesión to the 
Plan of Casa Mata was in itself not only a rejection of the Iturbide Empire, but also a way for 
the camarillero elite to regain the control over local politics and economy which they had lost 
during the centralist Iturbide Empire. Although the 1829 Campechean pronunciamiento 
pronounced for centralism, it was provoked by much more concrete factors; the active 
battalions and regular army suffering from low salaries worked in alliance with the centralist 
as well as the Camarilla party (the latter‟s members had been defeated in the 1825 elections 
by the rival Liga party) in order not only to change the political system, but to overthrow the 
governing Liga faction.
133
 In fact, Betty Zanolli Fabila suggests that one of the primary aims 
of the camarilleros in this pronunciamiento was to overthrow the internal administration,
134
 
while the centralists genuinely wanted a change of administration. Indeed, the Camarilla 
party were actually ardent federalists, and even separatist to a degree, as shall be discovered.  
The Meridian-based 1832 pronunciamiento, led by Yucatecan Commander General 
Francisco de Paula Toro, although supporting Santa Anna‟s pronunciamiento in Veracruz 
against the Bustamante administration, also demanded the (successful) re-establishment of 
the Liga authorities in local government, as they regained the power which they had lost to 
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the Camarilla in 1829.
135
 The camarilleros and centralists retaliated in 1834 and 1835; 
headed by the same comandante general Toro they simultaneously and successfully 
pronounced for centralism and the dismissal of the Liga administration. Even the Santiago 
Imán revolt of 1840 was not just a rejection of the centralist administration, but was part of a 
plot by the then-formed party of federalists to take over power from the centralists in the 
peninsula. The Yucatecan pronunciamiento was thus a practice which, in Fowler‟s words 
“empowered the disempowered,”136 and in this one aspect, it was a regional coup.  
It consequently becomes evident that local power struggles were as equally dominant 
in these major Yucatecan pronunciamientos as negotiation tactics with Mexico. With the 
exception of the pronunciamiento of 1823 which successfully lobbied for federalism, no 
isolated Yucatecan pronunciamiento (i.e. not part of a national movement) accomplished its 
aims when attempting to negotiate with Mexico (1821, 1829, and 1840). Regardless of the 
national failing of the pronunciamiento, the pronunciados still did not hesitate to make the 
pronunciamiento triumph locally, overthrowing the Yucatecan government, and subsequently 
proclaiming their pronunciamiento to be a victory. Also, they always ended up reuniting with 
Mexico sooner or later anyway. It evidently seems that the local battle for the possession of 
elite political roles was equally or even more important than Yucatán‟s relationship with 
Mexico.   
  This idea of local issues dominating regional objectives in the pronunciamiento is 
highlighted in many ways, especially concerning the pronunciamiento text. Several historians 
such as Fowler
137
 and Kerry McDonald
138
 have highlighted the importance of the “metatext” 
in the regional pronunciamiento, whereby the regional elites (the pronunciados) had ulterior 
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motives from what was actually stated in their pronunciamiento text. In other words, while 
the pronunciados had regional demands in their pronunciamientos, they had much more local 
unstated objectives and ambitions (the metatext) which they hoped to achieve through the 
pronunciamiento. As a result, national trends and even national pronunciamientos were 
“hijacked” to secretly achieve local objectives. This was not the case with Yucatán. The 
Yucatecan pronunciados did not even attempt to hide their agenda at overthrowing the 
internal government in their pronunciamientos. From 1829, every single pronunciamiento 
text clearly stated that a Liga or federalist administration would replace a Camarilla or 
centralist one, and vice versa. This was even apparent in the pronunciamientos de adhesión of 
1832 and 1834, where local demands were tacked on to the seconding of national 
pronunciamientos. National reactive plans were always converted into local proactive plans. 
These pronunciamiento texts thus resulted in being a jarring combination of both national and 
local demands, or in Fowler‟s words, combined “private and public concerns, micro and 
macro demands, concrete and general grievances.”139 Moreover, outright hatred and 
denouncement of the opposing political faction was dominant in the Yucatecan 
pronunciamiento text. These revelations challenge Báquer‟s statement that the 
pronunciamiento “No busca vencer, sino convencer.”140 There was no negotiation or 
convincing going on here in the local realm, but outright struggles for political control. 
Added to this is the glaring fact that all the principal pronunciamientos discussed 
were actually started in Yucatán. Perhaps the only possible exceptions to this statement are 
the pronunciamientos of 1832 and 1834, which were carried out by military man Toro, who 
was following orders from brother-in-law President Santa Anna to realise these movements. 
Despite this, as will be discovered, there were pronunciamientos similar to Toro‟s in 1831 
and in 1833 which had been motivated by local factions, but which were unsuccessful due to 
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lack of military intimidation. Taking this into account, it is thus undeniable that Yucatecan 
pronunciamientos were local exercises addressing local grievances. Why then was regionalist 
rhetoric included in the pronunciamiento text? Challenging the conclusions of the majority of 
historians, it is argued here that regionalist rhetoric was not, with the exception of the Imán 
pronunciamiento, included in the majority of Yucatecan pronunciamientos to give them the 
greatest chance of increasing their support base. The general view has been that the more the 
ideals expressed in the pronunciamiento were vague, ideological and all encompassing (such 
as federalism, centralism, reunification, and secession), the more supporters could identify 
with and thus support the pronunciamiento. In Rugeley‟s words, it had to be “like the 
porridge of the fairy tale [...] not too big and not too small, not too cold and not too hot, but 
just right.”141 Indeed, it has been claimed that the strength of the pronunciamiento lay in its 
ability to gather support through pronunciamientos de adhesión, thus gathering the force 
needed to powerfully negotiate at a national level, and consequently giving it that air of 
legitimacy as it claimed to represent the will of the people.
142
 In the words of Erika Pani, 
“One could even argue that a pronunciamiento‟s success depended on its objectives being as 
broad as possible and its language conciliatory enough for it to attract as many of the 
disaffected as possible.”143 
Nevertheless, this was not the case for most of the pronunciamientos in Yucatán. It 
had always been clear since independence who would support which pronunciamiento here: 
in the early 1820s, the Meridians would support their regional movements, while the 
Campecheans would support their own territorial leaders. By the late 1820s, it became 
apparent that the Camarilla faction would be in major part supported by its followers, with 
the Liga political faction amassing its own support in their pronunciamientos. By the early 
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1830s another dynamic became apparent: any pronunciamiento by the commander general 
and his active forces, combined with the power of the permanent army, could easily 
overpower the government and its meagre military support base (the civic militias), in spite 
of the level of political support for the administration. This led to the same commander 
general in 1832 and 1834 successfully pronouncing for federalism and then centralism 
respectively. Additionally, one must take into account the small towns which seconded these 
pronunciamientos without fail, be them federalist, secessionist or centralist. The 
ayuntamientos of these towns had to simply follow the general pronunciamiento sway at the 
time; without money, only equipped with the poor and untrained civic militias, it was futile 
for them to try and resist the more powerful elite political and military bodies in the 
peninsula. They were essentially passive pronunciamiento supporters in most cases; as 
Vázquez has pointed out, “allegiance [to the pronunciamiento] was often a product of the fear 
awakened by military presence.”144 Moreover, one must bear in mind the characteristic of the 
majority of the population in Yucatán: the Maya. With the exception of the few educated 
Maya leaders, the Maya had no idea what federalism or centralism, or even Mexico, was. 
They did not participate in pronunciamientos because of the ideals stated, but were recruited 
into pronunciamientos through other means (discussed below).  
Nonetheless, all pronunciados did not hesitate to claim that they were pronouncing 
according to the “will of the people.” Two hyperactive elite factions were clearly not 
representing a general feeling; but it was imperative that they state that they were serving the 
needs of the pueblo, in order to preserve the ideological legitimacy of their pronunciamiento. 
Indeed, as Guardino as highlighted, there was the need to include the rhetoric that a particular 
faction was addressing the needs of the general population. According to him, “dominant 
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classes, no matter how firmly entrenched in power”,145 usually need to present their actions 
(and he quotes Eugene Genovese here) as “the embodiment of a moral code much of which 
represents the interests and sentiments of all classes.”146  
If national rhetoric and ideals were not used to garner support for pronunciamientos, 
what were the specific strategies used in order to increase the core constituents behind the 
Yucatecan pronunciamientos? The glaring answer is the cooption of the military; every single 
successful and significant pronunciamiento which occurred during this period only succeeded 
because of the adherence of the military, or by the threat of military force. This is true in an 
obvious and non-arguable way. The pronunciamientos of 1821 and 1823 had the support of 
the civic militias and active battalions, with the former pronunciamiento also being backed by 
the national garrison; that of 1824 was supported by the same regular army in Campeche and 
by the Second Active Battalion which was also stationed there. The 1829 pronunciamiento 
was notoriously military, with the leaders of the First and Second Active Battalions along 
with the permanent army realising the entire pronunciamiento (and subsequently taking 
control of government). The pronunciamientos of 1832 and 1834 were instigated by 
Commander General Toro, his followers in the active battalions, along with the regular 
troops; finally, the Imán pronunciamiento of 1840 was initiated by the Third Active Battalion 
stationed throughout the eastern towns of the region. 
The military presence in Yucatán deserves explanation. After Yucatán became united 
with Mexico in 1821, the peninsula became heavily militarized. The well trained and armed 
active battalions (or the reserve army) were established in 1821 and 1824, under the orders of 
the commander general; it should be noted the commander general himself was appointed by 
and was loyal to the national government. Meanwhile, the Permanent Army was stationed in 
Campeche, where the most fortified garrison had been established since the 1600s to protect 
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Campechean ships coming into port from pirates, and to defend the Spanish colonies against 
other European powers in the Seven Years‟ War.147 They answered directly to the Mexican 
national executive branch. Finally, the civic militias were established in 1821, to serve the 
town councils from 1820-1827, and then the state governments from 1827-1835.  
With the civic militias being by far the weakest body in Yucatán, pronunciamiento 
success usually depended on which movement the active battalions and the national garrison 
gave their support to. Whether it was the resolution of internal political factionalism (all 
pronunciamientos in this period), or the solving of relations with Mexico (all 
pronunciamientos once more), the military always had an excuse to get involved in politics 
through pronunciamientos. The pronunciamiento which had the better military backing was 
thus destined to succeed in Yucatán; this was the case for all the region‟s victorious 
pronunciamientos, as cities and towns had to accept the pronunciamiento out of fear of 
occupation, plunder, eviction, and sometimes even violence. Indeed, the camarilleros were 
forced to issue the pronunciamiento of 1821 because of the mutinous national garrison in 
Campeche; that of 1823 was carried out by the civic and active militias themselves. The 
pronunciamiento of 1824 resulted in potential civil war between the active battalions and the 
national garrison, with that of 1834 actually provoking war among the civic militias, active 
battalions, and the regular army. The military pronunciados of 1832 (the commander general 
and the active battalions) easily ousted the powerless civilian authorities. In a different vein, 
but equally important to the military dimension, the Imán revolt of 1836-1840 was sparked 
among the Third Active Battalion in the eastern town of Tizimín, who were being forcefully 
recruited to go to Texas to battle against the insurgency there. In a remarkably similar 
situation to Rafael de Riego, the military did not want to leave their homeland. Consequently 
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they pronounced continually, until with the help of the Maya, they finally succeeded in 
February 1840.    
One should be wary of perceiving that the army‟s heavy participation in the 
Yucatecan pronunciamiento made it a militaristic practice. Distinctions need to be made 
concerning the type of military officers who participated in these pronunciamientos. The 
active battalions were one of the primary military and pronunciamiento actors during this 
period. The members of these battalions, despite constituting the reserve army, were not 
solely official army officers. Instead, the active battalions were, in the words of Juan Ortiz 
Escamilla, “un tipo de fuerza armada, disciplinada e intermedia entre la vida militar y la 
doméstica.”148 The men who belonged to the active battalions were granted military ranks; 
but their main occupations were their “actividades económicas”.149 These battalions had thus 
been created as a reserve force in case of emergency, and were not meant to be a strain on the 
national treasury, as their members primarily supported themselves through their other 
activities, being merchants, hacendados and politicians. Thus, in the words of Howard Cline, 
“On Yucatán, properly speaking, there were no militarists.”150 The active battalions were also 
a political force; in them were sheltered all the officials for which “no tuvieron cabida en la 
permanente, es decir, a los expulsados del ejército, los considerados con menos preparación, 
los que no tenían prestigio y por lo tanto no contaban con una fuerza a su mando.”151 It is 
only natural that these battalions would consequently feel resentful towards the governing 
administrations who had placed them there, and this would provoke problems for authorities, 
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as they (the battalions) almost always presented a considerable opposition through the 
pronunciamiento.
152
  
Key civilian sectors such as the political and business elite (who were not members of 
the active battalions) also participated in and supported the majority of these 
pronunciamientos. In Yucatán, as early as 1821, civilian actors took an active part in the most 
influential pronunciamientos in Mexico, with the pronunciamiento of independence being 
issued by the governor and the Provincial Deputation together with the military.
153
 The 
pronunciamiento of 1823, although first issued by the military, had the heavy support of the 
liberals and merchants behind it. That of 1824 was an exercise by the political, business and 
military elite in Campeche; the pronunciamiento of 1829 actually began as a cooptive 
practice of the military by the centralist political faction. Additionally, the pronunciamientos 
of 1832, 1834 and 1835 similarly had the support of either the federalists or centralists. This 
civilian participation in pronunciamientos constantly expanded to the point that it can be 
argued that by the late 1830s, pronunciamientos became a societal instead of a strictly 
military-political phenomenon, as ayuntamientos, elites, merchants, campesinos, and even 
indigenous groups pronounced in the hope that the governing institutions would recognise 
their demands and address their problems.  
In Yucatán, the 1836-1840 Imán revolt was the watershed in pronunciamientos 
involving extensive civilian participation. While the pronunciamientos prior to this all had 
significant support from the political elites in Mérida and Campeche, it was from this 
pronunciamiento that larger sectors such as the hombres de bien of the east of the region, 
campesinos, and the Maya all participated in the practice. Eastern-based businessmen and 
landowners (such as the cotton, tobacco, and aguardiente hacendados) who were 
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discontented with decrees emanating from the centralist government were coopted by Imán in 
order to grant prestige and financial resources to his movement. Imán also recruited the Maya 
and the campesinos in order to gain the manpower which was severely lacking in his 
pronunciamiento. This would result in a range of societal demands being included in his 
pronunciamiento text, which was radically different from all the pronunciamientos before 
(which had simply concentrated on elite politics).  
 One sector of civilian participation deserves special attention in the Yucatecan 
pronunciamiento, which is that of the Maya. As noted, the Imán pronunciamiento was the 
very first pronunciamiento to recruit the Maya in its realisation. Through cooption (promises 
of not having to pay the dreaded Mayan religious obvención tax of 12 ½ reales for men and 9 
for women), Imán managed to persuade thousands of Maya to support his cause, leading to 
the pronunciamiento‟s success in mere months, after it had been failing for years. The 
incorporation of the indigenous peoples to realise pronunciamientos in such a formal manner, 
to the extent of including their demands in a pronunciamiento text, was something for which 
Yucatecans were unprepared; the Maya had not even be allowed to enlist in the civic militias 
for fear of them possessing arms. To have an elite merchant and a soldier of the active 
battalion arm the Maya and consciously encourage them to revolt, thus educating them in 
pronunciamiento and insurrection practice, would eventually have its consequences in the 
Caste War of 1847, which actually began as a Mayan protest against taxes.  
From this analysis of civilian participation, it becomes apparent that with the 
exception of the Imán revolt, the Yucatecan pronunciamiento (and the perhaps the 
pronunciamiento in general) was thus not the tool of the general will of the people. It did not 
express the views of the majority, but on the contrary, was the instrument used by the 
militarily, economically, and politically powerful elite of Mérida and Campeche. It was their 
ability to mobilize larger sectors of society through the measures discussed above that made it 
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appear as if the pronunciamiento was the will of the people. Barbara Tenenbaum therefore 
has good reason to warn us against viewing the pronunciamientos “as some subtle form of 
representative democracy in action,” as she stresses that “local elites used them as a vehicle 
to pour out their political frustrations.”154  
Consequently, just as the inclusion of nationalist rhetoric was to a degree an 
instrument to make the pronunciamiento seem justifiable and “legitimate”, so too was the 
assertion that these pronunciamientos were the genuine representation of the beliefs of the 
people. In Pani‟s words, “As the nation‟s sovereignty became a fundamental legitimizing 
political fiction, setting up a system that would articulate the „voice of the people‟ was seen 
as indispensable.”155 The majority of Yucatecan pronunciamientos were manifestations of an 
evidently elitist power struggle between two hyperactive minorities for possession of the 
state‟s administration, which included the larger and lower sectors into its elitist politics 
through cooption, coercion, and intimidation. These pronunciamientos were a false type of 
democracy, as there was no genuine consultation of the larger population.
156
 Indeed, the 
Mexican politicians would disregard the popular demands of the Imán pronunciamiento, and 
in 1847, when the Maya attempted to use the derecho de insurrección to protest for lower and 
less taxes, they were executed. The lower classes were not permitted to use this tool; it was 
designed by the elite as a tool for political and economic change and representation. 
On an even more intimate level, the Yucatecan pronunciamiento could potentially not 
only be the tool of the elite, but of a particular individual to gain social, military, and political 
status and recognition.
157
 Riego and Iturbide had demonstrated from the very beginning that 
the pronunciamiento was the quickest (and for most the only) way to go about achieving 
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higher rank and/or political status. Constitutional procedures were lengthy, exclusive, and 
difficult. The pronunciamiento was quick, glorifying, and adrenaline packed, with the 
champion pronunciado almost guaranteed elevation and glorification. You could not only 
become a hero, saving your nation from self-proclaimed unwanted decrees and institutions, 
but you could become leader of that territory, thus serving “los apetitos personales en torno al 
poder.”158 In this vein, it is significant to point out that the leader of almost every single 
successful pronunciamiento in Yucatán during this era became the head of the region in one 
form or another. Pronunciamiento leaders José Segundo Carvajal, Juan de Dios Cosgaya and 
Francisco de Paula Toro became governors in 1829, 1832, and 1834. Additionally, the 1836-
1840 Imán revolt was supposed to enable Imán to possess the rank of Comandante General 
del Ejército Libertador, with temporary rule over the constitution and laws of the 
independent nation (this did not happen for reasons discussed in Chapter Seven).
159
  
All these pronunciamientos exemplify and embody a microcosm of the constitutional 
crisis and lack of legitimacy of ruling authorities which was generally present during the 
nineteenth century in Mexico. The Yucatecan pronunciamientos demonstrate that the crisis of 
authority did not have to be on a national scale, but could occur on a regional level as well, as 
pronunciados could also question and overpower regional authorities.
160
 Vázquez highlights 
that following the violation of the constitutional presidency of Manuel Gómez Pedraza in 
1828 and the extra-constitutional imposition of Vicente Guerrero as president, Mexicans 
realised that through a pronunciamiento, a president (and a governor in the Yucatecan case) 
could be replaced if certain sectors were not happy with the existing ruling authority.
161
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Anyone could now claim to represent the people, overthrow the present administration and 
set up a government with those chosen by the pronunciados to be in power. The legitimacy 
and authority of constitutional bodies consequently became inferior to the voice and 
representation of the pronunciados. It is no coincidence that only after Gómez Pedraza‟s 
overthrow that the pronunciamiento began to be used in this manner in Yucatán. An excerpt 
from the 1832 newspaper El Regulador Yucateco and how people then interpreted the 
pronunciamiento deserves to be quoted in this context:  
Pronunciamiento: […] en el estado de libertad natural en que nos hallamos, a pesar de 
pactos y convenciones constitucionales, que decimos adorar, respetar, defender, y 
sostener, con la última gota de una sangre que nadie quiere derramar, cada uno se 
cree con derecho para formar su plan, que (como diré en su lugar) viene a ser una 
especie de ley fundamental que todo buen patriota puede dar a la nación, 
convidándolo primero y forzándole después a entrar en él por su libre voluntad, y si 
ésta falta, por su aquiescencia; todo supuesto el libre, espontáneo y franco apoyo de 
las armas, que tienen el derecho de iniciativa y el de interpretación, comentario y 
aclaración del plan ó pronunciamiento.
162
 
The pronunciamiento thus became an instinctive response in a context where a certain sector 
or sectors were dissatisfied with the ruling authority. Constitutional power structures 
consequently never had the chance to be in place long enough to be respected, strong, 
effective, representative or legitimate, and pronunciados would constantly contest them 
through the pronunciamiento. Moreover, if you came in to power through a pronunciamiento, 
there was nothing wrong (in the pronunciados‟ eyes) with pronunciados forcing you to leave 
through a pronunciamiento (this was especially manifest in the early 1830s). While those in 
authority denounced contesting pronunciados as agents of instability, when these same 
figures were eventual pronunciados themselves, all of a sudden they claimed their own 
pronunciamiento to be a necessary evil in order to overpower the unwanted ruling opposition.   
Yucatecan pronunciamientos were not only representative of constitutional crisis and 
the constant search for political change. They were equally important as expressions of 
identities of communities. In this case, they were literally written expressions of the factional 
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identities and ideologies existent in the peninsula, be them meridanos, campechanos, 
sanjuanistas, camarilleros, ligados, centralists, separatists, or federalists. Regardless of the 
impact which the pronunciamiento had on the political scene, it served the purpose of voicing 
those distinct opinions, beliefs, ideas, and desires of a community, thus serving to announce 
that sector‟s distinctive identity. The pronunciamiento made Yucatecan regional and political 
identities extremely visible and tangible, especially when notions and ideas of solidarity and 
communal identity were projected against the rival faction. Thus, while the pronunciamiento 
stressed the importance of individual representation (and in this sense, it was seen as liberal), 
it still ironically fostered the communal and corporate colonial traditions to a certain 
extent.
163
 In this aspect, the pronunciamiento was undeniably a significant practice in the 
context of this all-important era in terms of the construction of identities. It marked who 
represented what and why, and in this light, it was at once unique and constructive.  
  The Yucatecan pronunciamientos were thus quite distinctive from the general model 
of the pronunciamiento, in terms of actors, origins, process, and even outcomes. They were 
not motivated by popular will but by elite opportunism in the majority of cases, and their 
texts contained not only national political ideals, but also much more local and personal 
ambitions. Additionally, in most cases their success did not depend on popular support and 
pronunciamientos de adhesión, but on military strength. The elite factional struggle provoked 
by and manifested in the pronunciamiento plagued the Yucatecan peninsula for twenty years, 
and ultimately engendered a Mayan rebellion which would bring decades of disaster to 
Yucatán. This is not to say that pronunciamientos were responsible for bringing anarchy to 
Yucatán during the period discussed here. They disrupted the constitutional order, but they 
always put new authorities or systems in place; the region was never left to suffer in disorder 
after a pronunciamiento. They were highly powered by ideological forces and factions, 
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groups which had ideas on which path would not only guarantee their interests, but which 
would benefit the prosperity and development of their region, along with positive relations 
with Mexico. In this sense, they were the markers of a peripheral and poor territory whose 
inhabitants were determined to have their voices heard, the intrinsic right of any man.
164
 
Furthermore, the majority of these pronunciamientos were the yucatecos‟ attempts to either 
second national movements, or to join Mexico through negotiation, rather than to secede. On 
a national level, they were consequently (for the most part) exercises in construction and 
integration, rather than deconstruction and disintegration. These aspects can possibly be 
applied to other regional pronunciamientos if they were to go under intense study.  
Pronunciamientos were therefore evidently not practices of pure instability and 
chaos.
165
 It is only when one realises that this view of the pronunciamiento needs to be 
adopted, that one can truly view the pronunciamiento for what it was: a unique, complex and 
fluid phenomenon arising from a very specific context, with differing origins, dynamics, 
processes and outcomes, always claiming to have the healthiest intentions, and always with 
intended and unintended positive and negative outcomes. It is an urgent task to discover the 
genuineness of the most significant political practice and experience of the time, which was 
not an isolated phenomenon, but was an experience that was inevitably and inextricably 
linked to national and local socio-political and economic circumstances and practices, and 
was essentially, an intrinsic part of Mexican political culture. We need to understand this if 
we are to understand nineteenth-century Mexico, with its grievances, its politics, its 
mentality, and ultimately, its culture, during this “era of pronunciamientos.”166  
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2 
Independence and establishing the Yucatecan pronunciamiento trend: 
The Pronunciamiento of 1821 
 
     Al pueblo que quiere ser libre 
 no le faltan recursos para serlo.
167
 
   
The date was 15 September 1821; the news was not unexpected. A letter from the 
governor of Tabasco, Ángel de Toro, addressed to Yucatán‟s governor and captain general 
Juan María Echéverri, informed him that Tabasco had been occupied by pro-independence 
troops commanded by Juan Fernández,
 
and the people of Tabasco had immediately adhered 
to the independent cause.
168
 New Spain had been swept up in independence movements since 
the proclamation of the Plan of Iguala by Agustín de Iturbide in February 1821, and it was 
inevitable that the wave would ultimately wash over the remote provinces of the southeast. 
The jefe político of Campeche, Miguel Duque de Estrada, had already written to Echéverri 
four days earlier, asking him to declare independence, and strongly suggested once more that 
the captain general swear it. Teniente de rey Hilario Artacho also advised the governor that 
the pro-independence revolts by the national garrison in Campeche were spiralling out of 
control. Additionally, the radical liberal sanjuanistas in Mérida were also calling for 
immediate adhesion to the Plan. Even the businessmen of the Camarilla political faction – the 
opposing party to the sanjuanistas – who constituted significant members of the Provincial 
Deputation had also shown dissatisfaction at the recent decrees of the Cortes against liberal 
Yucatecan trade. Echevérri had to make a decision quickly; the combination of pressure from 
all sides meant that independence was inevitable.  
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A junta made up of the Provincial Deputation, the ayuntamiento of Mérida, and 
various ecclesiastical and military authorities consequently met on that very day of 15 
September, issuing the pronunciamiento de adhesión to the Plan of Iguala and independence. 
The pronunciamiento signified a watershed for the peninsula not only in terms of 
independence; it highlighted several differing factions coming together to second a common 
cause. Despite the national orientation of the exercise, it should be noted that each body 
seconding the Plan of Iguala had its own local interests in mind when supporting the act; be it 
the hope of gaining political representation and changing the political system, the 
preservation of trade and commercial interests, the maintenance of clerical privileges, or the 
loyalty of the locally stationed national garrison to the pro-independent troops throughout the 
nation. One consequently and immediately gains the impression that this first 
pronunciamiento in Yucatán, though seconding a national movement – and thus manifesting 
the already present influence which Mexican politics and pronunciamientos were having (and 
were to have) on the region – was still heavily influenced by local factors, actors and desires. 
This was to be the pattern of pronunciamientos for the rest of the early nineteenth century in 
Yucatán: while the event of the pronunciamiento itself clearly depended on national 
circumstances, the content and motivations of the pronunciamiento were conditioned by local 
factors. This intricate linking of powerful local motivations and the necessity of national 
pronunciamiento strength is the element which would dominate Yucatecan pronunciamientos 
from 1821 onwards.  
Just how significant were the local currents for independence in the context of 
producing this pronunciamiento de adhesión in 1821? The distinctiveness of the origins of 
independence in Yucatán (as compared to those in New Spain) highlighted the locality of the 
desires for independence. The War of Independence of New Spain had not affected remote 
Yucatán, and the seeds for independence would be sown in a much different manner here. 
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Indeed, the idea of independence and its achievement through a pronunciamiento first arose 
among the liberal Yucatecan group known as the sanjuanistas. Formed in 1810 by padre 
Vicente María Velásquez, the sanjuanistas espoused the liberal ideology of philosophers such 
as Jean-Jacques Rousseau, René Descartes, Voltaire (François-Marie Arouet), Charles-Louis 
de Secondat, baron de La Brède et de Montesquieu and Benjamin Constant, highlighting the 
necessity of individual and equal rights for all. They were especially concerned with the 
Maya, campaigning for the abolition of the compulsory religious indigenous obvención tax, 
and the end of Mayan servility.
169
 They had thus vigorously supported the liberal Constituton 
of Cádiz in 1812 in the peninsula, which had decreed that all Maya were to be considered as 
vecinos, and thus exempt from all special taxes and servility.
170
 The most prominent members 
of the sanjuanistas by 1812 were liberal clergy and middle class criollo businessmen, 
lawyers, priests, and teachers, men such as José Matías Quintana, Pablo Moreno, Manuel 
Jiménez Solís, Francisco Carvajal, Lorenzo de Zavala, Pantaleón Cantón and José Mariano 
de Cicero. The Campechean liberals Francisco Antonio Tarrazo and Joaquín García Rejón 
were also united to the sanjuanistas.
171
  
The sanjuanistas had nevertheless faced more than significant opposition since their 
formation in 1810. In reaction to the liberal ideology permeating throughout the cities of 
Mérida and Campeche, another political faction formed. Those opposed to the sanjuanistas 
and everything they represented were called rutineros, so-called because they were “amantes 
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de la rutina.” The rutineros were made up in their majority of members from the upper crust 
of society: landowning and clerical elite, ex-encomenderos, the military, the old aristocracy 
and high royal officials.
172
 They were the defenders of the Church, of the obvention, and of 
Maya labour, elements which were necessary to maintain their social and economic status.
173
 
They dominated the Provincial Deputation in 1812, placed there by special selection methods 
from above,
174
 with rutinero figures such as Juan José Duarte, José María Ruz, Diego 
O´Horán, Manuel Pacheco and Francisco de Paula Villegas all constituting the Deputation. 
While the Constitution of Cádiz had enabled them to be in these positions through its very 
creation of the Deputation, they did not appreciate the liberal reforms which the same 
constitution had decreed with reference to the Maya.
175
 The hate between the liberal 
sanjuanistas and the traditional rutineros consequently ran deep when it came to these 
clashing ideologies.
176
 When the Constitution was abolished in 1814 with the return of 
Ferdinand VII, the rutineros wasted no time in ridiculing and persecuting the sanjuanistas, 
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even sending Zavala, Quintana and Bates to the prison of San Juan de Ulúa in Veracruz for 
three years.
177
  
In 1817, Zavala and his fellow sanjuanistas returned to Yucatán, ever more eager to 
reimplement the Constitution. The faction expanded its base through the liberal Masonic 
lodge La Aurora, which included not only sanjuanistas, but surprisingly, rutineros as well. 
Indeed, news had arrived that year of the revolts of the Spanish liberals against absolutism, 
which included Mina in Pamplona, Porlier in La Coruña, Lacy in Cataluña and Vidal in 
Valencia; yucatecos began to realise that there was the possibility that the King would have 
to re-establish the constitution. Rutineros thus joined the lodge, ensuring that they would be 
on the victorious side if the King decided to bow to the wishes of the rebels. Additionally, by 
joining forces with the sanjuanistas, they intended to capture the sympathies of the liberals, 
hoping to prevent the sanjuanistas from attacking their interests (the tribute, the obvention, 
and Mayan servility) if the King agreed to re-establish the Constitution. Clerical elite such as 
Francisco Paula Villegas, powerful merchants like Pedro José Guzmán, and military men like 
Benito Aznar, José Segundo Carvajal and most importantly, former rutinero Mariano Carrillo 
y Albornoz (commander of the ingenieros of the permanent army) consequently all joined the 
lodge.
178
  
The triumph of the pronunciamiento of Rafael de Riego (which began on 1 January 
1820 and succeeded in March) led to the King‟s restoration of the Constitution. Captain 
General of Yucatán Miguel Castro y Araoz hesitated on its reimplementation, after powerful 
arguments by rutineros headed by teniente de rey Juan José León convinced him not to do so. 
Nevertheless, on 9 March, leaders of the Aurora (Zavala and Carrillo) along with military 
men Benito Aznar and Joaquín Rivas Vertiz convinced the captain general to reestablish the 
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Constitution on 12 May 1820.
179
 Untrusting of the rutineros‟ influence on Araoz, a private 
faction made up of Aznar, Carrillo, Rivas Vertiz, and Villegas forced the captain general to 
resign on 8 June.
180
 The law stated that with the resignation of the captain general, political 
command automatically went to teniente de rey Juan José de León, who was a leading 
rutinero (stationed in Campeche), and thus was an enemy of the masons.
181
 Carrillo 
consequently ordered his dismissal, and promoted himself to captain general of Yucatán.
182
 
He then named Hilario Artacho, commander of the artillery, as teniente de rey.
183
 The 
jefatura política was handed over to Basilio María de Argaiz, and the intendancy to Pedro 
Bolio.
184
   
Further actions by Carrillo would soon however provoke the fragmentation of the 
liberal coalition and herein would lay the first stirrings of a Yucatecan pronunciamiento for 
independence. Just three days after the criollos had assumed their posts, a group headed by 
Carrillo (whose supporters were former rutinero and priest Francisco Paula Villegas, Joaquín 
Rivas Vertiz, Pedro Almeida, businessmen Pedro José Guzmán and Sergeant Major Benito 
Aznar)
185
 demanded the dismissal of Argaiz from his post of jefe politíco of Mérida on 21 
June. While heavy protests came from Zavala and Quintana – who had close links with 
Argaiz
186
 – they were powerless to stop it. The Carrillo coalition ironically nominated former 
rutinero Rivas Vertiz in Argaiz‟s place, ensuring that the three branches of power were now 
in the hands of this newly formed, powerful, and potentially authoritarian faction. Former 
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sanjuanistas José Cadenas, Joaquín Castellanos, Francisco Bates, Manuel Milanés, and 
Pantaleón Cantón now joined this stronger Carrillo-led faction which would soon become 
known as the Camarilla.
187
   
The other half of the faction, led by Zavala and Quintana, was disgusted by the 
dismissal of Argaiz, and by Carrillo‟s disloyalty to the sanjuanistas, as they realised that he 
had simply used them to promote himself and his followers to positions of power.
188
 
Additionally, the fact that former rutineros Carrillo and Rivas Vertiz were in governing 
positions meant that the sanjuanistas had lost any chance of representation at a political level; 
indeed, the ruling coalition did not represent any of their principles. The sanjuanistas thus 
reorganised themselves in September 1820, with the new name of the Confederación 
Patriótica. With Zavala as president, the faction declared that its aims were to educate the 
citizens on their constitutional rights and to spread the importance of the respect of the 
constitution (no doubt in the face of the unlawful moves made by Carrillo and his men).
189
 
Many politicians chose to either stay or unite with Zavala, with Manuel Crescencio Rejón, 
Lorenzo Peón, Joaquín Casares y Armas, José Encarnación Cámara,
190
 Manuel García Sosa, 
José Tiburcio López, and the brothers Francisco Antonio and Pedro Tarrazo all becoming 
confederados.
191
  
The confederados had placed their hopes in the October elections in order to gain 
political positions. Nevertheless, their expectations were soon quashed, as throughout the 
voting process, Carrillo ordered the increase of military patrols to intimidate voters. 
Additionally, camarillero Rivas Vertiz also allowed his supporters to vote more than once, 
simply dressed in different clothing, and then granted himself and his secretary the privilege 
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of tallying the final votes (a deed which should have been done by a neutral parish junta).
192
 
Needless to say, the confederados were infuriated by the blatant disrespect for fair elections, 
heading a motín on 3 October, which led to the temporary imprisonment of Zavala, García 
Sosa, and others (these two figures had to leave to attend the Cortes in Spain the very next 
day).
193
  
For the confederados, faith had now been lost in a just government and free and fair 
elections. Their members had been imprisoned, elections had been rigged, and it had been 
demonstrated that the camarilleros were willing to take any measures needed to maintain 
their political control over the peninsula; and they could afford to do so, because men such as 
Carrillo and Aznar were members of the permanent army. Zavala consequently believed that 
once political power resided with the military, the liberal ideas of and respect for the 
constitution would never be observed.
194
 In his words: 
La constitución que había servido de escalón al señor Carrillo para usurpar el mando 
militar, vino a ser luego el objeto de su mayor desprecio, y se vieron atropellados por 
este déspota letrados, eclesiásticos, jueces, militares, y en fin toda clase de 
ciudadanos, como fuesen libres y tuviesen valor para manifestar la verdad […] ¿Y es 
ésta, decían los meridanos, la libertad que hemos jurado defender? ¿Ésta la felicidad 
que nos ofrecía el señor Carrillo cuando aspiraba al mando? ¡¡¡Provincia desgraciada, 
tu destino es ser siempre esclava y víctima de la tiranía!!!
195
 
There only seemed to be one solution left for confederado Quintana: independence, 
meaning a complete break from the current system and authorities, and a fresh start. With his 
own son participating in the insurgency in far-off Mexico, Quintana had been partial to the 
idea of independence for several years, but the majority of sanjuanistas had not welcomed his 
ideas, having placed their faith in the restoration of the constitution.
196
 Now, with those in 
charge of implementing the constitution having proved themselves unreliable, and with a 
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much more concrete and immediate reason to break with the current system, the 
confederados began to warm to Quintana‟s ideas. Zavala became one of the principal 
advocators of independence; it was reported that in a dinner in September 1820, Zavala “ya 
caliente con los licores,” had an interesting discussion with a fellow confederado. According 
to sources, Zavala declared that “la Confederación producirá mil bienes.” “Será,” answered 
his fellow confederado “el despojo de los jefes actuales.” “Sí,” responded Zavala, “pero sobre 
todo la independencia.”197 The intrinsic right of the people to take whatever means necessary 
– even if they be unlawful – to depose unwanted authoritarian leaders and re-establish justice 
in the constitutional system thus became intrinsically linked to independence. Indeed, 
camarillero Raimundo Pérez condemned the confederados for trying to “formar el espíritu de 
los pueblos [....] [para] hacerse dueño de las elecciones, deponer a los ilustrados y virtuosos 
jefes que gobiernan la provincia, y de este modo, sustraerla del gobierno monárquico de la 
metrópolis y erigirla en república,” adding that the confederados were spreading the belief 
among the “pueblo […] a no tener distancia entre el que manda y el que obedece, pintar 
siempre a las autoridades como opresoras de la humanidad o conspirar [par]a hacerlos 
despreciables.”198 Nevertheless, confederados now (ironically) believed that they were 
allowed to take anti-constitutional measures in order to ensure the eventual respect of 
constitutional procedures. Quintana thus declared that the conduct of a true sanjuanista “se 
ajustaba a la regla de que la autoridad no debe ser respetada sino en cuanto cumple con el 
objeto de su institución.”199 On this basis, the confederado program was now legitimate, as it 
was their right to “quitar a las autoridades”200 when their rule exceeded acceptable limits. 
Even as the confederados began plotting for independence at the end of 1820, events 
in New Spain would change the entire face of politics of the region forever. While criollos 
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had managed to take over constitutional power in Yucatán, Spanish officials still holding 
power in New Spain had dragged their feet over the full implementation of the constitution, 
thus leading to severe disillusionment and a loss of faith among criollos in the administrative 
bodies. Their solution was the same as the resolution of the confederados: independence. On 
24 February 1821, Agustín de Iturbide headed the pronunciamiento of the Plan of Iguala in 
Guerrero, declaring Mexican independence, the union of Mexicans and Spaniards, and 
respect for the Roman Catholic Church (the three guarantees). A constitutional monarchy 
system would rule the nation, and the emperor would be from a Spanish dynasty (the throne 
was actually offered to Ferdinand VII). The Treaties of Córdoba followed on 24 August 
1821, where Spanish Viceroy Juan O‟ Donojú ratified the Plan, fully establishing Mexican 
independence. 
The Plan of Iguala was the missing element which the confederados had needed to 
proclaim independence. Firstly, it conformed exactly to their ideology which had been 
formed concerning the right of the people to protest and “pronounce” against authorities 
which did not represent the needs of the pueblo, in order to establish a system which was 
beneficial to the majority. Additionally, confronted with the powerful civic and military 
Camarilla faction, it was impossible for sanjuanistas to take any real action which targeted 
only strictly local aims. To adhere to the much larger independence movement which was 
sweeping through New Spain bolstered their own project‟s strength. Furthermore, the all-
encompassing doctrine and vast appeal of the Plan of Iguala would also give the sanjuanista 
cause a greater sense of political and ideological validity; all they had to do was issue a 
pronunciamiento de adhesión in order to legitimately fit into the wider context of a grand 
movement which was saving the patria from imperial rule. This was to be the basis for 
successful Yucatecan pronunciamientos throughout the early nineteenth century; yucatecos 
essentially needed a national pronunciamiento to adhere to, in order to give their own local 
82 
 
cause some sort of national and greater authenticity and strength, and thus allow some chance 
of the pronunciamiento‟s success. Yucatecan pronunciamientos would also in major part 
identify with and follow the ideologies permeating throughout Mexico. Finally, it had to 
succeed; the power of the pronunciamiento had been demonstrated in Riego‟s success in 
intimidating a King to re-establish the constitution, and now a Mexican was daring to do the 
same, with heavy support; how could he not triumph?  
With the news of the Plan of Iguala, the now renamed liberales sanjuanistas (as of 
1821), including Quintana, Agustín Zavala (his brother Lorenzo was still abroad attending the 
Cortes), José Tiburcio López, and Mateo Morenos all worked vigorously for the cause of the 
seconding of the pronunciamiento in the peninsula. They held juntas in San Juan, advocating 
independence, and published pro-independent ideas and discussions in their liberal founded 
newspapers El Miscelaneo, El Redactor Meridano, and Los Clamores de la Fidelidad 
Americana contra la opresión o Fragmentos para la historia futura. Fervent sanjuanista Juan 
de Dios Cosgaya also had his own newspapers El Yucateco o Amigo del Pueblo, El 
Democrático Universal and El Cometa o Tertulia Mitidáctica, claiming Iturbide to be the 
saviour of the patria.
201
 The sanjuanistas began a campaign to collect signatures for 
independence in September, and by the 11
th 
of the same month, they had already collected 
more than two hundred.
202
 In response, the camarillero-dominated Deputation (made up of 
Pedro Bolio, Pedro Manuel de Regil, Joaquín Torres and Pablo de Lanz) declared that New 
Spain was in a state of civil war, while reiterating Yucatán‟s fidelity to the monarchy. 
Nevertheless, it was impossible to repress the open discussion on and action concerning 
separation from Spain; in September, the people of Mérida woke up to see a statue of King 
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Fernando VII dressed in a cowboy hat, with a rope around his neck, and holding a banana. 
For the liberals, the monarchy was practically finished.
203
 
The news of the Plan of Iguala mobilised part of another powerful faction in favour of 
independence: the rutineros. As expected, before the news of the Plan of Iguala filtered down 
to Yucatán, the rutineros had declared themselves sworn enemies of the insurgency, with 
priests even condemning the rebels in their sermons. Nevertheless, the realisation that the 
Cortes were bent on clerical reform (to abolish the fueros and the obvention, securalize the 
convents, and end Mayan servility) made most of the rutinero party quickly change its mind. 
When the plan of Iguala outlined promises to protect the Catholic religion, to conserve the 
fueros of the clergy and to protect their (the clergy‟s) properties, with no talk of ending Maya 
servility, there was hardly any rutinero who did not feel compelled to adhere to the Plan. In 
the words of rutinero Ceferino Gutiérrez “la total separación de México a la dominación 
española, nos será muy útil” as it would free rutineros from “la inicua y siempre maldita 
Constitución española, origen de cuantos males hemos experimentado, ya será causa de que 
España pierda infaliblemente todas las Américas.”204 They held no loyalty to the camarilleros 
in power, as many had been furious at the dismissal of staunch rutineros Captain General 
Araoz and teniente de rey León; the event of masons taking over of administration was not 
only unlawful, but blasphemous, (indeed, a significant section of the clergy saw masonry as 
evil). Moreover, they had lost confidence in the king who had bowed to the wishes of the 
liberals.  
Merchants (both camarilleros and sanjuanistas) also began calling for the seconding 
of the pronunciamiento due to recent harmful trade measures decreed by the Cortes. External 
trade was of vital importance for the economic survival of the peninsula, and Yucatecan 
businessmen had enjoyed significantly more liberal terms of trade than those in New Spain, 
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especially with regard to more partners and lowered tariffs.
205
 Powerful Campechean 
businessmen Pedro Manuel de Regil and Pablo de Lanz, although camarilleros and members 
of the Provincial Deputation, had been protesting against the decree of 9 October 1820 which 
had declared that from 15 August 1821, the trade of cotton goods between Spanish colonies 
and all other ports would cease. For Yucatecans, this meant the end of legal commerce of 
textiles and cloths coming in their majority from Jamaica, affecting Meridian and 
Campechean merchants.
206
 Additionally, in mid-1821 the Crown blocked the principal 
mercantile routes from Yucatán to Veracruz, the first leg of the route for goods exported from 
Yucatán.
207
 With no response to the merchants‟ complaints, it became apparent that the 
institution was no longer willing to serve the needs of the elite tradesmen, and their 
inclination towards independence consequently heightened. Just as Jamaica was about to send 
a substantial shipment of English cloths and threads to be sold in Campeche on 11 September 
(now an illegal move), on that very same day, the Campechean ayuntamiento asked Echéverri 
to declare independence.   
Campeche itself was a hotbed of independence. The Campechean ayuntamiento had 
looked on with increasing disgust at the dictatorial moves of the Meridian-based Camarilla 
administration, which had not bothered to consult with any other political body (i.e. the 
ayuntamiento of Campeche). This was the beginning of a Campechean resentment against the 
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Meridian administration‟s enjoyment of political domination which would last for decades to 
come, and would be responsible for some of the most significant pronunciamientos of the 
century. The head of the ayuntamiento of Campeche Miguel Duque de Estrada now 
demanded independence in early September, declaring to the Deputation that if the Meridians 
did not support the cause, the Campecheans “atropellarían con todo”, declaring themselves 
independent of Spain on their own.
208
 He then sent commissionaires to Tabasco to let Captain 
General Ángel de Toro know that Yucatecans sympathised with the cause of independence, 
and that they only awaited orders to second it. The national garrison in Campeche was also 
up in arms;
209
 the news in Campeche of the occupation of Tabasco by four hundred military 
troops was their catalyst,
210
 as they began revolting in support of the pro-independence army 
(called the Ejército Trigarante) in Mexico. It should be kept in mind that they had also been 
highly upset by the dismissal of their teniente de rey Juan José de León by Carrillo, and on 15 
September, the new teniente de rey Hilario Artacho wrote to the governor complaining that 
he was being obligated to take extreme precautions to try to preserve order.
211
  
The threat posed by the mutinous garrison was to be the last push needed for the 
Provincial Deputation to issue the pronunciamiento de adhesión. This was yet another 
pronunciamiento trend which was to be demonstrated throughout early nineteenth-century 
Yucatán; regardless of the civilian desires for a pronunciamiento in the region, it would 
always be the military who would be responsible for the actual issuing of the 
pronunciamiento, be it through the threat of military violence, violence itself, or the military 
themselves taking matters into their own hands and becoming the first and primary 
pronunciados. This was just the first sign that the pronunciamiento would soon become a 
                                                          
208
 „Los Yucatecos‟, Compendio de la historia de Yucatán, 1825, p.4. 
209
 The garrison was constituted of the permanent battalions of Castilla, that of pardos or tiradores, the milicias 
blancas and the body of artillery. See Ancona, Historia de Yucatán Tomo III, pp.131-132.  
210
 Raquel Barcelo, “La consumación de la Independencia en Yucatán” in La consumación de independencia 
Tomo II (Archivo General de la Nación: México, 1999) p.379.  
211
 Alcocer Bernés, “Campeche en la consumación de la independencia”, p.77. 
86 
 
military-dominated practice which was to last throughout the early independent years, as 
army officers would increasingly become involved in politics through their ability to issue 
and control pronunciamientos.  
Interests among all sectors had thus converged for independence, and all for very 
different reasons. Echéverri, forced by the pressure from all sides, but ultimately fearful of 
the garrison in Campeche,
212
 ordered a junta on 15 September in which the members of the 
Provincial Deputation, the ayuntamiento of Mérida, sanjuanistas, rutineros, the military (with 
only Carrillo refusing to sign the act) and the clergy attended, reflecting the grand spectrum 
of interests to which the pronunciamiento appealed.
213
 The pronunciamiento de adhesión, the 
first pronunciamiento to ever be issued in Yucatán, claiming to be “unida en afectos y 
sentimientos a todos los que aspiran a la felicidad del suelo Americano” proclaimed to uphold 
the Plan of Iguala and Independence, which “la reclama la justicia, la requiere la necesidad y 
la abona el deseo de todos sus habitantes.”214 The pointed references to the ideological 
sympathies which Yucatecans shared with the insurgents of New Spain were already 
important indicators of the influence which politics and pronunciamientos in Mexico were to 
have on Yucatán in the future.  
While the pronunciamiento had declared itself united with the movement and 
affections of New Spain, recognising as “hermanos y amigos a todos los americanos” there 
was nevertheless no indication in its text concerning actual unification with Mexico. Instead, 
it simply declared that sanjuanista Francisco Tarrazo and camarillero Juan Rivas Vertiz were 
to go to Mexico to communicate the adhesion to the Plan, and to wait on the “definitas 
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resoluciones” of the powers in Mexico.215 The camarilleros had adhered to the 
pronunciamiento of an entirely different province (Mexico), without demonstrating any 
intention of uniting with that province, and this had been intentional. They (the camarilleros) 
had only obtained power less than a year ago, and they had no intention of losing their 
authority due to alterations of the political system inspired by events from without. As Anna 
has pointed out, regional elites in the more remote provinces of Yucatán viewed the Plan of 
Iguala not primarily as unification with Mexico, but more importantly as an opportunity to 
consolidate and strengthen their own positions.
216
 In his words, “Throughout the country, the 
provinces rushed to independence because the Plan of Iguala […] promised protection and 
development for groups in control of local power.”217 John Tutino has also supported this 
view, as he believes that “Mexican elites saw independence as a means to claim control of the 
state to serve their class interests”218 The camarillero-dominated Deputation, contrary to the 
desires of the sanjuanistas, rutineros and and campechanos, had thus manipulated the 
pronunciamiento to ensure that no resetting of the local political system would occur, but 
instead ensured that they would simply consolidate their power through independence as they 
freed themselves from Spanish rule. Article Two of this pronunciamiento de adhesión thus 
stated that “sin la menor alteración se observen las leyes existentes, según el orden 
constitucional, y se respeten las autoridades en todos los ramos de gobierno, actualmente 
establecido.”219 In one blow, the hopes of the sanjuanistas, the army, the rutinero clergy, and 
the Campechean politicians for political change were thrown back in their faces. The 
camarilleros had frustrated the entire plan of uniting with Mexico and resetting the political 
structure; the people, the systems, and the mechanisms were identical to before. All that had 
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changed was that Yucatán was left floundering without any Spanish economic aid (an annual 
contribution of 150,000 pesos which dated from early Bourbon rule), and with an uncertain 
future relationship with Mexico.
220
 
The camarilleros also ensured that their merchant interests with Cuba were protected 
with Article Three of the pronunciamiento decreeing that Yucatán “reconoce por hermanos y 
amigos a todos los americanos y españoles europeos,”221 and Article Five stating “que para 
precaver los irresarcibles perjuicios que resultarían de la interrupción del comercio entre 
aquellos y estos puertos, se acuerde del mismo modo su continuación, bajo las reglas, 
aranceles y seguridades, actualmente establecidas.”222 Camarilleros had thus successfully 
consolidated both their political and economic dominance; independence, it seemed, had not 
been such a bad idea after all. This was only the beginning of the practice of the Yucatecan 
elite adapting a national pronunciamiento to favour their local circumstances; even though 
the pronunciamiento had reflected the desires of the majority for independence, it had been 
manipulated by the camarilleros to suit their own purposes. Throughout early nineteenth-
century Yucatán, the political and military elite would continually hijack and convert a 
national reactive pronunciamiento (against ruling authorities) into a local proactive practice 
to ensure that it benefitted their interests. In this sense, from the very first pronunciamiento in 
Yucatán, there were already inklings that it was to become in part an opportunistic elite 
exercise. A regional political faction giving local flavour to a national movement (manifested 
in a pronunciamiento de adhesión) would be a pattern of Yucatecan pronunciamientos for 
years to come. 
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Regardless of the camarilleros‟ outright manhandling of the pronunciamiento de 
adhesión, they were careful to formulate a rhetoric which was to become almost standard text 
for pronunciamientos in the future. To mask their self-serving actions, the pronunciamiento 
text was filled with dramatic talk that it had indeed been a liberal exercise, representing the 
needs of the people and their rights to make decisions for their own wellbeing. The 
camarilleros thus declared that the preservation of the current political power system was 
necessary “afianzar más eficazmente los derechos sagrados de la libertad, propiedad y 
seguridad legítima, elementos que constituyen el orden público y la felicidad social” and for 
the “bienestar y prosperidad de esta benemérita provincia.”223 The need to tangibly express 
that the pronunciamiento was serving the needs of the people, while it clearly was against the 
majority‟s desires was highly paradoxical. Nevertheless, the camarilleros had to include this 
rhetoric in order to preserve that liberal aspect of legitimacy which validated the existence of 
the pronunciamiento in the first place. This practice of keeping up appearances through 
pretentious liberal rhetoric (i.e. claiming to represent the needs of “the people” and thus 
ensuring the general happiness of Yucatecan society) in a pronunciamiento, while in fact it 
was exercised by one elite minority in Yucatán (not just by the camarilleros, but other 
factions as well as shall be discovered) was to be one dominant characteristic of the 
Yucatecan pronunciamiento. Indeed, this was just a glimpse into the pronunciamiento future.  
Despite the actions of the camarilleros, they were fully aware that Yucatán could 
never survive on its own as a fully independent nation; the region‟s terrain was lacking in 
natural resources needed to nurture a prosperous internal industry and market; trade was thus 
extremely important to its economic survival. However, its exposure to the sea meant that it 
was a victim to constant looting and pirating unless a richer nation subsidised the protection 
of its coasts and its trade. In fact, the province was so poor that until recently, instead of 
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having to pay contributions to Spain (as all the other Spanish colonies did), it instead received 
150,000 pesos annually from the Crown.
224
 Unification with Mexico was the only answer; 
but the camarilleros were to attempt to negotiate for positive terms in this domain. On 20 
September 1821 the Deputation declared to Iturbide‟s newly installed administration that 
unification with Mexico would only happen if the liberal mercantile regulations of 1814 of 
Yucatán were reimplemented,
225
 and if Mexico provided the annual subsidy of 150,000 
(previously granted by Spain).
226
 This use of the pronunciamiento to pave the way for 
negotiation with Mexico in the interest of the preservation of relative Yucatecan economic 
(and political as shall be seen) sovereignty would become a defining characteristic of the 
Yucatecan pronunciamiento throughout the following decades.  
The camarilleros‟ political manipulation of the pronunciamiento de adhesión would 
not be accepted quietly. On 13 October, the national garrison (loyal to the executive and the 
national army) and the clergy of Campeche (eager for the protection offered by the Plan of 
Iguala), headed by deposed teniente de rey Juan José de León, powerful parish priests José 
Mariano de Cicero and Vicente María Velasquez, assumed the name of the iturbidistas and 
began revolting for the swearing (not just the declaration) of the Plan and unification with 
Mexico. They then proceeded to order the ayuntamiento of Campeche to host the tricolour 
flag of the Army of the Three Guarantees (on King Ferdinand VII‟s birthday, of all days), just 
days after the Deputation had declared that the Spanish flag was to remain flying; it was the 
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first city in Mexico to hoist the flag, and the Deputation quickly interpreted it as an act of 
disrespect to Spain and the constitution.
227
   
On 22 October the iturbidistas then interrupted a session by the Campechean 
ayuntamiento and read aloud a pronunciamiento which they had formulated that day. They 
demanded that all authorities swear independence (instead of merely proclaiming it), and 
fully implement and respect the 21 articles of the Plan of Iguala and the 17 articles of the 
Treaties of Córdoba.
228
 They were soon followed by a second group demanding the 
reestablishment of teniente de rey León (who had been replaced by Hilario Artacho since 
June 1820) and jefe político Miguel Duque de Estrada (who had been dismissed by the 
Deputation following the motín of 13 October) in their posts.
229
 The ayuntamiento quickly 
called together a junta made up of powerful military, administrative and ecclesiastic 
figures,
230
 and just after a few hours, it declared that “convencido de la justicia de la solicitud, 
y de lo general del pronunciamiento, resolvió, se procediese sin demora alguna a jurar la 
independencia, en los términos pedidos, y se verificó, recibiendo juramento a todos los 
individuos de la junta.”231 It also granted Duque de Estrada and León their former positions. 
This violence by upset factions would signal yet another aspect of the Yucatecan 
pronunciamiento. Dissatisfied parties would constantly threaten armed force if they were 
opposed to the pronunciamiento issued (this would be the case in 1824 and 1834).  
The mutiny in Campeche was enough of a scare for the Meridians; on 2 November 
1821 a junta met in Mérida, and resolved to unite with Mexico. The ayuntamiento of 
Campeche, witnessing the success of its demands, now took an even stronger stance against 
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the Deputation, sending a letter on 5 November refusing to recognise Echéverri as governor, 
and declaring that León was now jefe superior político and captain general of the entire 
peninsula.
232
 In a junta convened on 8 November 1821, in the face of unrelenting 
Campechean pressure, Captain General Echéverri renounced his position, stating that he 
believed “lejos de creer que con su permanencia en él se impediría la anarquía, por el 
contrario estaba persuadido que la ocasionara.”233 The same junta nevertheless resolved that 
León was not to be recognised in any official position.
234
 Instead, the junta handed the post of 
the intendancy to Pedro Bolio, and the post of military commander to Sergeant Major Benito 
Aznar.
235
 
Needless to say, Campecheans were enraged, and stubbornly declared that León was 
to assume both commands.
236
 The result was that Pedro Bolio (acting as jefe superior 
politico) and Benito Aznar (acting as military commander) governed Mérida, while Léon 
ruled Campeche and its environs, acting as both governor and captain general. Both groups 
sent separate representatives to National Congress in Mexico City; Mérida sent Francisco 
Antonio Tarrazo and Juan Rivas Vertiz, and Campeche sent José Mariano Cicero and Juan 
Esteban de Requeña. With both cities stubbornly clinging on to their sovereignty over their 
areas, the governance of Yucatán would continue this way for several months. Indeed, when 
centrally appointed Governor Melchor Álvarez arrived in Yucatán in March 1822 to take up 
his post (thus replacing all ruling figures), he declared that he had found “la Provincia en una 
perfecta anarquía manteniéndose independientes uno de otro el partido de Campeche y el de 
Mérida y resto de la Provincia.”237   
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The pronunciamiento of 1821, beginning so positively with the hope of independence, 
had evidently soon caused unrest within the Yucatecan region, mainly due to its manipulation 
by the camarillero elite. This pronunciamiento was already demonstrating characteristics 
which were to become prominent in future pronunciamientos of Yucatán: the need for 
adherence to a national movement in order to realise a successful regional pronunciamiento 
had already been established, and this would not change for the next twenty years. While an 
outside impetus had to generate the Yucatecan pronunciamiento, its nature would 
nevertheless be conditioned by local forces in the peninsula. Moreover, the hijacking of these 
national pronunciamientos by local elites, who nevertheless claimed to represent the voice of 
many, was to dominate the most significant pronunciamientos in Yucatán. This adaptation of 
the pronunciamiento to serve an elite faction would trigger opposition in other sectors, 
another factor which was to be present. This elite manipulation did not mean that there was 
no ideological drive behind the pronunciamiento. It was not only a political practice in terms 
of holding on to local power, but in terms of fulfilling ideas and ideals. Indeed, the 
sanjuanistas, camarilleros, and rutineros had all demonstrated distinct principles and desires 
in their motivations for seconding the Plan of Iguala, be them liberal, regionalist, or clerical. 
Finally, the use of the pronunciamiento to open negotiation with Mexico would be a 
continual manifestation during the early independent years, meaning that the Yucatecan 
pronunciamientos were to be clear signposts of the fluctuating relations which were to occur 
between the peninsula and Mexico. This use of the pronunciamiento as a negotiating tactic 
between local and national powers would be even more heavily manifest in the very next 
pronunciamiento of Yucatán; the assault of the centralist Iturbide empire on elite autonomy 
would provoke powers in the peninsula to use the pronunciamiento as a powerful tool of 
national lobbying, as they defended their interests against a new “outside” power: Mexico.  
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3 
Federalism and Inter-Regional Factionalism: 
       The Pronunciamientos of 1823-1824 
 
The Geographical position of Yucatan  
renders it in many respects independent  
of the rest of the Mexican Territory. [...]  
its connection with Mexico for social  
or political purposes may be said to have 
 always been rather nominal than real.
238
 
 
The pronunciamientos of 1823 and 1824 signified the first phases of the evolution of 
the practice in a newly independent Yucatán. The 1823 pronunciamiento seconding the 
national movement inspired by the regional plans of Veracruz of 1822 and of Casa Mata of 
1823 demonstrated a significant development in the practice: as an instrument by the regions 
to forcefully negotiate with the newly formed Mexican national administration for political 
change. Indeed, through the pronunciamiento, elites in the regions reacted to the negative 
experience of the centralist Iturbide administration which had assaulted their previous strong 
realms of political and economic autonomy. In Yucatán, the Iturbide regime would harm the 
interests of the elite and powerful camarilleros, the radical liberal sanjuanistas, and the 
Spaniards, all in different ways. The pronunciamientos of 1823 (for there were several in 
Yucatán during the year) thus demonstrated the realisation in nineteenth-century Yucatán 
(and Mexico) that pronunciamientos (and power) could originate from the regions and target 
the Mexican administration. Moreover, these regional pronunciamientos could assert 
themselves over the will of the powerful politicians in Mexico City as they called for national 
political change if circumstances demanded it.  
The pronunciamiento of 1824, issued by the Campechean elite against the Meridian 
politicians and merchants – due to the latter‟s refusal to obey the national 1823 decree of war 
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against Spain – would demonstrate an even further advancement of the practice; there was yet 
another sub-level of utilisation, as pronunciados adapted the practice from a regional to a 
local (or inter-regional) exercise. Indeed, for the first time in 1824, one local faction (the 
Campecheans) would use the pronunciamiento directly against another (the Meridians). 
Yucatecans had evidently realised that the pronunciamiento did not have to express political 
opinion just nationally, but could be used as a vehicle of local protest as well. The 
commencement of the use of the pronunciamiento as a local exercise began in this 
pronunciamiento of 1824, but the fact that this pronunciamiento would protest against 
disobedience to Mexico highlighted the still permeable influence of Mexican relations in 
inspiring the Yucatecan pronunciamiento (which had been a trend formed since 
independence).    
The Yucatecan pronunciamiento of 1823 seconding the plans of Veracruz and Casa 
Mata, although part of a national movement, was intensely local in the aspect that it reflected 
several socio-political factions‟ desires in Yucatán to repel the centralist attempts of the 
Mexican Empire and to regain the relative autonomy which Yucatecan elites had enjoyed 
previous to the union with Mexico. It is relevant to remember that from the onset, 
unconditional unification with Mexico was not what the Yucatecan camarillero elite had 
hoped for in the accomplishment of independence. Pressured to proclaim independence by 
the rebellious iturbidistas (headed by then teniente de rey Juan José León) in Campeche in 
October 1821, the camarilleros’ aim had still been to preserve their hold on the region, as 
their pronunciamiento of independence had evidently been designed to maintain their 
political domination of the region. Additionally, the terms of unification proposed by the 
camarillero-dominated Provincial Deputation to the Iturbide government in late 1821 were 
meant to preserve the economic and trade freedom enjoyed by the elite merchants. The forced 
union with Mexico in November had, however, led to the national government‟s complete 
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dismissal of these Yucatecan political and economic attempts at relative sovereignty. From 
the start of this new era the Deputation had thus become under the control of Mexico with no 
assurance of the preservation of its administrative and/or economic autonomy. There was 
consequently significant resentment, fear, and insecurity in placing the fate of Yucatecans‟ 
precious realm in the hands of a government more than a thousand kilometres away which 
knew nothing, and probably cared nothing, about their priorities and interests. 
The more radical liberal sanjuanistas, while supporting the Plan of Iguala, had not 
been enthusiastic to unite with a centralist government; while they had all wanted 
independence, they were fearful that the Iturbide regime would debilitate the relative 
sovereignty of their region. It is significant to note that radical sanjuanistas such as Manuel 
Crescencio Rejón, Manuel García Sosa, José Matías Quintana and Francisco Tarrazo were all 
against the unification with the central government from the very beginning. In their minds, it 
constituted the “opresión del pueblo, y la impunidad de los empleos y funcionarios en sus 
arbitrariedades y abusos.”239 They thus immediately began discussing the usefulness of a 
republic as an alternative to this centralist system.
240
 Consequently, from the very advent of 
unification with Mexico, camarilleros and sanjuanistas already had one common interest: 
they could not achieve independence with the presence of the iturbidista faction in the 
peninsula, but they would work for the establishment of relative Yucatecan autonomy and the 
reduction of Mexico‟s power over their province, hopefully to be manifested in a federal 
republic, and which they would attempt to achieve, of course, through a pronunciamiento.  
What more specific reasons would provoke these factions to pronounce for the 
empowerment of the regions throughout 1822 and 1823? The dominating factor was the 
assault on the economic and trade practices of Yucatán. Not only had the Mexican 
administration not accepted the Yucatecan economic negotiations for unification, but they 
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demolished the Yucatecans‟ historically liberal trade conditions almost immediately. Two 
weeks after the Deputation had pledged its unification with the Mexican nation, on 15 
November 1821 Iturbide‟s government abolished the liberal reglamento de comercio of 1814 
(detailed in the previous chapter) which the Deputation had reimplemented following their 
declaration of independence on 15 September. Instead, the Mexican government ordered the 
imposition of customs duties at 25 percent of the invoice value of all imported and exported 
goods to and from overseas destinations (including Cuba and Jamaica, and the United States 
– Yucatán‟s main trade partners) throughout the empire. The 25 percent tax charge sent 
shockwaves throughout the commercial sector, as by September 1822, the officials of the 
Campechean treasury body declared that due to the inability to pay export taxes, the export of 
meat, meat products, and henequen had ceased completely. Lack of income from exports 
logically meant a severe drop in the financial ability to import products, with the same 
Campechean officials lamenting that “A nuestra bahía llegan ya pocas embarcaciones, y más 
adelante serán menos […] queda este puerto reducido a solo el comercio de importación de 
sus precisos consumos.”241 These measures affected both camarilleros and sanjuanistas, as 
camarilleros Pedro Marcial Guerra, Joaquín García Rejón, Lorenzo Peón, Pedro Almeida, 
Pedro José Guzmán and Pedro Manuel de Regil (these last two being the most prominent 
merchants of Campeche) along with sanjuanistas José Tiburcio López, Eusebio Villamil, 
Crescencio José Pinelo, Ciprián Blanco, Francisco Tarrazo, José Matías Quintana and Pedro 
del Castillo all felt the strain of the loss of trade.
242
 Discontent was manifest as by 4 May 
1822, the members of the ayuntamientos of Campeche and Mérida declared that they refused 
to carry out the national economic policies, with Meridian ayuntamiento members such as 
businessmen José Tiburcio López, Joaquín Quijano, Manuel Carvajal and José Julián Peón 
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protesting specifically against the tariff of 25 percent on imports and exports.
243
 Moreover, 
the Deputation – also occupied by several members of the economic elite such as Pedro 
Bolio, Pedro Almeida and Luciano Dorantes – chose to simply refuse to implement the 
economic decrees by mid-June 1822.
244
  
The camarillero-occupied Provincial Deputation also lost significant political power 
due to the establishment of centrally-appointed Governor and Captain General (and 
iturbidista) Melchor Álvarez in January 1822. He came with an agenda contradictory to 
Yucatecan camarillero and sanjuanista desires: for Yucatecans to bow to the centralist 
regime in all political and economic matters, ensuring their obedience to the Mexican 
government and all its decrees.
245
 The camarilleros resented him because he was now the 
supreme authority of the peninsula, subjugating their leaders Military Commander Benito 
Aznar and jefe superior político Pedro Bolio. His imposition also incensed the sanjuanistas 
who were becoming aware of the increasing centralism of the Iturbide administration. On 3 
February 1822, Governor Álvarez forced Pedro Bolio and the ayuntamiento of Mérida to not 
only swear their fidelity to Iturbide, but also to write to Zavala and López in National 
Congress at the time, ordering them to observe and respect the independent system.
246
  
The swearing of Iturbide as emperor on 21 July 1822 only angered Yucatecan factions 
even further. For the sanjuanistas, this was a cause opposite to the one which they had 
pronounced for in 1821; they had wanted independence, not a centralist empire. For the elite 
camarilleros (who were also in their majority liberal, one should recall), it was only a 
confirmation of the loss of their regional power. So disgusted were both sections of liberals, 
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that the Yucatecan republican faction attending Congress in Mexico City (made up of 
sanjuanistas José Tiburcio López, Manuel Crescencio Rejón, Fernando Valle, and Francisco 
and Antonio Tarrazo), all boycotted the session of Congress on 19 May which declared 
Iturbide as emperor; Zavala would also later reflect in his Ensayo Histórico that he 
considered the crowning of Iturbide an unwise act.
247
 Subsequently Francisco Tarrazo was 
imprisoned, accused of participating in a republican conspiracy against Iturbide, only 
increasing sanjuanista discontent.
248
 Indeed, in May 1822, liberal Joaquín Casares y Armas, 
while in Havana, published various articles against Iturbide, condemning the farce of his 
proclamation as emperor and the tyranny which the monarchy represented.
249
 In August of 
the same year, when the deputies and other figures who had travelled to Mexico to see the 
coronation of Iturbide returned to Yucatán with their highly unfavourable impressions of the 
monarchy, the opinions pitted against the Iturbide Empire heightened considerably.   
An unspoken and understood pact was now formed between the camarilleros and 
sanjuanistas; the struggle for internal power would be put aside in the face of a much larger 
external threat. The economic and political traumas in the peninsula throughout the past year 
were not to be blamed on any internal party, but on outside imposition and interference. 
Moreover, the creation of an empire was just too extreme. These circumstances were to 
cultivate a new – and very temporary – ideology among the liberal elite; it was a compact and 
united stand between sanjuanistas and camarilleros against afuera, taking privilege over any 
of their conflicts adentro.
250
 Any hope of a republic now depended on their united efforts, 
and this would be manifest in the next pronunciamiento to soon occur in the peninsula.  
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These two factions were not to provide the only efforts behind the next 
pronunciamiento in Yucatán. If there was one sector of society more angered than the liberals 
at the news of Emperor Iturbide, it was the Spanish. In their eyes, a Mexican emperor was 
simply unacceptable. Indeed, liberal Spanish figures Juan Rivas Vertiz and Joaquín 
Castellanos had also boycotted the Congress session which had proclaimed Iturbide as 
emperor, subsequently quickly returning to Yucátan to avoid imprisonment in Mexico.
251
 
Upon their arrival, they began to spread the rumour among the Spanish that the iturbidistas 
had simply used the Bourbon cause as a ruse, and that the plan had been to crown a Mexican 
all along, adding that the event of “la proclamación [de Iturbide que] fue una borrachera.”252 
Additionally, the news in April that the Spanish crown had refused to recognise the Plan of 
Iguala and the Treaties of Córdoba, and was planning a military invasion of Mexico to 
reconquer it, had led the Spanish elites in Mexico to mobilise against Iturbide in a purely 
defensive move, needing to protect their own interests. In Yucatán, Spanish members of the 
permanent army such as José Cadenas, José María Ibarran, Esteban Paullada and Rafael 
Jimenez Montalvo proclaimed themselves to be anti-Iturbide
253
 with similar sentiments being 
echoed by the Spanish masons who were heavily present in liberal yorkino lodges in 
Campeche (represented by army officer Simón Ortega).
254
 
Despite the high level of discontent emanating from these sectors, a pronunciamiento 
could not occur without significant cooperation or cooption of the military; and they 
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themselves were not very happy with the current political system. The bankrupt treasury in 
Yucatán had resulted in extreme underpayment – or even no salaries – of the active battalions 
along with a lack of food, clothing, and arms.
255
 Additionally, on 11 March 1822 the Mexican 
Junta Instituyente (the body succeeding Congress after Iturbide had ordered its dissolution on 
31 October 1822) had decreed the reduction of whatever salaries were left for all members of 
the permanent army, with cuts ranging from 8 to 16 percent (much to Iturbide‟s disgust, it 
should be noted).
256
 Added to this, those returning from Mexico brought rumours of 
prestigious and well-known military men such as Vicente Guerrero, Nicolás Bravo, 
Guadalupe Victoria and Pedro Celestino Negrete supporting the idea of a republic.
257
 This 
meant that by June 1822, the Yucatecan military (army and active battalions) started claiming 
that the empire would only last six months. Consequently, the Meridian-based First Active 
Battalion (under the command of camarillero Benito Aznar) began planning to pronounce for 
a republic in mid-1822.
258
  
By the end of 1822, when news of Iturbide‟s order to dissolve Constituent Congress 
reached the peninsula, the imperial government in Yucatán was practically finished, and its 
grave was completely dug when the Junta Instituyente decreed on 5 November the end of 
commerce with Spain and all its colonies. The end of legal trade with Cuba meant the near – 
if not complete – termination of business activities for the merchants of Mérida. This was in 
complete opposition to the terms of unification which the Yucatecan Provincial Deputation 
had stated to the national government in September 1820. The preservation of commercial 
relations with Cuba had been absolutely essential to the survival of the Yucatecan economy, 
being one of the region‟s main sources of income. Indeed, the Meridian ayuntamiento 
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calculated that it provided an average of 500,000 pesos a year to the peninsula. In that 
administration‟s words. “la isla de Cuba […] es el único punto en que se expiden nuestros 
frutos […] quedaremos llorando esta inesperable pérdida.”259  
There was now a congregation of sectors in Yucatán which were pitted against 
Iturbide. The centralist despotic empire represented everything which was in opposition to 
the sanjuanista ideals of independence. The camarilleros had lost political and economic 
dominance over their treasured realm. The Spanish felt tricked, disillusioned, and threatened 
by the crowning of a Mexican emperor in a nation which had turned hostile to Spain. The 
severely underpaid military had no loyalty to an administration which had caused their 
suffering. The time was ripe for a pronunciamiento; yet Yucatecans did not mobilise, but 
waited for a sign from without. Indeed, the only pronunciamiento which they had ever 
experienced had been an adherence to a national act (Iguala), therefore it made sense to them 
to wait for a larger movement to occur before they simply issued a pronunciamiento de 
adhesión. Additionally, Yucatecans knew that their bankrupt region did not have the 
resources to head a nationally-directed pronunciamiento; they were heavily lacking in arms 
supplies and the strategic location needed to effectively negotiate for change. The potential 
pronunciados consequently waited for a more powerful national movement to second.  
They did not have to wait long. On 27 December 1822, during the formal dance of the 
final night of official celebrations for the swearing in of Emperor Iturbide, a boat from 
Veracruz arrived, bringing notice of two pronunciamientos by General Antonio López de 
Santa Anna in Veracruz earlier that month. The Proclama del General Santa Anna of 2 
December 1822 was the first of the two pronunciamientos, calling for the end of the empire, 
the formation of a republic, and the preservation of the Three Guarantees of the Plan de 
Iguala. The Mexican government was to establish an armistice with the Spanish forces in San 
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Juan de Ulúa, and, of extreme significance for Yucatecans, was to allow a recommencement 
of trade relations with Spanish colonies, along with the low tariff rates of 1812. Despite the 
national demands of the pronunciamiento¸ it was clearly mixed with very local Veracruzan 
issues; the constant battle between Spanish and Mexicans in the fort of San Juan de Ulúa had 
been harming the Veracruzan business sector, and its trade with Cuba was suffering just as 
badly as Yucatán‟s. The Yucatecans thus identified not only with the fact that it was a 
regional pronunciamiento, but that the Veracruzan woes were so similar to theirs.  
More significantly this predominantly locally-inspired pronunciamiento exerting 
national demands over the centre was something novel in Mexican politics. Despite the 
locality of its origins, the pronunciamiento was careful to state that it was serving "la voz 
imperiosa de todos los habitantes de esta América Septentrional”260 in order to attempt to 
highlight its national ideology and thus gain the support needed for a regional 
pronunciamiento to be accepted and adopted by the majority of the country. Santa Anna‟s 
second pronunciamiento, the Plan de Veracruz (which the well-known military figure and 
old enemy of Iturbide, Guadalupe Victoria had helped to collaborate, and Colombian 
politician Miguel Santa María had written) of 6 December declared the end of the recognition 
of Iturbide as Emperor, but made no mention of the republic which Santa Anna had 
pronounced for just four days earlier. Instead, it declared that the nation was now entitled to 
form the government which it thought was most appropriate. Additionally, the 
pronunciamiento called for the restoration of the Congress which Iturbide had dissolved 
earlier that year.
261
 This pronunciamiento was evidently a more nationally-oriented exercise, 
containing openly vague ideological declarations concerning the political systems to be 
established, perhaps in an effort to widen its potential triumph through appeal to an even 
greater spectrum of society.   
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The news of the Veracruzan-inspired yet nationally-directed pronunciamientos only 
encouraged the Yucatecans to pronounce against the centralist empire, but there was 
repression present in the peninsula. Powerful iturbidistas still existed in the region, with their 
stronghold in Campeche. The teniente de rey Juan José de León, some members of the 
permanent army in Campeche, and a numerous clergy who had appreciated the clerical 
protection of the Plan (represented by powerful parish priests José Mariano de Cicero and ex-
sanjuanista Vicente María Velásquez) were all against the pronunciamientos of Veracruz. It 
should be noted that with the exception of Velásquez, these were the same figures who had 
led the agitations in Campeche in 1820 for the swearing of the Plan of Iguala.
262
 Governor 
Álvarez himself was also a fervent iturbidista; on the very same day in which the news of 
Santa Anna‟s pronunciamientos reached the region, he issued a decree declaring that order be 
maintained in the peninsula, as well as simultaneously granting teniente de rey Léon political 
as well as military command in order to quash any rebellious spark which may have been 
started.
263
 The iturbidistas then started a motín on 31 December, headed by presbítero 
Vicente Mendez and other figures from the clergy, along with several army officers, who 
revolted for the preservation of the Empire and its leader, proclaiming “¡Viva la religión y el 
Emperador!” in Campeche.264  
The iturbidista actions within the region would nevertheless fail to suffocate the 
pronunciamiento spark that was to come not from within, but from without and which would 
deal the final blow to the Iturbide empire. While Santa Anna‟s pronunciamientos had not 
been immediately successful, they had paved the way for the third and final pronunciamiento 
of this cycle, the Plan of Casa Mata.
265
 The Acta de Casa Mata of 1 February 1823 originated 
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in Veracruz and was led by José Antonio Echávarri, the First Commander of the Imperial 
Army who had deserted his troops to lead the movement, primarily in protest against 
Iturbide‟s dissolution of Congress.266 In his pronunciamiento, Echávarri proposed a new 
congress, and assigned to the army the function of protector of the constitutional system, 
which had been so badly damaged by the Emperor. A much more delicate and subtle 
document than Santa Anna‟s pronunciamientos, this plan did not even contain the word 
“republic” in it.  
The attraction of the plan of Casa Mata did not lay in its vagueness, but for Yucatán 
(and the majority of provinces in Mexico) its appeal lay in its Article Nine, which declared 
“la Diputación Provincial de esta provincia será la que delibere en la parte administrativa, si 
aquella resolución fuese de acuerdo con su opinión.”267 The provinces immediately chose to 
recognise this as not only the temporary and absolute political and administrative 
empowerment of the Deputation of Veracruz, but of all Provincial Deputations in Mexico. 
Elites in the majority of the regions interpreted this as a measure which enabled them to 
recover the power which had been severely debilitated by the centralist empire over the past 
two years, and the Plan gained a rapid and resounding success throughout the entire empire as 
Provincial Deputations rushed to take command of their provinces. According to Benson, the 
Plan of Casa Mata was thus “a provincial plan,”268 as it represented “la expresión política del 
malestar de las provincias por el despotismo y la arbitrariedad del gobierno general.”269 
Additionally, as Anna stated, it “opened the ultimate door to the onset of provincial 
autonomy.”270 It must be noted that Casa Mata also called for the formation of a new 
Congress; thus creating the chance to reset the national political agenda entirely, with 
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regional elites now having a clearer idea of the systems which would benefit – and harm – 
them, and now having the chance to nominate individuals who could represent their most 
precious local priorities.  
The regional powers had thus adopted and shaped a pronunciamiento in order to serve 
their own desires, and this was to be only the beginning of hijacking national 
pronunciamientos and converting them into local ones in Mexico; indeed, the Yucatecan 
camarilleros had already done in it in 1821, and as shall be discovered, this was to become a 
dominant practice in Yucatán. In this instance, Yucatecans were quick to second Casa Mata. 
The military would now be the first pronunciados, highlighting their established essentiality 
in enacting the practice. The First Active Battalion, along with the Artillery Unit of the 
Permanent Army (commanded by José Cadenas)
271
 together with the civic militias
272
 
seconded the pronunciamiento of Casa Mata in the town of Bécal on 3 March 1823. Key 
military political figures such as Interim Colonel Agustín López de Llergo (of the Second 
Active Battalion), camarillero and Sergeant Major of the Brigade of ingenieros José Segundo 
Carvajal (of the First Active Battalion), camarillero Commander of the Infantry Sebastián 
López de Llergo (of the Second Active Battalion), and Commissioner of the Regiment of the 
Active Battalions Agustín Duque de Estrada all signed, representing their respective 
bodies.
273
  
The military officers claimed in the pronunciamiento that their duty was to “conciliar 
los grandes intereses de la nación, y afianzar la representación nacional”,274 essentially 
declaring that it was their duty to represent and protect their region‟s interests, which they 
could only accomplish through the pronunciamiento. One should also recall that the Plan of 
Casa Mata had explicitly stated this in its text; this was to be just the beginning of this 
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political role of the military. In the Yucatecan case, for decades to come, military-dominated 
pronunciamientos would declare in their respective texts that by pronouncing, they were 
simply fulfilling their duty of saving their people from unlawful and unbeneficial ruling 
administrations, on both local and national levels. In Antonio Annino‟s words, the military 
thus claimed to represent “la función de protector del estado desarrollado por el ejército, la 
primacía de la norma pacticia sobre la constitucional, la soberanía territorial como 
fundamento del principio de representatividad patriótica de todos los grupos oligárquicos.”275 
The military as the saviour of the patria thus had its defining role in the pronunciamiento. 
While this military participation constituted members of the permanent army (thus justifying 
this claim of officers stepping in to save a nation where political institutions were 
ineffective), one must remember the civilian character of the active battalions who were also 
taking part in the pronunciamiento. These men also had civilian occupations (be them 
merchants, hacendados, or politicians). They were thus in major part using their military rank 
to excuse their intervention in unlawful politics. Additionally, the fact that this 
pronunciamiento‟s demands were not militaristic, but political and economic, fortifies the 
view that significant civilian participation was taking place.  
Camarilleros, sanjuanistas and businessmen now clamoured for an immediate 
seconding of the plan of Bécal, and with the unspoken threat of military violence if he did not 
follow the military pronunciados, Governor Álvarez had no option but to arrange a 
pronunciamiento de adhesión in Mérida the very next day. On 4 March 1823 in Mérida, a 
junta made up of the Provincial Deputation and the ayuntamiento of Mérida, along with key 
civil, military and ecclesiastic authorities swore the plan
276
 agreeing to all articles of Casa 
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Mata, “en todas sus partes.”277 Despite the national cause of the pronunciamiento, it was 
already showing signs of localism, as it chose to specifically support Article Five of the Plan 
of Veracruz of 6 December, which had stated that “Como independiente y soberana y libre, y 
en un estado natural, tiene plena facultad para constituirse conforme le parezca que más 
conviene a su felicidad, por medio del Soberano Congreso Constituyente.”278 It was thus not 
only a local adaptation of the Plan of Casa Mata, but a highly regional reaction to the attacks 
on economy and politics which the elite had undergone during the Iturbide Empire.
279
   
In Campeche, Simón Ortega (alcalde primero of the Campechean ayuntamiento) led 
the pronunciamiento de adhesión, where the Second Active Battalion, along with several 
economic and clerical officials attended. The pronunciamientos de adhesión of Yucatán 
highlighted the temporary unification of sentiment among camarilleros, sanjuanistas some of 
the permanent army, and the active battalions against the empire. They also served to show 
the clear split between those supporting the regional pronunciamientos, and those iturbidistas 
still loyal to the centralist system and its ruler. Indeed, iturbidistas such as teniente de rey 
Léon and his followers Alejandro Villajuana, Juan Estevan Arfían, Ignacio de la Roca, Juan 
Nepomuceno Trujillo, Policarpio Sandoval, Jacinto Cardos and Antonio Carrillo had 
stubbornly refused to sign the Meridian pronunciamiento de adhesión, claiming that they 
preferred to wait on the political system which would be implemented in Mexico. The 
Campechean pronunciamiento de adhesión subsequently stated in Article Six the dismissal of 
these officials, with Léon being replaced by Sebastián López de Llergo. Also, it was agreed 
to free Joaquín Castellanos from prison, and suspend the persecutions against anti-iturbidistas 
Juan Rivas Vertiz, Felix Merino, Francisco Rodríguez, José del Carmen Perez, Perfecto 
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Baranda and Francisco Aguilar.
280
 As Vázquez has pointed out, in this sense, 
pronunciamiento texts “se convirtieron en uno de los vehículos más eficaces de politización y 
de información sobre los problemas del país, al tiempo que difusión del sentimiento 
nacional,”281 with Guerra agreeing that they were “una preciosa fuente para captar sus 
imaginarios, valores y las prácticas políticas.”282  
 The adhesion to the pronunciamiento of Casa Mata would again open the door (as in 
1821) to efforts at negotiation between the Yucatecan elite (along with the elite of other 
regions in this case) and the Mexican administration for the complete revision of the national 
political system. In Yucatán, the first step was the now instinctively defensive reaction of the 
camarilleros whenever they were placed in a situation where they had to negotiate: declare 
secession from Mexico until the national administration attended to their demands. On the 
same day of 4 March the Deputation thus proclaimed Yucatán as an independent state, as its 
members assumed the right to complete government and internal administration of the 
region,
283 
stating:  
roto el pacto que las unía al gobierno del imperio, cada una había regresado a su 
estado natural, la de Yucatán se creyó libre y con derecho a su felicidad; pero su amor 
nacional, algunas razones traídas de su situación, unidas a la esperanza fundada en las 
luces del actual congreso, la habían tenido vacilante, hasta que el espíritu general 
obligó a sus representantes a tomar la indicada resolución, en obvio de los horribles 
males que la oprimen.
284
 
 
After Governor Álvarez almost immediately resigned from his post pleading illness (Casa 
Mata-itis perhaps), his replacement camarillero Pedro Bolio declared on 7 March that all the 
economic and administrative decrees of the past two years by the Mexican Junta Instituyente 
were null and void, consequently restoring the conditions which Yucatecans had enjoyed 
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prior to unification with Mexico in 1821.
285
 When in mid-March 1823 the news arrived that 
Iturbide had abdicated, the Yucatecan iturbidistas, seeing the glaring defeat in both national 
and local terms, retreated.
286
 
In mid-April, after receiving the news on the reinstallation of Congress and the 
establishment of the triumvirate (led by Pedro Celestino Negrete, Nicolás Bravo and 
Guadalupe Victoria) on 29 March, the Yucatecan Deputation issued a pronunciamiento 
which declared that it would recognise National Congress, but conditioned in Article Four 
that:  
siendo demasiado preciosa la libertad para aventurarla absolutamente a un gobierno, 
cuya Constitución aun se ignora; acabando de enseñar la triste experiencia de igual 
confianza que puso en el gobierno anterior que abusando de ella; la sujetó a su 
despotismo, por medio de los empleados militares y políticos que colocó a su frente 
[…] que no procederá el poder Ejecutivo a enviar empleados civiles o militares.287  
Once more, elites were demonstrating through a pronunciamiento (as in 1821) their natural 
preference for relative provincial sovereignty; in the words of Ortiz Escamilla, “Although the 
pronunciamientos of Iguala (1821), Veracruz (1822), and Casa Mata (1823) each had their 
own dynamic, we cannot ignore that in essence they were all were part of the same problem: 
independence, provincial autonomy, and the form of the national government.”288   
As in 1821, Yucatecans knew full well that the region depended on Mexican aid and 
markets; the only solution now was to lobby for political change with the national 
administration. Efforts at negotiation with Mexico soon got under way, and Yucatecans saw 
no better way to accomplish this feat than through a pronunciamiento. Weeks of discussions 
found Yucatecan elites agreeing on a federalist system; Yucatán was too poor to survive on 
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its own, but it could not risk another “intento centralizador”289 Iturbide experience. The 
sanjuanista desire for relative independence and the elites‟ hunger for rule over their private 
realms, combined with the inevitable economic need to unite with a greater power now meant 
that a republic had to be the solution. As Zanolli Fabila so aptly put it, “liberalismo y 
monopolio, eran fuerzas en juego en los momentos mismos en que el federalismo se 
materializaba en nuestro país.”290  
Federalism was thus to be the answer; a junta general meeting in Mérida on 29 May, 
constituted of the ayuntamiento representatives, the Provincial Deputation, and military 
officers, issued a pronunciamiento declaring that “la unión de Yucatán será la de una 
república federada, y no en otra forma, y por consiguiente tendrá derecho para formar su 
constitución particular y establecer las leyes que juzgue convenientes a su felicidad.”291 
Campechean member of the Provincial Deputation Miguel Duque de Estrada ensured that the 
pronunciamiento was realised in Campeche two days later, with the ayuntamientos of the 
towns throughout the region also issuing their pronunciamientos de adhesión. Yucatecans 
had now pronounced that federalism was to be the only option; they had for a second time 
used the pronunciamiento as an exercise of political negotiation between the region and the 
central administration, clearly expressing their political ideology and identity.
292
 This 
employment of the pronunciamiento was to endure for decades to come, as the majority of 
significant Yucatecan pronunciamientos to occur in the peninsula would have this 
unchanging objective of national negotiation for a defined political system. 
The federalist efforts commenced by the pronunciamiento were to continue 
throughout the year; the elected Junta Gubernativa (which replaced the Provincial 
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Deputation on 30 May)
293
 declared on 14 June to the Mexican government that Yucatán was 
to be part of Mexico only under the system of a federal republic, declaring “es imposible que 
unas mismas leyes sean adaptables a hombres de diversas provincias, que tienen distintas 
costumbres, que viven en distintos climas.”294 They also defended their right to federalism as 
a natural consequence of their distance from the centre, adding that “la localidad de Yucatán, 
su comercio, las opiniones de sus habitantes generalmente [son] inclinados al gobierno 
republicano […] no debían esperarse de otra forma de gobierno.”295 These powerful 
negotiations did not go unrecognised by Lucas Alamán, then secretary of state and minister 
of interior and exterior relations, who on 6 August condemned the Yucatecan Junta for trying 
to pressure the government to proclaim a federal republic. In reply, the Junta issued a 
statement using typical pronunciamiento rhetoric: “La provincia de Yucatán […] no ha hecho 
otra cosa que usar de un derecho […] y seguir la inclinación de los pueblos”,296 also declaring 
that it had been “Comportándose en su pronunciamiento con toda la circunspección que 
exigía negocio tan interesante: respetando los derechos de los demás pueblos e invocando la 
unión y amistad de las otras provincias.”297  
 The first Yucatecan Constitutent Congress (replacing the Junta on 20 August 1823 
and constituted of camarillero and sanjuanista liberals)
298
 continued Yucatán‟s federal 
stance, issuing Yucatán‟s bases federativas on 27 August 1823. Its very first article stated 
“Que el Estado de Yucatán es soberano e independiente de la dominación de cualquiera otro, 
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sea el que fuere.”299 Furthermore, the bases declared that sovereignty resided “esencial y 
colectivamente en los pueblos que componen este Estado”, and as a result, it was their 
exclusive and instrinsic right “de formar su régimen interior y el de acordar y establecer por 
medios constitucionales sus leyes.”300 Apparently, pronunciamiento rhetoric did not have to 
be strictly contained in the pronunciamiento text, but could be included in all dealings 
surrounding the pronunciamiento in order to justify its existence and its objectives.  
The Yucatecan representatives who were elected to attend the Second National 
Constituent Congress (which was installed on 7 November 1823) also transported the 
essentiality of federalism on a national level. Even before national sessions began, the 
Yucatecan Congress had instructed that their deputies Manuel Crescencio Rejón, Alpuche 
Infante, Andrés Quintana Roo, Francisco Tarrazo and Lorenzo de Zavala only be empowered 
“para que como representantes del Estado de Yucatán, puedan formar la Constitución política 
de esta República federativa, democrática representativa.”301 The provinces of Guanajuato, 
Guadalajara and Zacatecas had also placed similar restrictions on their delegates.
302
 On 3 
December, Congress opened the discussion of the type of political system which they would 
establish, and the voice of the regions and their determination for a federal system was 
overpowering, as on 31 January the federal Acta Constitutiva was issued with its Article Six 
declaring that Mexico‟s nineteen created states were “libres, soberanos e independientes en lo 
que exclusivamente toque a su administración y gobierno interior.”303 It is also significant 
that the committee created to design the Acta had included representatives from the pro-
federal provinces of Veracruz, Guadalajara, and federalist Manuel Crescencio Rejón of 
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Yucatán.
304
 The powerful negotiations of the regions had consequently finally triumphed, and 
in the words of Luis Medina Peña, “Todo ello fue resultado de una evidente realidad política 
que operó de la periferia al centro.”305     
A newborn federal republic dawned in January 1824. Hope was permeable throughout 
Mexico, and especially in Yucatán, where the unrelenting struggle for a relative level of 
sovereignty had finally triumphed. Pronunciamientos had once more led to national change, 
and the regions had demonstrated that they had the power to achieve this. In Yucatán, the 
elites had used the pronunciamientos of 1823 to achieve the national ideology of federalism, 
but their motivations had been primarily local. They had also united their interests in the 
pronunciamiento, as camarilleros, sanjuanistas, and Spaniards had come together 
temporarily for the common cause of federalism. Nevertheless, inter-regional fragmentation 
was soon to reoccur in Yucatán, and factions were to enact their differences through a 
pronunciamiento; indeed, regional elites had already learnt that a pronunciamiento could 
originate in the regions and could serve very local purposes. The next pronunciamiento – to 
be issued in the space of a mere few months – would demonstrate the realisation among 
pronunciados that the now regional exercise did not even have to be part of a national cause, 
but could have a very local agenda, as they would now use the practice to target not the 
Mexican administration, but each other.   
The Campechean-directed pronunciamiento of 1824 would be a concrete 
manifestation of the Meridian-Campechean rivalry which had long been present in the region. 
The Campechean loyalty to Mexico which had been demonstrated in the pronunciamiento of 
1821 (the swearing the plan of Iguala) would again reveal itself through the practice of the 
pronunciamiento, as the same pronunciados of those years would aim to rectify Meridian 
disobedience to Mexico and its decrees. In late 1823, even while Yucatán was consolidating 
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its position as a free and sovereign federal Mexican state, the declaration of war on Spain – 
and the consequent end of commercial ties with Cuba – caused a severe disruption in the 
Meridian elites‟ pledge to obey National Congress under a federal system. Evidently, the end 
of trade with Cuba implied the virtual bankruptcy of the Meridian treasury, as its income was 
almost entirely dependent on trade with the Cuban market. Campechean trade did not depend 
heavily on relations with Cuba, but on commercial ties to Mexican ports (more specifically 
Veracruz, Tampico and Matamoros). The refusal by the Meridian-dominated Congress to 
implement the decree, versus Campechean desires to obey the national government, inspired 
the latter to pronounce, demanding that the Meridian political and merchant circles 
completely submit to all national laws. The pronunciamiento had now evolved even further to 
become an inter-regional practice, with elites using it to accomplish immediate local political 
objectives, to express local political views within Yucatán, and to protest against 
administrative ills on a state level. It also now became a definitive expression of the struggle 
for financial and political power between the Meridian and Campechean elite circles. The 
differing attitudes towards Mexico demonstrated through this pronunciamiento highlighted 
that local rivalries were inextricably linked to the national picture, illustrating the 
increasingly inescapable context of Yucatecan relations with Mexico, especially with respect 
to the occurrence and dynamic of the Yucatecan pronunciamiento.  
While federalism was being ratified in Mexico City in late 1823, Spanish troops 
headed by Commander Francisco Lemaur on the island garrison of Spanish stronghold San 
Juan de Ulúa recommenced their attack on Veracruz,
306
 as the return of absolute monarchy to 
Spain in 1823 had also brought with it plans of reconquest of the Americas, thus refreshing 
Spanish attacks on Mexico. Consequently, on 8 October 1823, the Mexican government 
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declared war on Spain, and with it the end of mercantile relations with it and its colonies.
307 
On 19 November the Yucatecan Congress received the order to end all types of 
“comunicación política y mercantil con los españoles,” along with a request from General 
Guadalupe Victoria to send resources and arms to Veracruz.
308
 The Meridian authorities had 
already experienced the cessation of trade with Cuba just one year before, an exercise which 
had put important Meridian merchants out of business and which had sent the region almost 
completely bankrupt; they had no intention of reimposing this decree once more.  
While the Meridian-based Congress (made up of camarilleros and sanjuanistas) had 
only just pledged to unite with the Mexican nation and to subordinate themselves to the 
general government, they were evidently now in a significant quandary with regard to the 
fulfilment of their obligations. In late November 1823 a special commission was 
consequently created to deliberate on the delicate situation. Constituted of members of Local 
Congress (which was dominated by sanjuanistas and camarilleros) Pablo Moreno, Francisco 
Genaro Cicero, Pedro Baranda, Joaquín García Rejón and Juan de Dios Cosgaya, the 
commission agreed to send military aid to Veracruz, but simultaneously declared that the 
Yucatecan government was to be allowed to freely express its opinion on the rupture of trade 
relations with Spain.
309
 Ten pieces of artillery and other war supplies were sent from 
Campeche to Veracruz, but the authorities of the peninsula said nothing about agreeing to cut 
commercial ties with Cuba.
310
  
To the camarillero and sanjuanista businessmen, the end of commerce with Cuba was 
a completely distinct matter from the subject of war; it was solely a question of economic 
survival. The opposition to the order was dominant in Local Congress, where members such 
as sanjuanistas José Tiburcio López, Eusebio Villamil, Pedro Almeida, Manuel Jiménez 
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Solís, and camarilleros Pedro José Guzmán, Juan Rivas and Manuel León were all affected 
by the trade decree, with members Raimundo Pérez and Francisco Bates declaring that the 
end of the commercial ties would be the ruin of Yucatán “que mendigaba su subsistencia de 
la isla de Cuba.”311 Congress decided in late November to suspend the declaration of war on 
Spain, and trade with Cuba would thus proceed normally.
312
 Yucatecan officials present in 
National Congress agreed in their majority with the stance taken by their political brothers, 
with José María Sánchez, Fernando Valle and Manuel Crescencio Rejón arguing that 
Yucatán should be excepted from the decree,
313
 as in the words of Valle “Yucatán subsiste 
únicamente por su comercio marítimo que casi todo se hace con la isla de Cuba, y así cortada 
su comunicación con ésta, se le acaban también los recursos.”314 Zavala was the only 
Yucatecan member in National Congress who believed that his fellow-natives should 
implement the declaration fully, as he argued that by maintaining relations with Cuba, 
Yucatán was “declarándose así enemigo de la Nación Mexicana.”315  
This attitude of the Meridians not only provoked anger in National Congress, but 
more importantly, in a city much closer to home: Campeche. Since the defeat of the 
iturbidistas earlier that year, Campechean resentment towards the camarilleros, the 
sanjuanistas, and the Spaniards had heightened considerably.
316
 In the autumn of 1823 a 
distinct pro-Mexican, anti-Spanish group formed, calling themselves the patriotas 
campechanos. Made up of 73 members, the group mainly consisted of important military 
figures such as brothers Miguel and Agustín Duque de Estrada, Eduardo Vadillo, Ignacio de 
la Roca, José María León (son of teniente de rey Juan José de León), Tomás Requeña, and 
Pedro Baranda. Members of the Campechean business circle such as José del Carmen Pérez, 
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Joaquín Molina, Pedro Sancho and Joaquín Bueno, along with politicians such as Manuel 
Casares y Armas, Manuel Manzanilla, and Pedro de Elizalde also made up the group.
317
 The 
patriotas declared themselves to be specifically against the hypocrisy and highly localist 
attitude of the Meridian powers, who they stated had claimed to unite with Mexico, but at the 
same time, were refusing to implement national decrees due to purely local business 
concerns. To the patriotas it was imperative that the camarilleros declare war; they feared 
that through the camarilleros‟ exercises, the independence of Yucatán and the Mexican 
nation was being heavily risked by not putting the state on a defensive stance with Spain.
318
 
Additionally, they believed that Yucatán‟s pledge of loyalty towards Mexico was being 
threatened by the disobedience of Local Congress. It must also be acknowledged that an end 
to relations with Cuba meant the annihilation of Meridian trade, and thus the elimination of 
Campeche‟s main commercial competition.319 Additionally, businessmen in the east of the 
peninsula such as Domingo Trueva, José Antonio Boves and Fernando Gutiérrez were all 
supporting the declaration of war, as they were interested in ending the import of sugar from 
Cuba in order to stimulate their local cultivation of sugarcane.
320
 
The patriotas’ inspiration did have some input from national figures. As had been 
demonstrated in the pronunciamientos of 1821 and 1823, the regular army stationed in 
Campeche (now made up of the Sixth and Thirteenth Permanent Battalions) were following 
executive orders from Mexico. Mexican military caudillos like Guadalupe Victoria along 
with Minister of the Interior and Exterior Lucas Alamán were giving the garrison instructions 
to pressure the Meridian merchant circle to obey Mexican law. From the end of 1823 the 
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patriotas began to have open meetings in decided opposition to the disobedience of the 
Meridian-based Congress. They stated in their meetings that they refused to recognise the 
local government and Congress which they called “de Mérida”, and which they claimed 
“trabajaban esforzadamente por no unirse a México ni declarar guerra a España para 
continuar sus truhanerías y despotismo insufrible en Yucatán.”321 They also generated 
significant propaganda upholding the idea that the Spaniards were the causes of the 
misfortunes of the country, with the Campechean press circulating articles which affirmed 
that the true republican was distinguished by his “patriotismo, delicadeza, buena educación y 
honor”, while the “ultramarinos sean unos verdaderos enemigos de nuestra 
independencia.”322 Actions were soon to manifest this anti-Spanish spirit; on 29 September 
1823, the Campechean ayuntamiento ordered the arrest of the captain of a ship which had 
docked in its port to restock with supplies for the Spanish in San Juan de Ulúa. It later 
revoked the order, but patriota sentiment was manifested once more on 12 December, when 
the same Campechean ayuntamiento refused the landing of the ship Constitución, which was 
bringing Spanish businessmen fleeing San Juan de Ulúa and who were attempting to 
reestablish themselves in Yucatán.
323
 The ship was forced to carry on to Cuba instead.
324
 
Local Congress was not unaware of the actions underway in Campeche; on 24 December 
1823, it issued a severe decree condemning to death every person who “conspire 
directamente” against it, and who tried to disturb the system of federal republican 
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government (even though it was Congress itself which was ironically disobeying the federal 
administration).
325
 Congress continued to manifest its dominance over politics as on 31 
January, while the Acta Constitutiva de la Federación was declared throughout Mexico, it 
(Congress) only published Article Five which declared that the nation adopted a popular 
representative federal republic, ignoring all other decrees.
326
  
Needless to say, the patriotas were outraged, accusing the Yucatecan administration 
of being unpatriotic and putting the interests of the nation in peril. Despite this climaxing of 
Campechean resentment, no pronunciamiento would be issued, as Yucatecans once more 
waited for news of a national movement with similar aims to their own; regardless of the 
locality of the Campechean agenda, the potential pronunciados still needed a larger impetus 
in order to give their own local pronunciamiento some semblance of national legitimacy and 
strength. Indeed, the presence of a national pronunciamiento to identify with not only added 
ideological validity to the Campechean cause, but it also foresaw that if the pronunciamiento 
in the capital won, then so would theirs most likely have victory in Yucatán. This need to 
adhere to a larger pronunciamiento was becoming an interesting distinctive trait of the 
Yucatecan pronunciamiento. Unlike states which were relatively closer to Mexico City and 
consequently posed more of a serious armed threat if and when they pronounced (like Puebla, 
San Luis Potosí, Guerrero and Jalisco), or controlled vital Mexican ports (Veracruz), Yucatán 
was isolated, poor, and controlled hardly any resources needed in Mexico. A solitary 
Yucatecan pronunciamiento with national objectives would thus more than likely fail to pose 
any serious threat to the national administration in terms of armed threat or withholding of 
resources. The Yucatecans‟ failure at negotiation in 1821 for beneficial trade tariffs had 
already demonstrated this. Additionally, the peripheral character of Yucatán and the unique 
demands of its elite contributed to the state‟s lack of potential to inspire pronunciamientos de 
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adhesión from other states. Yucatecan pronunciados consequently realised that if any 
pronunciamiento of theirs was to have a chance of success, it had to adhere to a larger and 
more powerful movement occurring in “mainland” Mexico. 
In early February came the news which the Campecheans had been waiting for; on 23 
January 1824 Brigadier José María Lobato and the garrison of Mexico City had issued a 
pronunciamiento demanding in the text‟s Article Two “Que sean removidos de sus destinos 
los españoles europeos.”327 Just as in 1821 and in 1823, Yucatecans would use a national 
cause to formulate their own local pronunciamiento. On 15 February 1824, “imitando la 
conducta de los que causaron los movimientos de esa capital en los días de 24 a 27 de enero 
ppo,”328 Campechean-based military chiefs José Antonio López, Gerónimo López de Llergo, 
Ignacio Roca, Eduardo Vadillo and José Ignacio Antezana called on then primer alcalde 
Agustín Duque de Estrada to take on functions of jefe político and to convene an 
extraordinary meeting on the very same day.
329
 The meeting, attended by ayuntamiento 
officials, military officers and merchants (made up in their majority of the patriotas), after an 
“acalorada y borrascosa” discussion, issued its pronunciamiento which demanded the 
complete unification of Yucatán with Mexico, “Guerra a España que nos hostiliza” and “Los 
empleos y destinos en americanos idóneos, moderados y decididos por nuestra emancipación, 
conservando los actuales jefes patricios o de escala, sin perjuicio del arreglo interior del 
Estado.”330 Campecheans had thus adopted a movement in Mexico City, but had clearly 
shaped and manipulated it to suit their own desires. The camarilleros had already 
demonstrated this hijacking of a national pronunciamiento in 1821 (declaring independence 
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without promising unification with Mexico), and now the campechanos were using their own 
camarillero tactics against them. With the sound of bells tolling and horns blowing, the 
pronunciamiento was celebrated throughout Campeche, while it was circulated to the local 
and national authorities.
331
 The powerful army ensured that the pronunciamiento was 
immediately put into effect in the city, with pronunciados ordering the dismissal of Spanish 
figures Joaquín Trava, José Cadenas, Manuel Mediavilla, José de Argüelles, Rafael 
Montalvo, José Antonio Mediz, Antonio Cánovas, Esteban Paullada, Hilario de la Presa, 
Pedro Casas, Alejo Helguera, Pedro Rodríguez, and Lorenzo Vargas from their posts.
332
  
The pronunciamiento had once more demonstrated the discrepancies between factions 
in the peninsula; Campecheans had tangibly expressed hatred towards the Spaniards, along 
with their (Campechean) loyalty to Mexico and anger against regionalist Meridians. Upon 
hearing of the proclamation in Campeche, Local Congress in Mérida denounced the 
pronunciamiento and the threat of disorder occurring in that city; pronunciados were only 
good, apparently, when they – the Meridian political elite – were involved (a theme which 
would be further developed in the 1830s). On 18 February, Local Congress then issued a 
decree which stated that any person found conspiring against the authorities or the Spanish 
“será perseguido conforme a las leyes, como atentador contra el orden y seguridad 
pública”,333 and on 28 February, local government ordered that it was allowed to use 
whatever resources needed to reestablish order in Campeche.
334
 
Word soon came that the pronunciamiento of Lobato in Mexico City had not garnered 
sufficient support, and had consequently failed. With the loss of this national justification and 
a backbone to lean on, the Campechean pronunciados now quickly modified their demands in 
order to give some type of legitimacy to their movement. They consequently sent word in 
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mid-March to Local Congress that they would now only obey when the Acta Constitutiva was 
sworn in its entirety, and they made no mention of their previous Spanish hatred.
335
 The anti-
Spanish pronunciamiento had thus quickly evolved into a patriotic Mexican movement due to 
changing external circumstances, and the need to have a valid national cause. Without a 
national pronunciamiento or ideology to refer to, the Campecheans realised that their 
blatantly local and specific demands were not applicable in the standard Yucatecan 
pronunciamiento practice and rhetoric which had been developing since 1821; one faction 
outrightly attacking others was not good pronunciamiento manners. They also reinforced 
their change of demands by modifying their anti-Spanish rhetoric of earlier, with the 
ayuntamiento communicating that “No es el odio […] a los europeos, ni el deseo de 
aprovecharse de sus destinos, lo que motivó aquellos acontecimientos […] [pero] aquel amor 
sagrado y zeloso de la independencia, y libertad.”336 
To strengthen the legitimacy of their movement, they also began consciously 
declaring that their pronunciamiento was only motivated out of a noble obligation to save the 
Yucatecan people from an administration which was untrustworthy and inept. In their words:  
Cuando los gobiernos no previenen los acaecimientos que pueden traer algún 
desorden lamentable, los pueblos están exentos de toda responsabilidad, y si éstos 
hacen lo que aquéllos debieron practicar en bien de su tranquilidad y libertad, no 
hacen otra cosa que declarar de hecho la ineptitud de sus gobernantes [...] al súbdito 
no le compete más que el derecho de petición.
337
 
This claim was quickly reinforced by the military pronunciados, who claimed (similar to the 
military pronunciados of 1823) that it had been “el espíritu de patriotismo, noble alma de esta 
población ilustrada” which had moved them to pronounce on 15 February, and that they had 
no choice but to protect the people and to exercise “el derecho de petición que gozan todos 
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los pueblos de la tierra.”338 Just as pronunciados had claimed in the previous year, these 
pronunciados declared that they were intervening to save the region from unjust and 
unreliable governing authorities. Once more, one should note that it was not a clear-cut 
instance of the military saving the patria from inefficient governance, but of officers and 
civilians with clear political demands and protestations against the authorities.  
The convenient change to this martyr-like attitude in order to legitimise the 
pronunciados‟ movement was quickly recognised by the Camarilla. In a letter to the 
Secretary of State, Francisco Bates harshly condemned this sudden Campechean patriotism, 
declaring: 
conociendo por ellas que el soberano congreso y el S.P.E. no aprobarían su conducta, 
en todo conforme con la del general Lobato y otros revoltosos, pretendieron variar sus 
peticiones, queriendo persuadir que todos sus deseos estaban reducidos a que se 
uniese este estado al resto de la nación.
339
 
 
An anonymous and very popular circular was also published in Mérida, criticising the 
“puñado de hombres” who had the audacity to call themselves the “pueblo.”340 There was 
now an official standoff. 
341
  
 The confrontation provoked by the pronunciamiento would soon be converted into 
preparations for civil war. It had not taken long for a pronunciamiento to pave the way for 
violence in the peninsula (as shall be discovered, this would be developed even further into 
the 1830s, as pronunciamientos would be used then to not only provoke violence, but to 
justify it). In mid-March 1824, as ordered by the local government, 2,000 forces (named the 
Columna volante de la Unión), commanded by comandante general José Segundo Carvajal, 
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marched to Campeche.
342
 The local government announced that they were not marching to 
“hostilizarlos”, but to protect the rights which had been so openly abused by the 
pronunciados
343
 (even though the officers of the Columna had orders to imprison, judge and 
punish the pronunciados).
344
 The response of the ayuntamiento of Campeche on 13 March 
was to announce the suspension of all official relations with Local Congress until the 
Columna was withdrawn and there was the complete implementation of the Acta 
Constitutiva.
345 
The camarilleros, as always, found a solution to suit their own needs; on 25 
March, Congress swore the Acta in its entirety, but stated that it would continue “tolerando el 
tráfico mercantil [de Cuba], no obstante, de hecho y por solo el tiempo necesario.”346  
From March to May 1824, the Columna remained in the Campechean barrio of Santa 
Ana.
347
 The Campechean garrison was too strongly manned and armed for the Meridian 
forces to prevail; while the Meridian troops camped in Santa Ana, in the city itself the annual 
carnival proceeded without interruption throughout March, with festivities nightly. Even after 
the carnival ended, there was mere pretense at battle, as in the words of historian Bernardino 
Mena Brito, “permanecieron los dos enemigos sin atacarse; hasta que, después de mucho 
pensarlo […] empezaron a hacerse gestos, a disparar tiros al aire y blandir sus machetes a un 
kilómetro de distancia: pero sin matar ni herir a nadie.”348 The fruitless attempts at shooting 
made by the Meridian troops were given the name of bala fría by the Campecheans, to the 
point where the humiliation became a popular song: “En la plaza de Santa Ana// Bajo un gran 
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ramonal// Se encontraba cierto día// Una hermosa pava real// Que en su cantito decía:// 
Agacha, Carvajal// Que viene la bala fría.”349 
When young liberal lawyer and sanjuanista Francisco Antonio Tarrazo became 
governor of Yucatán on 23 April,
350
 he immediately gave instructions for the withdrawal of 
the Columna, and with it the hopeful consequent reestablishment of relations with the 
ayuntamiento of Campeche.
351
 Following the withdrawal of the Columna, the Campechean 
ayuntamiento declared that to guarantee the full reestablishment of relations with Local 
Congress, the camarilleros had to fulfil three basic conditions: the declaration of war on 
Spain, the “exacta y escrupulosa” observation of the Acta Constitutiva and obedience to all 
decrees issued by the national government, and finally amnesty to all the pronunciados of 15 
February.
352
 The Meridians refused to listen to the demands of the Campecheans, and it was 
only after Antonio López de Santa Anna was appointed as commander general of Yucatán on 
28 March that he resolved the situation. On 1 May he arrived in Yucatán,
353
 and took his time 
about getting the job done, dallying in both Campeche and Mérida, while Alamán sent a 
further communication on 27 May to Governor Tarrazo insisting on “el obedecimiento exacto 
de las órdenes dictadas por S.A.S. acerca de la guerra contra España y prohibición absoluta 
de comercio con la Península y los países que aun existen bajo su dominación,” declaring that 
“será muy extraño que hubiese en una misma nación algunos de sus miembros en guerra y 
                                                          
349
 Álvarez, Anales Históricos, p.173. 
350
 Baranda, Recordaciones, p.141.  
351
 Molina Solís, Historia de Yucatán, p.30. 
352
 Ignacio Roca, José Ignacio Sarricolea, Felipe Antonio Molina, Joaquín del Puerto, José López Gil, Julián 
Romero, Joaquín Sánchez, José de la Luz Solís, Joaquín Calixto Gil, Miguel Casares, José Mauricio Rodríguez 
secretario, Informe que sobre las ocurrencias de esta ciudad ha dado al gobierno del estado el respetable 
ayuntamiento de esta ciudad, a virtud de orden que al efecto le dirigió de oficio con fecha 1o de mayo último, el 
exmo. Sr. Gobernador de el, c. Francisco Antonio Tarrazo, Campeche, 28 May 1824, in El Sol, 24 December 
1824.  
353
 M.F.C. Diario de las ocurrencias desde la salida de Alvarado hasta la llegada a esta estado del general 
Santa Anna, Campeche, 19 May 1824 in El Sol, 17 June 1824.  
127 
 
otros en paz y comunicación con una potencia enemiga de la independencia y libertad de 
todos.”354 
Santa Anna hesitated about implementing the end of relations with Cuba, 
sympathising with the Meridian cause, and even agreeing with a report written by the special 
Meridian commission on the matter , which stated on 23 June that: 
siendo la Isla de Cuba el único mercado en que hallan salida las cortas y pobres 
producciones de Yucatán […] antes de dar este paso tan peligroso, debe proveerse a 
su subsistencia por otro medio seguro. La interrupción de aquel comercio por pocos 
meses a fines del año de 1822 y principios del de 1823, inundó de miserias y 
desgracias a este infeliz Estado.
355
  
On 30 June, Santa Anna himself wrote to the national administration that he had been 
persuaded by the Meridian authorities to postpone the implementation of the declaration of 
war on Spain, declaring that: 
Si ahora con la publicación de la guerra se le estanca el comercio, y de otro lado no se 
le socorre, es destruirlo […] no será extraño […] que Yucatán, miserable y viéndose 
desatendido, trate de segregarse de la Federación, constituyéndose en Estado separado 
por sí mismo, o arrojarse en el seno de otra Nación que lo proteja.
356
  
 
He also compared Yucatán to a “bomba arrojada del mortero próximo a reventar” associating 
the declaration of war against Spain to: 
la caja de Pandora, que lanza males abriéndose […] Los meridanos, aunque quisieron 
dar exacto cumplimiento a las órdenes del gobierno supremo de la federación, se 
abstienen de publicarla, porque privado su comercio con la isla de Cuba, resultaría 
casi una total carencia de sus fondos par ayudar a sostener el Estado.
357
  
He subsequently demanded that the national administration send 100,000 pesos annually to 
the region, if Yucatecans were to implement the decree of war.
358
 
With his adherence to their cause, Local Congress named Santa Anna as governor on 
20 July 1824.
359
 He then restored the Spanish authorities who had been deposed by the 
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pronunciados of 15 February, and dismissed the pronunciados who had been involved.
360
 
National Congress on 9 October nevertheless firmly ordered Santa Anna to stop stalling on 
the implementation of decree of war on Spain, which he was finally forced to enforce on 16 
November 1824 in the peninsula. On the 21 of the same month, he presided over the swearing 
of the constitution of the federal republic.
361
 He resigned as governor on 25 April 1825, two 
days after the liberal constitution of Yucatán was sworn.
362
 
The Campecheans had now three times demonstrated their loyalty to Mexico, while 
the Meridians on the other hand had shown their tendency towards regionalism and even 
secession. The established and standard vehicle to manifest both of these differing ideological 
tendencies was the pronunciamiento, with the military beginning to play the increasingly 
important role of carrying out the exercise, and of resolving the differences which arose from 
it; indeed, on this occasion, the pronunciamiento had given way to potential civil war. There 
is no doubt that while Yucatecan pronunciamientos were still embroiled in Mexican politics 
and undeniably linked to national pronunciamientos, the local agenda in their 
pronunciamientos was beginning to play an increasingly larger role, with regional factions 
now using it in inter-state rivalry. This novel form of the exercise as a local instrument to 
express political dissent and achieve local political objectives – especially by the military – 
would be expressed at its most extreme level yet in the next pronunciamiento to come. Once 
more, local differences among political groups and differing attitudes towards Mexico would 
prevail in the pronunciamiento. These elements, together with the complete dominance of the 
military in the practice, would be demonstrated in one of the most conspicuous and 
mystifying pronunciamientos of nineteenth-century Yucatán: the 1829 centralist and military-
directed pronunciamiento of Campeche. 
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4 
Centralism, Secession, the Military, and the beginning of the 
crisis de legitimidad: The Pronunciamiento of 1829
363
 
  
no hay defección cuando no hay legitimidad 
 ni constitucionalidad en el gobierno; 
 un gobierno de hecho no es más legitimo 
 que otro provisorio para conocer 
 la voluntad legal de la Nación.
364
 
 
The Campechean-issued pronunciamiento of 1829 was one of the milestones of this 
practice in nineteenth-century Yucatán for several reasons. It was primarily a climax of the 
pronunciamiento trend which had been developing throughout the early 1820s, in particular 
with regard to its evolution as a national as well as local practice, and also in reference to the 
growing power of the military in the exercise. The belief in the pronunciamiento as a regional 
practice to negotiate with and hopefully intimidate national administrations now peaked, as 
the pronunciados of 1829 would call for centralism, threatening Yucatecan secession if the 
national administration did not attend to their demands. The stipulation of centralism seems 
odd in the Yucatecan case, as it was historically a very regionalist, federalist, and even 
separatist state, but as will be discovered, the separatist faction of the Camarilla would hijack 
this pronunciamiento in order to bring about their covert plans for Yucatecan secession. 
Additionally, this pronunciamiento would be the first to combine national demands with very 
local political desires: for the first time in Yucatecan history, pronunciados did not use the 
practice simply as part of a national force to negotiate for Mexican political change (1821 and 
1823) or to call for the respect to Mexican law (1824). Instead, they would proclaim the 
overthrow of the sanjuanista-turned-Liga radical liberal party (which had won the 1826 
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elections), and would demand that the elite Camarilla party (which was also liberal, but 
moderate) rule instead. This highlights the Yucatecan pronunciamiento‟s increasingly local 
importance in the context of, and utilisation in, the struggle between political factions for 
regional political power. This pronunciamiento would thus signify a significant evolution of 
the practice, as it developed a dual purpose: while the pronunciados would attempt to 
negotiate with the Mexican administration, on the local level it was a different matter. Indeed, 
this was the first pronunciamiento to simultaneously overthrow the Yucatecan governing 
administration and at the same time realize negotiation efforts with the national authorities. 
Finally, this exercise would exemplify the utmost importance of the military in not only 
leading and ensuring the success of the pronunciamiento, but also in mixing in politics as 
they took over the state government. In all these senses, the pronunciamiento of 1829 was 
nothing short of remarkable in the context of the evolution of the Yucatecan 
pronunciamiento.  
 The Campechean-based pronunciamiento of 1829 was the first Yucatecan 
pronunciamiento to lobby for national political change while simultaneously being employed 
to depose a local government. Pronunciados had never previously used the practice to 
overthrow Yucatán administrations; this was a novelty. Why and how, then, did this idea for 
using the pronunciamiento to overthrow a leader come about? The answer lies in Mexican 
national politics, and demonstrates the enduring influence which Mexican political practices 
were having on those of Yucatán. In this case, the Yucatecans copied the aim of a national 
pronunciamiento, and applied it to local circumstances in order to achieve much more 
immediate and specific objectives.  
 The events surrounding the Mexican presidential elections of 1828 were the 
inspiration for the novel duality of the 1829 Yucatecan pronunciamiento. A brief summary of 
the events in Mexico will suffice in order to highlight the significance which it held for future 
131 
 
Yucatecan pronunciados. In 1828, the two main candidates for the Mexican presidency were 
moderate liberal Manuel Gómez Pedraza and radical liberal Vicente Guerrero. Guerrero was 
the champion of the yorkino masonic lodge, a lodge dedicated to federalism, constituted in 
large part of supporters of anti-Hispanic sentiment. On the other hand, a more moderate 
sector of yorkinos (who did not approve of the extremism of their fellow masons) supported 
Gómez Pedraza. All expected that Guerrero, the war hero of independence, would win the 
election. When electoral authorities announced that Gómez Pedraza had instead won by a 
close margin, Guerrero‟s supporters manifested their fury; in Veracruz, General Santa Anna 
issued the Plan de Perote on 16 September 1828, demanding that Guerrero be made president 
(regardless of the constitutional results). In Mexico City, the yorkinos of the barracks of La 
Acordada then revolted on 30 November, causing scenes of violence and disorder on the 
streets, including an attack on the national Palace by the masses. The violence which 
escalated into the Parián Riot of 4 and 5 December 1828 provoked the resignation of Gómez 
Pedraza, with Guerrero assuming the presidency on 1 April 1829.
365
 In Fowler‟s words, “the 
rebellion was more similar to a coup than a pronunciamiento” as there was no attempt at 
negotiation, and no list of demands were made. 
The pronunciamiento and uprising of 1828 was a watershed in Mexican politics. It 
demonstrated to the rest of the nation (and Yucatecans in this context) the complete violation 
of the constitutional system through the efforts of a pronunciamiento (the Plan of Perote) 
combined with military force (La Acordada). Pronunciados could now evidently use the 
practice to target not only political systems, but individuals and administrations as well; the 
legitimacy and force of “public opinion” had overthrown a constitutionally elected president. 
Additionally, it seemed that pronunciados could employ military force and violence as a 
necessary tool to ensure that administrations obeyed the so-called voluntad del pueblo; 
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indeed, pronunciados had converted the “derecho de petición” of the early 1820s into the 
“derecho de insurección.”366 Mexican respect for constitutionality had thus disappeared in the 
wake of the government‟s obligated obedience to the voices of “the people”, in this case, the 
military. When Congress accepted Guerrero as president, it sealed the practice of the 
pronunciamiento – and the military violence which it led to – as the accepted and legitimate 
avenue to overthrow a governing administrative body. 
The pronunciamiento as nothing more than a legitimate coup (with Mexicans blaming 
the constitutional system itself for being flawed as it had denied Guerrero the presidency) 
would be henceforth applied to local events in Yucatán; the Yucatecan political and military 
elite had closely observed the events in 1828 in Mexico City, only to consciously apply them 
to their own circumstances. Indeed, given that national pronunciamientos encouraged 
imitation by soliciting the acta de adhesión, it is not strange that the practice spread so widely 
and so quickly, with pronunciados adopting it to suit local political demands. In the 
peninsula, there had been a struggle for state political power since 1825, which would be part 
of the inspiration for the first locally-targeted pronunciamiento of 1829.  
As of 1825, two main Yucatecan political parties were in existence: the same 
Camarilla (headed by captain of the First Active Battalion and merchant Pedro Marcial 
Guerra, along with businessmen Pedro Manuel de Regil, and Pedro José Guzmán), and their 
newfound opposition, the Liga. The Liga had been established at the end of 1824, when the 
former patriotas campechanos decided to unite with the sanjuanistas, in opposition to the 
Camarilla. The main reason for this formation was the discovery of a Camarilla-led 
conspiracy in November 1824 to secede from Mexico and reunite with Spain (mainly in order 
to maintain the camarilleros‟ lucrative trade links with Cuba).367 Indeed, the camarilleros had 
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planned a pronunciamiento for 2 December, to “separar este estado del general de la 
federación.”368 Even though the plan was unsuccessful, the Liga formed anyway, claiming its 
purpose was to maintain the federation and Yucatán‟s loyalty to Mexico, and prevent the 
Camarilla‟s projects to “preparar la desunión” from Mexico.”369 Made up primarily of young 
bourgeoisie members and businessmen and led by merchant José Tiburcio López, the Liga 
included among its most important members political figures Juan de Dios Cosgaya, Manuel 
Crescencio Rejón, José Matías Quintana, liberal clergy such as José María Meneses, and elite 
military individuals Pedro Landero, Pablo Antonio Lenard, Miguel Duque de Estrada, 
Joaquín Casares y Armas and Francisco Genaro de Cicero.
370
   
The struggle between the Liga and the Camarilla soon became embroiled in and 
evolved under the burgeoning Masonic lodges in Yucatán and Mexico. The ligados were 
primarily members of the liberal and pro-federalist yorkino lodge, and in late 1825, the 
camarilleros claimed their adhesion to the escocés lodge (the primary opposition of the 
yorkinos), which generally had a tendency towards centralism, with pro-Hispanic 
sentiments.
371
 Both lodges were basically in accordance with the Yucatecan political factions; 
the escoceses and camarilleros were the more traditionalist elite sectors of society, while the 
yorkinos and ligados, having a mix of higher and middle classes, were more popular. The 
only main difference was that the camarilleros were obviously highly regionalist – with some 
of them even possessing separatist desires – rather than being centralist. Indeed, they had 
declared Yucatán‟s secession from Mexico in 1823 in their efforts to establish a national 
federal system, and they had also refused to implement the Mexican declaration of war on 
                                                          
368
 La camarilla y la liga. Copia de un informe del general Pedro Lemus, juez en la causa criminal seguido 
contra unos presuntos reos de conspiración para separar el Estado de la federación, denunciados por el 
capitán Leandro Poblaciones, AGEY, Poder Ejecutivo, Milicia, Vol.4, Exp.6, Mérida, 2 October 1826.   
369
 Menéndez, La huella del general, p.233; ‘Los Yucatecos‟, Compendio Histórico, pp.26; 29-32. 
370
 El Cosmopolita: Periódico misceláneo de Campeche, 4 October 1826.  
371
 Sumaria promovida por don Francisco Benítez, alcalde primero de Mérida contra don Ignacio Quijano, el 
capitán don Martin Peraza y otros connotados vecinos, por perturbadores del orden público y demuestran sus 
simpatías por la Camarilla, AGEY, Justicia, Justicia Penal, Vol.3, Exp.33, 15 and 17 December 1825; Zavala, 
Ensayo Histórico, p.258. 
134 
 
Spain in 1824, consequently plotting for separation from Mexico. There was thus a clear 
contradiction in calling themselves escoceses. Nevertheless, apparently it was possible to 
claim to belong to the national pro-Hispanic and centralist ideology of the escoceses, but 
regionally, the camarilleros could completely adapt that centralist ideology to become a 
regionalist and even separatist ideology in Yucatán. The claim of their adhesion to the 
escocés lodge was to give them ideological legitimacy and thus increase their supporters;
372
 
by 1826, some of the most influential military figures such as Lieutenants of the First Active 
Battalion Domingo Cantón and Ignacio Quijano (who was also an important merchant), 
Lieutenant of the Thirteenth Permanent Battalion Martín Francisco Peraza,
373
 Coronel of the 
First Active Battalion Benito Aznar (who was also an hacendado of a henequen 
plantation),
374
 Captain of the First Active Battalion Pedro Cámara, and Commander of the 
First Active Battalion Felipe de la Cámara (who was also an hacendado of henequen),
375
 all 
identified themselves as camarilleros.
376
   
 In 1825, the Liga triumphed in elections with José Tiburcio López becoming 
governor on 21 August, defeating camarillero candidate and Campechean businessmen Pedro 
Manuel de Regil.
377 
For the first time since 1821, the Camarilla had lost their political 
dominance over the peninsula. They did not hesitate to display their anger. Supported in 
particular by the First Active Battalion, several “conmociones populares” were held by the 
camarilleros throughout December 1825, leading to the government‟s unsuccessful order of 
the arrest of their head Pedro José Guzmán.
378
 Guzmán then denounced that his detainment 
would only serve to leave “el campo libre” for “esa ominosa clase de sanjuanistas” while 
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calling for the expulsion of López.
379
 After the triumph of the Liga in the ayuntamiento 
elections in January 1826, the camarilleros revolted once more, claiming that the Liga 
government had converted itself into a tyrannical institution from which one could now only 
free oneself through an armed uprising. The attacks on the ligados began; on 17 May there 
was an assassination attempt on ligado Manuel Crescenio Rejón, (with two assassins 
disguised as women asking for a private meeting with him),
380
 and subsequently military 
camarilleros cut off ligado publisher Manuel Anguas‟ ear in an unsuccessful attempt to 
behead him.
381
   
The plot to attain local power through the pronunciamiento of 1829 would not solely 
reside in camarillero intentions, but also in a new faction on the rise: the centralist party. In 
late 1826 in Mexico, the yorkinos had begun calling for expulsion laws of the Spaniards; 
indeed, hungry to obtain government posts for their members (posts which some Spaniards 
occupied), the yorkinos saw this measure as the easiest solution.
382
 On 19 January 1827, after 
the discovery of the plan of Father Joaquín Arenas to re-establish Spanish rule, the yorkino 
hatred towards the Spaniards significantly increased, and they drafted expulsion laws on 10 
May and 20 December 1827, which the radical National Congress in power approved.
383
 In 
Yucatán, the escocés-camarillero faction immediately began protesting against these laws, 
proclaiming that the yorkinos were attempting to “conmover a los pueblos contra los 
españoles y rebajar los vínculos federales.”384 However, Liga and yorkino member Governor 
López was a Meridian businessman who was harbouring hopes of re-establishing relations 
with Cuba (not Spanish domination like the camarilleros desired, as must be noted). In order 
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to keep favour with the Spaniards still resident in Yucatán, (and perhaps with Spain in 
general), he thus stalled on implementing the expulsion laws throughout the entire year of 
1828. Moreover, he had openly condemned the plan of duranguense José María González of 
10 March 1827 which had also called for the expulsion of the Spaniards.
385
   
It was this moderate attitude of López and his administration towards the anti-Spanish 
laws which caused the fissure in the Liga coalition of the sanjuanistas and the patriotas 
campechanos, ultimately giving rise to the centralist party. One should recall that the 
patriotas campechanos were a die-hard anti-Spanish faction, who had pronounced in 1824 to 
ensure the Meridian implementation of the end of trade with Cuba, and to dismiss the 
Spaniards from their posts in Yucatán. Once more, the old Campechean-Meridian rivalry 
came to the fore, with Meridian impartiality towards decrees against Spain (ligados) and 
reunification plans to Cuba (camarilleros) clashing with Campechean pro-Mexican and anti-
Spanish sentiment (patriotas campechanos). On 19 January 1828, the patriotas began to 
demand that López impose the laws of the expulsion of the Spaniards, pressuring him 
throughout the year to obey Mexican legislature, but he did not implement it until December 
of that year.
386
 The Meridian reluctance to act against the Spaniards disgusted patriota leader 
Francisco Genaro de Cicero, who, together with followers such as Joaquín Casares y Armas, 
Miguel Duque de Estrada, and Tomás Requeña, broke off from the Liga.
387
 They formed the 
cicerista party, which would soon become known as the centralist party in Yucatán, a faction 
opposed to the disobedience and individuality of the Meridian-dominated Yucatecan 
administrations. This faction had a clear centralist ideology, concerned with the creation of a 
stronger central Mexican government which would have greater control over the recalcitrant 
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Meridians. They would be responsible for spreading the idea of using the pronunciamiento to 
obtain local power in 1829 in order to ensure obedience to Mexico. One should note that they 
were using centralism not to serve a national purpose, but to accomplish local objectives 
which were remarkably similar to those of the 1824 Campechean pronunciamiento. They 
were thus using a national ideal as a local weapon against the elite Meridians, to force them 
to descend from their power-trip which they had been enjoying since colonial years, and 
instead completely obey the national administration.   
The centralists began their campaign against the Meridians, declaring that “Campeche 
nunca reconocerá más que a México, siguiendo en toda la suerte que corra la república”,388 
and proclaiming that the Sixth and Thirteenth Permanent Battalions (which constituted the 
regular army and obeyed the national executive) stationed in Campeche and which were 
commanded by Mexicans Juan José Codallos and Francisco de Paula Toro respectively (the 
latter who would soon head the pronunciamiento of 1832 against this very administration) 
would block any Meridian pro-Spanish plans. The discovery of clandestine correspondence 
from Havana to the wives of distinguished camarillero figures Pedro Escudero de la Rocha 
and Pedro José Guzmán led the centralist newspaper La Bandera de Anáhuac to attack the 
camarilleros throughout 1827, accusing them of planning a secessionist project.
389
 In their 
other newspaper, the Eco de Yucatán, they also made the ludicrous claim that ligados Zavala, 
Fernando Valle and Manuel Crescencio Rejón were also involved in “el horrible proyecto de 
separar a Yucatán de la unidad federal” which “no servirá más que para facilitar el 
engrandecimiento de muy pocas familias de Mérida.”390 With more reason, the centralists 
accused camarilleros Pedro José Guzmán and Felipe de la Cámara of planning to replace 
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Commander General Felipe Codallos with camarillero José Segundo Carvajal (who was then 
the commander of arms in Campeche). The centralists also warned the ligados that Yucatán 
“jamás será asilo de los delincuentes de la Acordada,”391 as they stated that because of those 
tumultuous events of 1828, the yorkinos had reawakened “los deseos del bárbaro y cruel 
Fernando, que nunca hubiera pensado atacarnos, si no hubieran suscitado la Discordia, los 
Poinsetts, los Zavalas y otros monstruos de esta especie.”392 They blamed the radicalism of 
the federal system for creating an unstable republic, vulnerable to invasion, and they declared 
that a centralist government was necessary in order to ensure public order, respect for the 
constitution, and the survival of independence.  
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Permanent forces, Active Battalions and Civic Militias in 1827 
 
Company Number of Men 
Sixth Permanent Battalion 677 
The Thirteenth Permanent Battalion 846 
First Active Battalion (Mérida) 1228 
Second Active Battalion (Campeche) 1182 
Third Active Battalion (Tizimín) 1107 
Coastguards 166 
Infantry of Bacalar 132 
Infantry of Carmen 63 
Veterans and actives of Artillery 244 
Cavalry, Mérida 108 
Cavalry, Carmen 67 
Total 5820 
      Source: Campos García, De provincia, p.149 
Moreover, the centralists (and the majority of the Mexican elite in general) did not 
approve of the presidential figure: Guerrero‟s lower class, mixed race, and unimpressive 
education contrasted heavily with the usual elite Caucasian political class of the hombres de 
bien. In addition, the extremism of the Minister of Finance Zavala – who had decreed a series 
of taxes on the upper classes in order to raise money for the treasury – led to further elite 
disapproval.
393
 Additionally, the more conservative Yucatecans viewed Zavala‟s radical 
sanjuanista legacy unfavourably. The administration had also begun to take initiatives which 
threatened the power of the Church, alarming the more traditionalist factions and the 
clergy.
394
 Nationwide opposition to the Guerrero administration and its radicalism was 
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consequently becoming manifest. The Yucatecan centralists now needed the right elements to 
dispose of the Liga, and to contribute to the end of Guerrero and federalism. As Yucatecan 
federalist Fernando Valle claimed, “Casares, a Requeña y a otros […] querían centralizar, 
porque éstos les habían asegurado que en México se trataba de ello y de derribar al Sr. 
Guerrero.”395 The early 1820s had demonstrated that the pronunciamiento could be used for a 
change of a constitutional system and the implementation of national decrees; 1828 now 
proved that pronunciados could use the practice to overthrow administrations and leading 
political figures. Nevertheless, experience had also shown that a successful Yucatecan 
pronunciamiento had to have two key elements to ensure a chance at success: a national 
cause to adhere to (and thus give the movement some sort of ideological legitimacy and 
strength), and the support of the army, as force needed to be employed where consent was 
not.  
The courting of the locally-stationed army was therefore a priority for the centralists. 
The timing was right; the permanent army was discontented with the national and local 
administrations for purely financial reasons. Since 1826, there had been a constant feud 
between Governor López and then Commander General Felipe Codallos concerning the lack 
of funds and supplies for the some 1500 permanent troops stationed in Yucatán. Although it 
was the national treasury‟s responsibility to pay these salaries, the scarcity of national funds 
led to Codallos‟ demand that it was the obligation of the local government to supplement the 
resources needed. López took several measures to make funds available to the troops 
throughout 1828 and 1829, through donations and readjustments to the local treasury, but 
Codallos was still dissatisfied.
396
 In July 1829, news came of the arrival of Spanish Brigadier 
General Isidro Barradas and his 3,000 strong troops in Tampico, with plans of the reconquest 
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of Mexico.
397
 With the national emergency, Codallos increased his demands for more money, 
as he put into force two battalions to defend the state; battalions which the national or local 
government had no money to fund.
398
   
 López did not advance any more money to Codallos, and instead invested it in the 
training and equipping of the civic militias (which were more under-armed and under-trained 
than the permanent and active battalions), providing them with more than 5,000 arms, and 
claiming that they were also necessary to repel the Spanish invasion.
399
 With López‟s refusal 
of funds, Codallos accused the governor of harbouring sympathies for the Spaniards (an 
accusation similar to the centralists‟ criticism), claiming that López had a “plan para que a 
pretexto de defender el pacto se dé lugar a que se destruya no ya la forma de gobierno, sino la 
independencia misma.”400 Codallos threatened that he would limit the defence of Yucatán to 
Campeche, declaring that his troops would resort to “desorden” if the government did not pay 
their salaries. The governor responded that if the troops did revolt, he would find it necessary 
to declare civil war.
401
 The situation soon became so extreme that López requested the 
dismissal of Codallos, whom he accused on 21 August of attempting to overpower the state 
authorities, with Codallos‟ employment terminating in late September, as camarillero José 
Segundo Carvajal replaced him.
402
   
 Despite Codallos‟ dismissal, the damage had been sufficient for the centralist party 
to take advantage. Throughout 1829, the ciceristas had begun to capitalise on army 
resentment, spreading the rumour among the permanent army that while the soldier did not 
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even have bread to eat, the governor and other civil authorities were swimming in riches. 
They blamed this situation on the inefficient bureaucracy of the federalist system; it had 
proved itself useless in maintaining the troops, and therefore what was needed was a change 
to a centralist regime.
403
 They also planted the idea (as had been practiced in 1828 in Mexico 
City), that if negotiation could not achieve this change, military force had to accomplish it. 
As Vázquez has pointed out, the resentment among the troops was to the point that they were 
inclined to believe in – and consequently support – whatever political change promised the 
payment of their salaries.
404
 The military consequently welcomed the centralist ideas, and 
began to discuss them in their tertulias and juntas. The López administration did not fail to 
notice this, and criticised them as a threat to the government.
405 The administration‟s fears 
were not unfounded; in early January 1829 Codallos himself had started calling for 
disobeying the national government as it was “sometido a la facción yorkina.”406 The local 
yorkinos then condemned him for plotting to “centralizar el gobierno de la nación.”407  
 The most powerful figures in the military to still be convinced of the centralist 
cause were the camarillero elite, who despite losing political power, still occupied some of 
the highest military positions in Yucatán, heading the active battalions. The camarilleros, 
with their ideology of a relative level of regional autonomy (based mainly on the need to 
maintain essential trade links with Cuba) were not – and would never be – true supporters of a 
strong centralist administration. Nevertheless, at the same time, they were hungry to regain 
the local political power which they had lost, and they noted the growing popularity of the 
centralist movement. They were also, as one should recall, the upper-crust of Yucatecan 
society, and they did not appreciate the radical administration of Guerrero and Zavala. They 
                                                          
403
 El Yucateco Constitucional, 3 August 1831.  
404
 Vázquez, “Two Reactions”, p.57. 
405
 El Yucateco Constitucional, 3 August 1831; Letter from José Tiburcio López to Felipe Codallos, AGEY, 
Poder Ejecutivo, Libro Complementario 4, Correspondencia de los gobernadores 1825-1829, 5 September 
1829. 
406
 Campos García, Que los yucatecos, p.86. 
407
 Campos García, De provincia, p.175. 
143 
 
had witnessed in 1828 that pronunciados could legitimately use military force in order to 
overthrow an unwanted political administration. Once there was the pronunciamiento glaze 
on a text which declared to represent public opinion, along with stating the pronunciados‟ 
intentions of saving the nation, the majority accepted it. The camarilleros thus realised that 
they could use the centralist ideology and plan as a platform for them to regain political 
power and consequently carry out the type of government which they desired (historically, of 
a distinctly regional character if 1821 and 1823 were anything to go by). Consequently, as of 
1829, camarillero military figures – among them Lieutenant Colonel Juan Manuel Calderón 
(Commander of the Meridian barracks),
408
 Captains of the First Active Battalion Gerónimo 
López de Llergo and Pedro Marcial Guerra and Second Lieutenant of the Permanent Cavalry 
Pedro Cantón
409
 – began claiming their adhesion to the centralist movement. As camarillero 
Joaquín Gutiérrez de Estrada rightly remarked, in the coalition participated “una masa de 
opinión por el federalismo” which had allied to the “partido centralista” in pure opposition to 
the government of López “y su pandilla.”410 Ligado Manuel Crescencio Rejón agreed, who 
saw among the golpistas “un gran número” of federalists who had united with the small 
centralist faction “para satisfacer resentimientos personales y pasiones innobles.”411  
  Despite the Mexican triumph over the Spanish invasion on 11 September 1829 and 
the dismissal of Codallos, the military‟s centralist juntas continued in Yucatán – presided by 
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Commander of Artillery Francisco Javier Verna
412
 and Commander General José Segundo 
Carvajal in Mérida and Campeche respectively – with the main theme being the poverty of 
the military. Distinguished camarillero businessmen Pedro Manuel de Regil, Pedro José 
Guzmán, Simón Peón, and José María Gutiérrez de Estrada also openly supported the juntas, 
donating one-third of their incomes to sustain the troops.
413
 These businessmen also had 
economic interests to protect; in Mérida, the Guzmán family had strong trade relations with 
New Orleans, while in Campeche, the Regil family and their relatives the Gutiérrez de 
Estradas sustained prominent trade with Jamaica. In May 1829, National Congress had dealt 
them a severe blow by declaring the prohibition of the import of foreign textiles. Moreover, 
on 14 October 1828, Congress had then declared a tax (5 percent) on the import and export of 
all agricultural and industrial products, and with it, the end of the free trade of cocoa, coffee, 
silk and wax.
414
 Guerrero had also used his extraordinary faculties (granted to him during the 
Spanish invasion, and which he now refused to give up) to abolish slavery on 16 September 
1829,
415
 angering the landowning elite camarilleros, such as the Peón family. Local 
government stalled on implementing these taxes, but by November, it was imperative that 
they be put into practice; November, the same month that the pronunciamiento would 
erupt.
416
 No coincidences there.  
The coalition which thus formed was made up of centralists, military officers, 
regionalist camarilleros, merchants and plantation owners. It is also interesting to note that 
the powerful nucleus of camarilleros was intimately connected: Carvajal was the son-in-law 
of the businessman Fernando Gutiérrez and therefore brother-in-law of José María and 
Joaquín Gutiérrez de Estrada. He was also related to the Escudero de la Rocha family, and 
was the cousin of Manuel José Peón, Joaquín Castellanos, José Encarnación Cámara and the 
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brothers Tomás, Benito and Alonso Aznar y Peón. He was the uncle of Sebastián Peón and 
relative of Pedro Cámara. The Baranda and Cicero families were related in Campeche, and 
also José Julián Quijano had married into the Escudero family in 1814.
417
 Family loyalties 
thus played their part in the coalition as well. 
  Rumours of a national pronunciamiento in favour of centralism then started 
swirling throughout Mexico. The ex-escoceses (their lodge had been extinguished in 1828) 
and the more moderate yorkinos who had supported Gómez Pedraza‟s candidacy, began to 
conspire in the autumn of 1829 against the too-radical Guerrero administration. With rumours 
of military leaders Anastasio Bustamante and Santa Anna plotting to pronounce for 
centralism from Jalapa, the pamphlet entitled “¿La república central nos librará de todo mal? 
Grito de centralismo en Jalapa por el general Santa Anna” was sent from Jalapa to Yucatán, 
with its contents provoking great excitement among the centralist faction in the peninsula.
418
 
A national pronunciamiento calling for centralism in order to save the nation from the perils 
of the current administration – and needed by the Yucatecans to ”piggy back” on – thus 
seemed to be really happening. The centralist juntas discussed the rumours with great 
enthusiasm, with the Liga consequently accusing their opposition of trying to “sobreponerse a 
los poderes del estado y sujetarlos a sus deliberaciones y acuerdos.”419 The centralist coalition 
paid no attention to the local administration, and all the Yucatecan centralists had to do now 
was to wait for the formal announcement of the national pronunciamiento.  
 The Yucatecan military, however, did not wait on Jalapa, but pronounced 
spontaneously, prematurely, and drunkenly on the night of 5 November (an example of one 
of the many unwise decisions which alcohol can lead to influencing). In Zavala‟s words, “El 
plan había tenido su origen entre los jefes residentes en Jalapa; se había extendido a todos los 
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militares de la república, y en Campeche estalló antes de la época convenida.”420 On 5 
November, Captain Luis Gutiérrez had just entered into service in the Sixth Permanent 
Battalion. Among the colleagues participating in his celebrations were Commander of Arms 
of Campeche Ignacio Roca, Commander of the Thirteenth Battalion Francisco Paula de Toro, 
Commander of the Sixth Battalion Ignacio Castro, Colonel of Artillery Francisco Verna, 
Commander of Artillery Leandro Poblaciones, and Commander of the Second Active 
Battalion Sebastián López de Llergo. The conversation at the celebratory meal revolved 
around the poverty from which the military was suffering, with the disgust against the present 
local and national administrations growing ever more heated. Spontaneously, Manuel López 
de Llergo, brother of Sebastián, toasted for the centralist republic, to which drunken shouts of 
support were immediately given. The troops then congregated in the plaza, giving cries of 
“¡Viva la República Central Mexicana!” causing a mere gathering of alarmed civilians. They 
now needed a text to transform this from a drunken brawl into a practice demonstrating the 
Mexican “derecho de insurrección.” They thus proceeded to the house of Ignacio Roca, 
where a commission made up of centralists of Cicero, Rafael Traba and José María Contreras 
drew up the pronunciamiento text, which was proclaimed on the following day.
421
  
The Acta del pronunciamiento de la guarnición de Campeche por la forma de 
gobierno de república central was the first Yucatecan pronunciamiento to be purely issued 
by the military, signed by the commanders of the Sixth and Thirteenth Battalions, along with 
officers from the active battalions (illustrating a powerful coalition formed by the active 
battalions and the regular army).
422
 In this sense, it clearly imitated the Plan de Perote of 
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1828, demonstrating the dominance of the military in the pronunciamiento practice. The 
pronunciados demanded a central Mexican government, with the justification of saving the 
republic from the disorder and threat to social security which the federal system had caused, 
and which Mexicans had witnessed in La Acordada and the Parián riot. In their words, “la 
independencia y seguridad de la nación, constantemente amenazada por las peligrosas 
oscilaciones de que ha sido y es combatida bajo el sistema federal” needed to be secured. 
Federalism was also the cause behind the “desorganización en que se halla el ejército y la 
hacienda.” The Spanish invasion had moreover proved that a strong central government was 
the “base esencial para mantener la independencia a toda costa.”423 The negotiating tactic was 
the same that had been used in 1823: recognise our demands, or we will secede. Once more, 
Yucatecans were using their distance from Mexico to their advantage; even though the 
pronunciamiento was military-based, given the isolation of the peninsula from Mexico City, 
it was not practical to intimidate the national administration using military force. Potential 
secession would instead be threatened.    
The military would use the threat of armed force much closer to home in order to 
pressure local powers into accepting the pronunciamiento. The pronunciados demanded in 
their text the resignation of all local administrative officials, stating that the local congress, 
senator and governor were now “sin ejercicio [...] porque se halla en contradicción con el 
sistema del pronunciamiento” and anyone who refused to second the pronunciamiento 
“cesará en el ejercicio de sus funciones.” The act was then sent to camarillero Commander 
General José Segundo Carvajal for approval.
424
 On 7 November, Carvajal declared to the 
state authorities that he would use all his resources to resist the pronunciamiento, including 
his own life.
425
 While the pronunciados in Campeche waited impatiently for Carvajal‟s 
response, their anxiety overflowed into talk of simply marching upon Mérida; they were 
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already considering the use of military power – learnt in 1828 – to enable the 
pronunciamiento‟s success.426 Carvajal met with his fellow military camarilleros Benito 
Aznar, Joaquín Muñoz, Juan Manuel Calderón, Néstor Escudero, Gerónimo López de Llergo, 
and Pedro Marcial Guerra, and they all declared that they were “interesados en cambiar de 
sistema,” with the exception of Aznar who declared that the mission of the military was to 
uphold, not demolish the institutions established.
427
 His comrades disregarded his protests, 
and Calderón and Llergo then seconded the pronunciamiento in the name of the First Active 
Battalion stationed in Mérida, with the added article that Yucatán would not wait on any 
negotiation for centralism, but had already seceded and would not reunite with Mexico until 
it adopted a centralist system.
428
 One cannot underestimate the importance of this addition; 
this was not a threat or the standard negotiating practice of a pronunciamiento, this was a 
camarillero tactic. The camarilleros did not want centralism; they wanted local power and 
they wanted sufficient relative autonomy in order to carry out their regionalist economic and 
trade practices without impositions or interferences from the centre. Indeed, they had been 
the ones who seceded in 1821 and again in 1823, were stubborn enough to maintain trade 
with Cuba throughout 1824 in spite of the Mexican declaration of war on Spain, and had 
plotted for secession in 1824 as well: why on earth would they ever want a centralist 
government? They had their own intentions and their own regionalist ideology to implement, 
and were consequently manipulating the pronunciamiento to immediately achieve Yucatecan 
secession. The camarilleros had, as in 1821 and 1823, once more adapted a pronunciamiento 
to make it theirs, modifying it to suit their own local needs. They had turned centralism on its 
head, to become a sort of contracentralism. 
Local Congress made a feeble attempt to battle the pronunciados. The body granted 
Governor López extraordinary faculties to defend the federal system, and congress members 
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swore loyalty to not recognise the pronunciados; they also declared the expulsion of anyone 
who directly or indirectly supported the pronunciados.
429
 Nevertheless, the poorly armed and 
trained civic militias were no match for the strong front provided by the unification of the 
active battalions and the regular army, and the ligados soon lost all hope of any popular 
resistance to the pronunciamiento.
430
 The pronunciados dismissed all Liga authorities almost 
immediately, encountering no resistance. Carvajal then assumed powers of both governor and 
commander general in accordance with Articles Three and Four of the act. At 7 o‟ clock that 
very night of 6 December, he dissolved Local Congress.
431
 He abolished all federal offices, 
and he ordered the establishment of military barracks throughout the province; in the words 
of Yucatecan historian Joaquín Baranda, “las ciudades se vieron convertidas en cuarteles, y el 
Estado todo parecía una plaza sitiada, sin mas ley ni más garantías que la voluntad 
omnipotente del jefe supremo que la mandaba.”432 A military junta constituted of Roca, Toro, 
Berna, Sebastián López de Llergo, Ignacio de Castro, Manuel de Lara Bonifas, Leandro 
Poblaciones, Manuel Duque de Estrada and Francisco Genaro de Cicero as secretary was to 
run the peninsula.
433
  
It may seem that the pronunciamiento had converted Yucatán into a type of regional 
authoritarian and praetorian regime, with Carvajal at the head, and his military elite 
subordinate to him. One should nevertheless recall the character of the active battalions 
(Carvajal himself was the head of these military units) in Yucatán. The active members were 
not like the regular army; they had military titles, but in their majority (and more importantly 
to them) were merchants, hacendados, and politicians. Their pronunciamiento demands were 
consequently not militaristic, but political, and their covert intentions would be (as one will 
discover) concentrated on trade with Cuba. They had used their military rank to guarantee the 
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success of their movement, but this movement was not militaristic, nor did it result in a 
praetorian regime taking over power from a civilian one. Thus, in Fowler‟s words: 
Lo importante es evitar ser influidos por esquemas anacrónicos, y no conceptualizar el 
pronunciamiento y la intervención política militar en el México independiente como 
si oficiales como Antonio López de Santa Anna o Anastasio Bustamante fueron los 
equivalentes decimonónicos de Alfredo Stroessner, Augusto Pinochet o Jorge Rafael 
Videla […] Se supuso, a modo de ejemplo, que los miembros de los ejércitos 
informales del siglo XIX se vieron a sí mismos como pertenecientes a una casta 
distinta y aparte de sus contemporáneos civiles, en el sentido que luego hicieron sus 
sucesores profesionales del siglo XIX.
434
 
Luis Medina Peña has also declared that: 
La historia civil ha considerado al ejército de la primera mitad del siglo XIX como 
una institución no solo tradicional, sino desestabilizadora desde el punto de vista 
político. Según esta versión, el ejército fue el responsable de todos los vaivenes 
políticos y de no pocas las desgracias nacionales. Ahí está, se dice, la larga lista de 
planes, revueltas y pronunciamientos para probarlo […] Tal imagen es producto de un 
anacronismo: suponer que el ejército de entonces debía comportarse de acuerdo con el 
modelo de neutralidad política que es propio de los ejércitos del siglo XIX en los 
países de democracia establecida. Ello ha contribuido a concebir la primera mitad del 
siglo XIX como una época en altos grados de violencia castrense ejercida sobre las 
endebles instituciones republicanas […] En general se ha soslayado considerar al 
ejército de aquellos días como un actor político legitimo de acuerdo con la mentalidad 
de la época.
435
 
The pronunciamiento had evidently been a top-down political exercise, used by the 
camarillero elite in order to defend their agendas. In the words of José Ortega y Gasset, the 
pronunciados “No iban […] a luchar, sino a tomar posesión del Poder público.”436 The 
camarilleros had silenced the public vote, constitutionally demonstrated in 1826. The Plan of 
Perote and La Acordada had taught the pronunciados well what they had the power to do 
through the veiled legitimacy of the pronunciamiento. The pronunciamiento thus 
demonstrated a pattern which was to be set for the next five years: the weakness of a 
powerless governor against the strength of the commander general, who had the resources 
and the men to dictate the political tune of the peninsula through the pronunciamiento. 
According to Medina Peña once more: 
                                                          
434
 Fowler, "El pronunciamiento mexicano”, pp.17-18. 
435
 Medina Peña, Invención del sistema, pp.243-244.  
436
 Ortega y Gasset, España invertebrada, p.88.  
151 
 
El ejército nacional es un actor político que en aquel escenario sólo tenía a su 
disposición el pronunciamiento, el plan y la revuelta como formas de acción política 
corporativa. El ejército recurría al pronunciamiento no para asolar el país, sino como 
medio para contrarrestar y enfrentar a la clase política civil ubicada en el Congreso y 
en los gobiernos de los estados.
437
 
 
 Additionally as Báquer has pointed out, it was not a despotic government which had 
provoked a pronunciamiento from its opposition, but a weak government: “alguien está en 
condiciones de poner a prueba la existencia operativa del Estado, es el grupo social que mejor 
conoce sus debilidades.”438 Zavala would later state: 
Aquel movimiento y sus consecuencias, es uno de los grandes argumentos contra la 
compatibilidad entre el régimen militar […] [y] las formas republicanas adoptadas en 
el país. Ochocientos hombres de guarnición en Campeche, y otros tantos en Mérida, 
fueron suficientes para echar abajo las leyes constitucionales, deponer al jefe supremo 
del Estado de Yucatán, disolver la asamblea legislativa y establecer un régimen 
militar, que bajo la denominación genérica de centralismo, sujetaba a una península 
de setecientos mil habitantes a las ordenanzas del ejército […] Lo más extravagante 
era que esa usurpación de los poderes públicos se hacía en nombre del Estado, cuyas 
autoridades populares habían sido despojadas, y vilipendiadas; cuya constitución fue 
hollada.
439
 
 
The view of Josèp Fontana also supports this perspective: 
[El pronunciamiento] consagraba una nueva fórmula política que permitía llevar a 
cabo un proceso revolucionario controlado, dirigido por unas minorías políticas y 
militares 'liberales' en que al pueblo le estaba reservado simplemente el papel de 
beneficiario pasivo, cuya participación no había de ir mas allá de mostrar su apoyo y 
aclamar a los caudillos que habían arriesgado sus vidas por la libertad de todos.
440
 
The rhetoric used by the Carvajal administration to justify their pronunciamiento 
clearly demonstrated the valuable lesson they had learnt from Mexico in 1828. They claimed 
that La Acordada and the consequent “ilegitimidad” of the “gobierno inconstitucional” which 
was “contra los votos legales de la mayoría de los estados” had broken the social order, and 
thus a pronunciamiento against said administration was not only legitimate, but necessary. In 
their words, “la época infausta de 827 a 829, época de sediciones y de trastornos, de 
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pronunciamientos que destruían las garantías constitucionales, y de otros que tuvieron por 
objeto, aunque no por resultado, restablecerlas y reformarlas” meant that there was a veritable 
crisis of legitimacy, which needed to be solved.
441
 In their eyes, their movement was a valid 
pronunciamiento, as the national government had never been constitutional in the first place. 
Now they were responsible for installing a new order, so as to reset the political security of 
the nation. They applied this same rhetoric to the Liga government (despite the fact that it had 
been popularly elected). The pronunciados condemned it as “un partido […] que trabajaba 
solo por sí y no por los pueblos,”442 an administration which was in contradiction to the 
wishes of the people, thus bolstering the patriotic cause of the pronunciados even more. The 
pronunciados consequently claimed themselves as part of an “empresa heroica y gloriosa de 
salvar la nación.”443 The pronunciados used this rhetoric very consciously; the need to seem 
like the saviours of the patria, rescuing it from an unwanted administration was part and 
parcel of pronunciamiento legitimacy. In the words of Brian Connaughton et.al, “La forja de 
una hegemonía política requiere de un lenguaje capaz de penetrar a las distintas capas 
sociales; debe ofrecer la promesa de una nueva legitimidad y una justificación ideológica y 
política que incluye y articule en sus pretensiones a toda la población.”444 
Not surprisingly, the camarilleros in power showed no intention of interacting with 
the national administration subsequent to their pronunciamiento; they had achieved relative 
independence and the autonomy needed to carry out their desires. The centralists quickly lost 
hope in negotiating with Mexico when Carvajal denied Zavala (which had been 
commissioned by President Guerrero to enter into talks with the pronunciados) the right to 
even step on to Yucatecan land, claiming him to be an “atentador del pronunciamiento” and 
declaring that if he returned to Yucatán, he would be executed by a firing squad 
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immediately.
445
 The centralist cause was further derailed when news arrived of the success of 
the Plan of Jalapa pronunciamiento of 4 December 1829, which was not centralist as had 
been rumoured, but was an act declaring instead the reformation of the representative popular 
federal system and the replacement of Guerrero by the more moderate figure of Anastasio 
Bustamante.
446
 This sent the Yucatecan centralists into despair; there was no hope for their 
movement, and instead separation from Mexico was now guaranteed, giving the camarilleros 
the full opportunity to implement their project which was completely contradictory to 
centralism.  
On 24 December, the Yucatecan military ruling the peninsula rejected an invitation 
from Veracruz to second the Plan of Jalapa of 4 December, declaring that it did not solve “el 
mal en su origen.” Instead, they agreed unanimously to ratify the pronunciamiento of 
Campeche.
447
 General Anastasio Bustamante became president of Mexico on 1 January 1830, 
and despite the installation of a much less radical government which was surrounded and 
directed by the hombres de bien, the Carvajal administration pressed on in their determination 
to remain separated. On 28 February, it rejected talks with Felipe Codallos and Tomás 
Requeña who had been commissioned by Bustamante to attempt negotiation with the powers 
of the peninsula. Minister of War José Antonio Facio then tried sending Martín Peraza with 
the same intentions, but the Carvajal administration also turned him away.
448
 Mexicans were 
mystified by the stubborn actions of the carvajalistas, having no idea of their real agenda of 
regionalism, “Lo ocurrido en Yucatán es verdaderamente un fenómeno, un hecho singular, 
aislado y sin trascendencia: un día se revelará a la nación el misterio que hasta hoy cubre el 
verdadero origen de este suceso.”449 Even British diplomat in Mexico, Richard Pakenham, 
with his convinced belief that Yucatecans preferred “the Federal System, under which they 
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enjoyed the privileges of enacting their own laws, and regulating as they thought proper all 
matters of Internal administration” thought it “strange that a Country so circumstanced, 
should [...] for a period of nearly three years – that is to say, from November 1829, till the 
end of 1832 – have held out against the Government of Mexico in favour of a Central 
Government.”450 With all attempts at negotiation failed, the national government ended 
financial aid to the peninsula, and established full customs duties on all products coming 
from Yucatán.
451
 On 5 April, the Yucatecan general assembly issued the Acta instituyente de 
la asamblea general de la provincia de Yucatán, which reinforced their stance that they 
would recognise and obey the Mexican government only when it pronounced for centralism, 
and that they had the right to review and approve all decrees emanating from the centre.
452
 
The carvajalistas were gradually cementing relative sovereignty.   
While the carvajalistas had been rejecting talks with Mexico, they had been busy in 
other matters. Illicit trade with Cuba now rose under the Carvajal administration, as the 
Mexican newspaper El Gladiador remarked “con la mayor desvergüenza llegaban con 
frecuencia buques en derechura de la Habana cargados de efectos españoles.”453 The 
Yucatecan government also allowed the tax free import of flour, along with all other products 
which Yucatán could not manufacture.
454
 They took more pro-Spanish measures, inviting 
more than 30 Spaniards who had been expelled under the government of López to return to 
Yucatán, along with others who had actually taken part in the invasion project of Barradas.
455
 
Carvajal‟s administration also had Spanish military figures Simón Ortega, José Ampudia, 
Agustín Mier y Terán and José Ontíveros exonerated from previous crimes of treason.
456
 The 
governor then publicly stated that that there existed nothing in common between Yucatán and 
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the other Mexican states,
457
 the union of Mexico and Yucatán was based on false data, and 
that a policy based on facts “probarían que Yucatán jamás debería unirse a la república 
mexicana, pues jamás será feliz un país regido por instituciones que no se conforman a sus 
leyes, su ignorancia y sus costumbres.”458 The Carvajal regime began suggesting that the 
general government should follow the examples of Buenos Aires, Colombia and Central 
America, countries which in spite of their declarations of independence, had decided to 
maintain mercantile relations with the Spanish colonies in America.
459
 Carvajal then declared 
in 1831 that: 
el sistema mercantil que se adoptó para toda la República, no podía comprenderle sin 
la ruina total de la Península, porque no hay nada de común entre la posición 
geográfica, las circunstancias locales, las relaciones mercantiles y la clase de industria 
de la misma Península con los demás Estados de la Unión.
460
  
 
Additionally, as Robert Patch has noted: 
the strengthening of ties with Cuba [...] were certainly behind Yucatán‟s well-known 
tendency toward separatism [...] Certainly, without strong economic ties to the rest of 
Mexico, the willingness of Yucatecan elites to contemplate such separation was 
greater, and this political tendency naturally would exacerbate any other divisive 
issues that might emerge.
461
   
 
Rumours also began that camarilleros Pedro José Guzmán, Carvajal, Pedro Manuel 
Regil and Pedro Escudero de la Rocha together with Perfecto de Baranda and Pedro de 
Baranda were all plotting to officially recommence trade with Cuba. The yorkino newspaper 
El Noticioso reported in July 1830 that the Cuban authorities were manifesting interest in 
uniting with Yucatán, with the Cuban Captain General sending “a Yucatán un espía para 
explorar que podía esperarse” of the camarilleros.462 The Mexican newspaper El Sol 
reported, “Entendemos que hay proyectos muy avanzados, muchos de ellos impracticables, 
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aunque podemos afirmar que todos están fundados sobre el principio de independencia de 
toda dominación extranjera.”463 In 1833, Yucatecan political figure Ignacio Basadre confided 
to Bustamante that Carvajal “puso a disposición del gobierno de la Habana, por medio de una 
comisión, al estado de Yucatán en caso de que fuese atacado por el gobierno federal de la 
república.”464 The Mexican administration‟s proposal to close all foreign and national 
commerce to the ports of Yucatán – in retaliation against the recalcitrant pronunciados – led 
to camarillero Gutiérrez de Estrada‟s threat “que Yucatán así hostilizado, abriría su comercio 
a la isla de Cuba, tomaría en lo político otra resolución contraria a sus reiteradas protestas de 
continuar siendo una parte integrante de la Nación Mejicana,”465 adding that “no puede privar 
al estado del derecho imprescriptible de organizarse por sí mismo, de gobernarse en lo 
interior, de juzgar y fallar por sí mismo sobre la legitimidad o ilegitimidad de sus autoridades 
propias.”466 Yucatecans and Mexicans alike were slowly realising that centralism had been an 
idea farthest from the minds of the pronunciados. Shunned centralist Joaquín Casares y 
Armas now claimed that the Camarilla had taken advantage of the pronunciamiento to revive 
its old separatist plans of union with Spain,
467
 with federalist Zavala suggesting the same.
468
 
Guerrero himself denounced the pronunciados as “un puñado de anarquistas”, adding that 
“quieren ellos llevarlo a práctica lo que no pudo efectuar el gobierno español en el frenesí de 
su reconquista.”469  
 Despite the ambitions of the carvajalistas, their secessionist dream was not to last 
for long, as shall be demonstrated in the following chapter. What remains significant here is 
that their pronunciamiento had been novel in several aspects: for the first time, pronunciados 
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had used the practice as a national negotiating force as well as a local overthrowing tactic; it 
had also targeted specific administrations instead of just the political system. Moreover, the 
call for centralism had evidently been a farce by the camarillero elite to completely fulfil 
their regionalist (and even separatist) desires, for the first time illustrating the 
pronunciamiento as a façade and a strategic practice for the elite in the peninsula to realise 
their own specific projects. The power of the military behind intimidating others who were 
clearly against the act also disputed the so-called claim to the voluntad del pueblo, which had 
since the pronunciamiento‟s inception been used to justify the existence of the practice; 
indeed, the pronunciados had only accomplished victory in this instance because of the fear 
which the camarillero military and the commander general had inspired. The 
pronunciamiento was thus now a precursor to repression and intimidation to all those who 
were against the pronunciados. Nevertheless, this is not to say that the pronunciamiento was 
exclusively a militaristic practice. As has been demonstrated, significant political and 
economic motivations and sectors were behind the pronunciamiento, with civilians using 
their military rank to their advantage. Pronunciados would again use this capitalisation on 
armed power continually throughout the 1830s; indeed, 1829 was just a glimpse into the 
abyss of what was to come, and the violent force which the pronunciamiento would become 
in early 1830s Yucatán. 
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5 
       Local Politics and National Influence: 
The Federalist Pronunciamientos of 1831-1832 
 
 Cuando no se observa la constitución  
no existe el pacto constitucional;  
cuando no hay autoridad legítima,  
no puede haber rebelión.
470
    
 
The pronunciamientos of 1831-1832 demonstrated the next phase in the evolution of 
the practice in terms of its conversion from a solely national exercise of negotiation into a key 
instrument used in the local struggle for political power between two key factions in Yucatán: 
the federalists and the carvajalistas. These pronunciamientos were primarily demonstrations 
of the federalist opposition which had been building since the carvajalistas‟ takeover of 
government in 1829. While the pronunciamientos of 1831 would be primarily local, – and 
unsuccessful – that of 1832 would triumph mainly because of General Antonio López de 
Santa Anna‟s order to his brother-in-law Francisco de Paula Toro (who was stationed in 
Campeche as the commander of arms of the regular army) that Yucatán pronounce for 
federalism. Led by Toro, the pronunciados of 1832 would demand a federal system, while 
simultaneously calling for the dismissal of the Carvajal administration. This not only 
highlighted the enduring importance of Mexican political events and pronunciamientos on 
Yucatecan politics, but also demonstrated once more the significance of the inspiration from 
without, if a Yucatecan pronunciamiento was to be successful. Additionally, these 
pronunciamientos illustrated the now indispensable need for military force to guarantee the 
success of a Yucatecan pronunciamiento; indeed, one of the main reasons behind the triumph 
of the pronunciamiento of 1832 was the military position and influence of Toro. This only 
served to demonstrate even further the powerlessness of the government against military 
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force, a pattern which had been established since the pronunciamiento of 1829. Finally, the 
pronunciamientos of this period were the initial markers of what was to be a decade of 
administrative instability in Yucatán. Throughout this period, pronunciados would constantly 
question the legitimacy of (and consequently overthrow) administrations which had been 
brought to power through pronunciamientos, thus exposing the fragility of such ruling 
authorities, especially when faced with a powerful opposition.  
 The Carvajal administration of 1829 was not to last for long. As has been 
demonstrated in the previous chapter, although powerful, it was a minor faction of separatist 
camarilleros; consequently, it faced significant ideological opposition in the peninsula 
(mainly concentrated in the large federalist faction, with the smaller faction of Campechean 
centralists still present). The pronunciamiento of 1831 would thus be manifestly local, with 
its main objective being the end of the Carvajal regime. The patriotas campechanos, furious 
at the hijacking of their pronunciamiento in 1829, were determined to right the wrongs 
committed by the carvajalistas. Additionally, the defiance of the carvajalistas towards the 
Mexican administration had debilitated the Campechean merchants‟ trade relations with those 
of Mexico.
471
 Campecheans consequently did not hesitate to condemn the monopoly 
established in Yucatán by the carvajalistas, stating: 
Uno de los mayores inconvenientes que tiene el actual orden de cosas de Yucatán, es 
que ha resultado la manía de cierto antiguo partido de la capital, que siempre ha 
propendido a la escisión del estado, con objeto de repartirse los destinos y organizar 
establemente su dominio.
472
 
They then declared that the actions of the carvajalistas would “resultar muy perjudicados” 
for the Campechean businessmen “por sus relaciones mercantiles con México,” predicting 
that “tarde o temprano estallará una división que induzca la necesidad de reconocer la unidad 
nacional.”473 The Sixth and Thirteenth Permanent Battalions (constituting the regular army), 
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commanded by Ignacio Castro and Francisco de Paula Toro respectively and thus ever loyal 
to Mexico, also declared their intentions to block any move by the carvajalistas to reunite 
with Cuba, and threatened revolt if they tried to do so.
474
 
The patriotas were not alone in their opposition to the carvajalistas, and another 
pocket of dissatisfied elite members would be responsible for the pronunciamiento of 1831. 
The Bustamante administration, or the partido de orden of 1830, guided by future 
conservative ideologue Lucas Alamán and made up of the hombres de bien, had been 
responsible for a dramatic change from the radical popular government of Guerrero. Openly 
elitist, the administration “did not touch de jure federalism, but it practiced a de facto 
centralism,”475 as it implemented constitutional reforms which limited the autonomy of the 
states and replaced universal suffrage with only property-owning citizens being allowed to 
vote. This change in governmental policies significantly influenced political opinion in 
Yucatán. With the exception of the carvajalistas ruling the peninsula, the camarilleros had in 
their majority remained passive in the centralist pronunciamiento.
476
 One should recall that 
the camarilleros, though greedy for local rule, were still in their majority liberal, and had not 
prepared themselves for the hierarchical and separatist administration which was ruling the 
peninsula. Camarilleros such as Francisco Martínez de Arredondo, Pedro Castillo, José 
María León and Porfirio Argüelles, in Lieutenant of Cavalry Manuel Cantón‟s words “eran 
federalistas [...] todos los hombres de bien y el populacho estaban irritadísimos”477 with the 
turn which the Carvajal regime had taken. These so called bustamantistas started secretly 
negotiating with the national administration for reunification with Mexico under the 
Bustamante system, “instruidos y autorizados por el gobierno general”, with Minister of War 
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José Antonio Facio supplying funds for a camarillero-inspired pronunciamiento. Colonel of 
the First Active Battalion Benito Aznar (who had been, as one can recall, against the Carvajal 
pronunciamiento in the first place) was the leader of the conspiracy.
478
 Campecheans such as 
Pedro Manuel de Regil – who had trade with Mexico to sustain – also turned towards the 
bustamantistas. This pro-Mexican faction began publishing in their newspaper El Gladiador 
articles condemning Carvajal for not making any effort to negotiate with Mexico, and thus 
counteracting “seguir la suerte de la república entregada hoy a manos puras.”479 The 
carvajalistas consequently became reduced to a small nucleus of “tres o cuatro familias” of 
Carvajal, Gutiérrez de Estrada, Calderón, and Sebastián Peón.
480
  
In Easter of 1831, the first inter-party pronunciamiento in Yucatán manifested the 
extent of this camarillero division. On the morning of 27 March, Carvajal had ordered a new 
flag to be flown in Mérida with the logo of “Centralismo o Muerte.” The opposition 
interpreted this act as a “refinada malicia de parte de los facciosos” which to them was the 
equivalent of declaring the “absoluta separación de México”, and the event produced “en los 
habitantes un alarma general, y se empezó a notar un disgusto e inquietud en todas las 
clases.”481 The military camarilleros in opposition then quickly organised a pronunciamiento 
in the state capital, headed by Benito Aznar, Lieutenant Colonel of the First Active Battalion 
Felipe de Cámara, Captain of the First Active Battalion Francisco Peraza, and Lieutenant of 
the First Active Battalion Luis Zunzuneguí. On the same day, they issued the 
Pronunciamiento restaurador de la unión a Mexico, y de la soberanía de Yucatán, 
demanding reunification with Mexico under the federal system. The pronunciados, 
considering that there was established in Mexico the “más justo, más benéfico y más liberal” 
administration, declared that nothing should stop them from “disfrutar de aquel goce.” They 
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accused the ruling camarilleros that the only thing preventing them from reuniting with 
Mexico was not the imposition of a national centralist system, but the fear of being replaced 
by the previous constitutional authorities if the national government ordered it to be. The 
pronunciados not only petitioned for a different political system, but stipulated that 
camarillero Benito Aznar was to become commander general, and called for new elections 
for the representatives of National Congress and the Chamber of Representatives.
482
 The 
pronunciamiento, although with primarily local demands, still evidently had its basic 
requirement as reunification with Mexico, demonstrating once more the dual aim of the 
practice.
 
The pronunciamiento had also served to clearly illustrate the deep split which had 
developed within the camarillero party, thus being a clear marker of the evolving political 
identities and ideologies which were taking place.  
The subsequent repression by the ruling camarilleros of their previous political 
brothers was characteristic of a repressive government. They arrested the pronunciados, 
along with figures who had nothing to do with the pronunciamiento, such as federalist Liga 
members José Tiburcio López, Juan de Dios Cosgaya, Antonio Seguí and José María 
Meneses.
483
 Carvajal and his minute circle of separatists then declared on Easter Sunday that 
they would sooner unite with Guatemala than Mexico.
484
 After shutting down the federalist 
newspapers La Catédra Política and El Noticioso, the opposition criticised the administration 
as a “gobierno despótico y puramente militar.”485 The opposition was becoming 
uncontainable, as yet another pronunciamiento occurred on 4 June in Mérida, once more 
calling for union with Mexico, this time with the carvajalistas imprisoning camarilleros (and 
members of the First Active Battalion) Manuel Molina, Palomeque,
486
 Lieutenant of 
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granaderos Eusebio Sabido, and the two Villafaña brothers (Sergeant José María and 
Lieutenant of granaderos Félix).
487
 The ayuntamiento of Mérida then condemned the state 
into which the regime had let the peninsula degenerate, as its leader Juan José Rosado 
declared that until the Carvajal administration bowed to the demands of others, the peninsula 
would be cursed with factional bickering for the “posesión de los puestos públicos, y el 
manejo de las riendas del gobierno” by parties which “acreditan la legitimidad de sus 
pretensiones” with “la verdadera o imaginaria voluntad soberana de los pueblos.” For the 
ayuntamiento, the reestablishment of the federal government was the only solution to the 
constant disorder.
488
 The ayuntamientos of Campeche and Mérida then officially voted for 
federalism on 18 June, followed by those of Tizimín, Hunucmá, and Hecelchakán.
489
 On 13 
July, a junta de Guerra in Campeche (constituted of recently promoted Commander of Arms 
of Campeche Francisco de Paula Toro, Commander of Artillery Francisco Javier Verna, 
comisario de Guerra Tomás Aznar, Colonel of the Sixth Permanent Battalion Ignacio Roca, 
Commander of the Thirteenth Permanent Battalion Francisco Calderón, Lieutenant Colonel 
Joaquín Rivas, First Adjutant of the Second Active Battalion Sebastián López de Llergo and 
Colonel of Artillery Francisco Javier Verna), “haciendo uso legítimo de sus derechos 
naturales y políticos” demanded the federal system. Incidentally, with the exception of Aznar 
and Calderón, every one of these figures had participated in the centralist movement and 
pronunciamiento of 1829, and Carvajal had subsequently lost their support through his 
stubbornness and refusal to listen to their demands to reunite with Mexico.
490
 Carvajal now 
no longer had the backing of the permanent and active battalions, the principal bastions of his 
power, and the very same forces which had brought him into governance. In the words of the 
editors of El Sol: 
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Los pueblos no quieren más trastornos; ya aprendieron a traducir el idioma engañador 
del interés individual que se disfraza con la expresión consagrada al culto de las 
grandes verdades del interés público […] ya no más corresponden a los gritos de la 
ambición y de los resentimientos de un caudillo que proclama un orden nuevo sobre 
una perspectiva de bienes fingidos.
491
  
Carvajal and his circle were outnumbered, and on 3 October 1831, the Yucatecan provincial 
council, accepting that there was no hope of establishing a centralist system, declared the 
“unión sincera y eterna a la república mexicana”492 and the observance of the federal 
constitution. The carvajalistas nevertheless refused to step down from power despite the 
change of the political system, meaning essentially that nothing had changed.
493
    
Discontent was consequently still heavily manifest. Experiences throughout 1831 had 
demonstrated that local pronunciamientos, without sufficient organised military force and 
without a national pronunciamiento to latch on to, were destined for failure. The opposers to 
the Carvajal regime thus lay in wait, hoping for a movement from without which they could 
adhere to and depose the Carvajal administration. They did not have to wait for very long. In 
Mexico, the federalists were harshly criticising Bustamante‟s government for its increasingly 
repressive nature. It had censored nearly all federalist newspapers, deposed federally-inclined 
governors in more than ten states, expelled U.S. Plenipotentiary and liberal colleague of 
Zavala, Joel Poinsett from the country, reduced the civic militias in several states, and above 
all, had authorized the execution of General Guerrero on 14 February 1831.
494
 The execution 
of a former war hero and president was one step too far; the moderates who had supported the 
Bustamante government now began to turn away from the administration.
495
 One moderate 
liberal in particular had been angered by the execution; Santa Anna had written to 
Bustamante (ironically on the day after Guerrero‟s execution, without even knowing of it), 
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warning him not to carry out the plan. Indeed, Santa Anna had supported Guerrero in 1828, 
and he had not agreed with his deposition in 1830. He was now upset about the execution of 
his comrade (who had also been godfather to his daughter), and he started planning to bring 
down the Bustamante government. He was not alone; the regional military leaders of the 
civic militias (especially those of Zacatecas) had resented the onslaught on their power and 
privileges, and plots for a pronunciamiento against the Bustamante administration began.  
 In November 1831, with no response from the Bustamante administration to his 
request that something be done about its centralist tendencies, General Miguel Barragán 
united with Generals Santa Anna, Joaquín Parres, and Luis Cortázar in Veracruz to conspire 
for the downfall of the government.
496
 On 2 January 1832, Colonel Pedro Landero and 
Commander Ciriaco Vázquez issued the Acta y Plan de Veracruz sobre remoción del 
Ministerio. The pronunciamiento denounced “los atentados cometidos contra la Constitución 
y garantías públicas e individuales” by the Bustamante administration and subsequently 
demanded the “remoción del Ministerio, a quien la opinión pública acusa de protector del 
centralismo.”497 The pronunciamiento called also for the renewal of the Bustamante cabinet, 
the respect for the federal system (reiterating the demands of the Plan of Jalapa of 1829), and 
an offer to Santa Anna to lead the pronunciamiento. Santa Anna accepted the plan the very 
next day, and the pronunciamiento got under way.
498
 
In Yucatán, the news of the pronunciamiento set free ligado, campechano, and in 
major part camarillero enthusiasm to rejoin Mexico. Nevertheless, the invitation from Santa 
Anna in Veracruz to second the pronunciamiento and re-establish in Yucatán “el verdadero 
orden constitucional”499 was met by an outright snub by the carvajalistas. In Carvajal‟s 
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words, “Yucatán no estaba en el caso de hacer pronunciamiento alguno, ni adherirse a los que 
se hagan de ninguna clase” because: 
La experiencia de los dos últimos años ha acreditado que así como en nada puede 
influir por medios extraordinarios con respecto al resto de la república en su cambio, 
así tampoco en variación o modificación alguna del gobierno político sea de la 
naturaleza que fuere.
500
 
Carvajal also argued that Yucatán had already sworn its adhesion and obedience to the 
Bustamante government. Indeed, the carvajalistas had made good progress with the national 
administration, as by 6 March 1832, the Bustamante government had granted amnesty and 
permission to the 1829 pronunciados to organise their own internal political system.
501
 After 
the rejection of the plan of Veracruz, Carvajal then actually sent troops to Tabasco to fight 
against the pronunciados there.
502
 His small force of 300 men joined powerful army forces 
which had been commanded by the Bustamante administration to put down the 
pronunciados. The pronunciamiento had nevertheless received the support of the militias in 
Zacatecas, led principally by Valentín Gómez Farías and governor of Zacatecas Francisco 
García. The clashes between the regular army and the pronunciados who were slowly 
advancing towards Mexico – despite several defeats – led to the bloodiest period of 
independent Mexico; for the first time in Mexican history, a pronunciamiento had led to 
outright and widespread bloodshed and civil war.  
In Yucatán, emotions were high. This was the moment that Carvajal‟s opposers had 
been waiting for, and his rejection of the Plan of Veracruz had been the last straw. On 
midnight on 8 June, a pronunciamiento seconding the Plan of Veracruz erupted among the 
“pequeña guarnición” of Sisal (made up of 70 men) under the orders of Commander of Sisal 
and Captain of Infantry Eulogio Rosado and Lieutenant Colonel of the First Active Battalion 
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Gerónimo López de Llergo.
503
 Only Lieutenant of Infantry Antonio Milán in Mérida 
managed to second the pronunciamiento before the regular army, not of their own accord but 
ordered by Carvajal, completely suffocated the pronunciamiento on 10 and 11 June.
504
 The 
official local newspaper – the Regulador Yucateco – reported that it was a matter of no 
significance, and denounced the ligado pronunciados for their ridiculous attempt to 
“apoderarse de las riendas del gobierno.”505 With their pronunciamiento put down and 
dismissed as inconsequential, the federalists unleashed their fury. Blood flowed in June, as 
the elections for the ayuntamiento of Hecelchakán turned into a violent scene between 
federalists and carvajalistas, ending with “la triste escena de varios muertos y heridos.”506 
The government nevertheless continued trumpeting to Mexico that Yucatán was enjoying “la 
dulce e inalterable paz” which the regime offered.507 The deposed constitutional Vice-
Governor Juan de Dios Cosgaya in his newspaper El Baluarte de la Libertad then began 
condemning the anti-constitutionalism of the Carvajal regime which was against public 
opinion; typical pronunciamiento rhetoric.
508
  
The federalists also started spreading the belief among the regular army in Campeche 
that Carvajal‟s granting of jobs had been a clear demonstration of his favouritism of the 
Meridians in the active battalions.
509
 They were gaining success, as in the newspaper El 
Meridano Imparcial there appeared a sarcastic dialogue between two fictitious persons, Juan 
y José (Juan de Dios Cosgaya and José Tiburcio López, perhaps?) that an alliance between a 
section of the military and the ligados had been struck, with three main objectives: 1. Support 
Santa Anna, 2. Declare null the centralist administration of 5 November 1829 and 3. 
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Reimpose all the deposed authorities of 1829.
510
 With attacks and unrest growing, on 18 
October 1832 Local Congress granted Carvajal extraordinary faculties to expel any person 
whose “maquinaciones maquiavélicas” threatened to destroy peace and order.511 The 
combination of the loss of loyalty of the majority of the army, the news that Santa Anna was 
on the doorstep of Mexico City and with him the inevitable success of the pronunciamiento, 
and the unstoppable attacks on the carvajalistas led, however, to Carvajal‟s resignation as 
governor in late October.
512
  
The pronunciamiento to bring down the Carvajal administration would not come from 
the Liga or the federalists, but from one man who was being personally directed by Santa 
Anna. Francisco de Paula Toro, brother-in-law of Santa Anna, and Commander of Arms in 
Campeche had been under pressure from Santa Anna since mid-1831 to lead Yucatán back to 
constitutional order, with Santa Anna asking him to raise “con la fuerza que manda en esa 
plaza, a favor de la Constitución nacional, reconozca los supremos poderes sin restricción 
alguna, y haga usted que en ese estado sean repuestos todas las cosas como estaban antes de 
la revolución.”513 Toro, under much more immediate domination by Carvajal, and witnessing 
the constant defeats and slow advance which the Plan de Veracruz was suffering, had been 
initially reluctant to second the pronunciamiento.
514
 Nevertheless, throughout 1832, after the 
plan had generated more than 100 pronunciamientos de adhesión which had moulded and 
shaped the demands to end up including a resounding call for the return of Gómez Pedraza to 
the presidency, it was becoming evident that the pronunciamiento would be a success. 
Combined with the regular army‟s loyalty to the executive (who was also incidentally his 
brother-in-law), the evident demise of the Carvajal regime in face of ligado, camarillero and 
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campechano anger, and the resignation of Carvajal himself, Toro realised that it was time to 
second the pronunciamiento. When Santa Anna finally marched with firm step towards 
Mexico City, Toro issued the pronunciamiento de adhesión in Yucatán.
515
  
On 4 November 1832, the forces of the regular army under the command of Toro – 
distributed in the towns of Tenabo, Hecelchakán and Calkiní – issued their pronunciamiento 
de adhesión to the Plan de Veracruz.
516
 Two days later, Gerónimo López de Llergo, heading 
the First Active Battalion stationed in Mérida, adhered to the grito and both forces formed the 
“Undécima División del Ejército Libertador”, mimicking the name of the Veracruzan 
pronunciados in order to highlight the national cause of saving the federation (and thus give 
the necessary national legitimacy to their exercise). On the following day, they drew up their 
act, where they outlined that the political nightmares which had filled the nation with blood 
and horror were due to the lack of fulfilment of the federal constitution, and that “el voto 
unánime de los yucatecos” was against Bustamante. The pronunciamiento then declared that 
the popular will of the people demanded the reimposition of Gómez Pedraza as the legitimate 
constitutional president of the nation
517
 (ignoring the fact – as the rest of the country was 
doing – that it had been the Santa Anna-inspired Plan de Perote and La Acordada which had 
brought him down in the first place).
518
  
Once more, pronunciados employed the dual aspect of national negotiation combined 
with local deposition. With Toro “Convencido de que el actual estado de Yucatán era 
sumamente violento [...] por la inconstitucionalidad bajo la cual se hallaban gobernados sus 
pueblos”, all local authorities of 5 November 1829 were to be re-established.519 The 
pronunciamiento once more included military ascent, as Toro was made Commander General 
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of the state (just as Carvajal had been in 1829, and identical to the demand which had been 
made for Benito Aznar in the failed pronunciamiento of 1831).
 
The pronunciamiento had also 
apparently become a method for military officers to climb to the top of the military and 
political ladder; the practice was now operating on three levels: national, regional, and 
personal. Toro was supported by his men, as the Thirteenth Permanent Battalion, along with 
the camarillero-dominated First and Second Active Battalions (commanded by Juan 
Nepomuceno Trujillo and Sebastián López de Llergo respectively), and Eulogio Rosado 
(ligado who had pronounced in Sisal in June and was captain of infantry), all pronounced in 
support. The civic militias played their part, as together with the ayuntamientos throughout 
the east of the peninsula, they seconded the pronunciamiento. Santiago Imán, elite landowner 
in the eastern town of Tizimín and captain of the Third Active Battalion (and the man who 
was about to head the biggest pronunciamiento in Yucatecan history in a few years time), 
headed the pronunciamiento de adhesión in the eastern towns of Tizimín and Sucopó. In 
total, there were more than 3,000 soldiers and officers supporting the plan.
520
 
 The detachment of artillery in Campeche (of the permanent army) – headed by 
Francisco Javier Verna and Joaquín Rivas Zayas – pronounced the plan on 12 November, but 
modified their pronunciamiento, declaring that the local authorities would remain in power, 
thus attempting to confine the pronunciamiento to a purely national cause.
521
 Ignacio Roca, 
(Colonel of the Sixth Permanent Battalion) was nevertheless pressuring them to support the 
pronunciamiento in its entirety, and when the Campechean ayuntamiento adhered to the act, 
and Colonel Toro (who had already occupied Mérida) announced his plan to march on those 
who refused to support his pronunciamiento, the unit then quickly pronounced the plan in 
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full.
522
 Military force and adherence to a national pronunciamiento had once more proven 
successful.  
The pronunciados re-established all deposed authorities of 1829, with the exception 
of the Legislatura and the ayuntamientos, whose constitutional period had really ended. The 
new Local Congress was installed on the 16
 
November and on the 24
th
 it decreed that all 
dispositions dictated by the previous administration were null. José Tiburcio
 
López 
temporarily returned to his post of state governor on 9 November in order to oversee 
elections. In February 1833 the ligados triumphed once more in local elections, with Juan de 
Dios Cosgaya becoming governor and Santiago Méndez nominated as vice-governor.
523
 
Meanwhile, in Mexico, Bustamante finally admitted defeat in December, with the Treaty of 
Zavaleta of 23 December cementing an agreement to allow Gómez Pedraza to resume the 
presidency, which he did on 26 December.  
The 1832 pronunciamiento contrasted with that of 1829 in the aspect that it was 
directly inspired from without (Santa Anna and Toro in 1832) as opposed to within (the 
centralists and the camarilleros in 1829). Toro himself had played a major part in the success 
of the 1829 pronunciamiento which had brought Carvajal to power; the fact that he was the 
same one to bring him down suggests that external circumstances were playing a strong role 
in this pronunciamiento. Additionally, the failure of the 1831 pronunciamientos fortifies the 
theory that Yucatecan pronunciados needed a direct outside impetus in order to issue a 
successful pronunciamiento. Moreover, these pronunciamientos served to highlight the now 
established essentiality of military force in guaranteeing triumph for the pronunciados. While 
the pronunciamientos of 1831 were without significant backing from army officers, almost 
all members of the permanent army and the active battalions carried out the pronunciamiento 
of 1832. Nevertheless, the importance of political – not militaristic – and ideological 
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motivations behind these pronunciamientos must be emphasised, as pronunciado demands 
during this period were based on political ideals. Finally, the influence of Mexican political 
circumstances combined with the fragility of the Yucatecan governing administrations in the 
face of military power would continue to dominate the early 1830s; indeed, these would be 
the same factors which would be responsible for the success of the pronunciamiento of 1834. 
In the space of less than two years, neither the national nor local political powers would be 
able to command authority for very long. Once more, the army would dominate and the 
following years would demonstrate the most vivid degeneration yet of the pronunciamiento 
from a predominantly national practice of negotiation (early 1820s), into a pretext for the 
physical battle for local political power.  
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6 
Centralism and Civil War: 
 The Pronunciamientos of 1833-1835 
 
The pronunciamientos of 1833 and 1834 were essentially the centralists‟ attempts to 
regain the power which they had lost to the federalists in 1832. These two years constituted 
an almost mirror image of the events of 1831-1832; while the primarily local centralist 
pronunciamiento of 1833 failed, that of 1834 was a grand success, mainly because of its 
adhesion to the national pronunciamiento calling for the end of the radically federalist 
Valentín Gómez Farías administration. Additionally, following orders once more from 
brother-in-law Santa Anna, Francisco de Paula Toro was again responsible for the success of 
the 1834 pronunciamiento. This dominance of Mexican relations continued into 1835, as 
Toro then successfully led the pronunciamiento calling for centralism, something clearly 
against the wishes of the majority of ligados and camarilleros in the peninsula. All the 
pronunciamientos of this period thus demonstrated the undeniable importance of links 
between local and national political ideologies and pronunciamientos, and the simultaneous 
and separate internal factional struggle for political control which was occurring in this 
corner of Mexico. These pronunciamientos would continue to illustrate the importance of the 
army in ensuring their success; indeed, the military-led pronunciamiento of 1834 would 
provoke violence for the first time in independent Yucatán. This time, pronunciados would 
not use the threat of force, but outright military aggression to ensure the triumph of their 
movement, using the pronunciamiento as a precursor and a justification to excuse civil war. 
In Mexico, following the end of Manuel Gómez Pedraza‟s constitutional term as 
president, elections led to Santa Anna becoming president on 1 April 1833, with Valentín 
174 
 
Gómez Farías as vice-president and a radical liberal congress coming into power.
524
 Santa 
Anna had never been a man to sit behind a desk and get bored with everyday politics (or 
perhaps he knew that trouble lay in store with the radical congress which had been installed); 
he thus withdrew to his hacienda in Veracruz, leaving Gómez Farías in charge of the national 
administration. Gómez Farías was then a moderate liberal, but his congress was filled with 
radicals, and it would be their efforts, combined with the actions of the Cosgaya 
administration ruling in Yucatán, which would be responsible for the next Yucatecan 
pronunciamiento just a few months later. This pronunciamiento would continue to 
demonstrate the belief that administrations brought to power through a pronunciamiento (i.e. 
by the so-called “will of the people”, even though by now it was in most cases obviously not 
the voice of the people responsible, but elite force) were extremely fragile, and it was feasible 
for pronunciados to attempt to bring them down through the same claimed voluntad del 
pueblo if their policies did not please a certain sector of the population.  
 The National Congress, determined to reverse the excessiveness of the Bustamante 
administration, began implementing radical liberal reforms, attempting to ensure greater 
suffrage, enhanced freedom of the press, and greater individual – rather than corporate – 
liberties.
525
 There were two main corporate bodies which were to be targeted by Congress in 
order to achieve this ideal of society: the army and the Roman Catholic Church,
526
 bastions of 
power since the colonial era, which now in liberal eyes needed to be reformed,
527
 and 
according to Medina Peña, more importantly, weakened. In his words, “los diputados no se 
proponían reformar la sociedad, sino debilitar a los dos pilares de los adversarios, el clero y el 
ejército, y fortalecer a las clases políticas de los estados de las cuales ellos provenían.”528 
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Furthermore, with the treasury running on empty, seizing Church property seemed like a 
useful source of income. With President Farías powerless against Congress, within one month 
the body had managed to issue a tumultuous succession of radical proposals and measures: 
the national jury tried Bustamante‟s cabinet for the execution of Guerrero (despite their 
amnesty which had been established in the Treaty of Zavaleta), Congress decreed the 
nationalisation of the Duke of Monteleone‟s properties, and also granted the right of 
patronato (the power to appoint all ecclesiastical posts which was previously held by the 
King) to the president. The radical press also started calling for extreme measures such as the 
end of military and church privileges (in particular the fueros).
529
  
  The attempts to reduce the power of the Church and the army and the seizing of 
private property now made the clergy, the military, and the hombres de bien – the most 
powerful sectors in Mexican society – extremely uneasy. Less than two months after 
Congress had come into power, military opposition manifested itself in the now-established 
way to demonstrate dissatisfaction with an administration. Ignacio Escalada and his garrison 
in Morelia pronounced on 26 May 1833, demanding the assurance of the protection of the 
fueros of the Church and the army, and requesting that Santa Anna act as the protector of 
their cause. Santa Anna was not opposed to clerical reform (and no army reform had actually 
been implemented), and he consequently refused to head the pronunciamiento, instead 
condemning the rebels.
530
 Nevertheless, the pronunciamiento cycle had begun, and General 
Gabrial Durán pronounced on 1 June in Tlalpan with roughly the same demands, with the 
addition that Santa Anna be made “magistrado supremo” of Mexico.531 Santa Anna, it 
seemed, was the magic word of the day if any pronunciamiento was to have a chance of 
success; his triumphs in 1828 and in 1832 had indeed proven that. Santa Anna once more 
refused the offer, but the pronunciamiento was essentially repeated on 8 June in the Plan de 
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Huejotzingo by Mariano Arista in Puebla, with the more extreme demand that Santa Anna be 
made supreme dictator of Mexico.
532
 After Santa Anna refused the offer of the 
pronunciamiento once more, he was temporarily captured by Arista, before escaping and 
returning to Mexico City. Congress then retaliated on 23 June 1833 with the Ley del Caso of 
23 June 1833 which decreed the expulsion of more than 50 politicians who they suspected of 
being against the republic.
533
  
The temporary capture of Santa Anna along with the pronunciamientos against the 
federalist administration led to an outcry of protest in Yucatán, as the federalist ligados (led 
by Governor Cosgaya), along with Toro as commander general had an unwavering loyalty to 
the federalist system and Santa Anna respectively. This led to Toro pronouncing once more, 
this time to reiterate Yucatán‟s loyalty to the federation, and to express his indignation at the 
seizure of the president (and his brother-in-law). On 21 June 1833, the Second Active 
Battalion in Campeche, under Toro‟s command, stating that in light of the “sucesos inauditos 
que han turbado en la nación el orden público” and the “escándaloso arresto del supremo 
magistrado de los pueblos”, it was necessary for them to ratify the pronunciamiento of 
November 1832, and to reiterate that no other authorities would be recognised than those 
which were constitutionally elected.
534
 On 24 June the First Active Battalion in Mérida 
seconded the act, “con motivo de los últimos sucesos con que la traición y la perfidia han 
puesto en conmoción a la república.”535 Among those signing this act were those 
camarilleros who had not supported or had turned away from the Carvajal regime, such as 
Commander of the First Active Battalion Felipe de la Cámara, Lieutenant of the First Active 
Battalion Luis de Zunzuneguí, Captain of the First Active Battalion José Luis Meléndez, and 
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Colonel of the First Active Battalion Juan Manuel Calderón.
536
 Nevertheless, this act also 
contained some closet centralists who had simply signed in order to protect themselves from 
opposition, important figures such as Néstor Escudero (Captain of the Cavalry Squadron) and 
José Julián Quijano (Commander of the same), who would be responsible for the very next 
pronunciamiento against the local Cosgaya and federal administration. 
  The roots of the next Yucatecan pronunciamiento would be mainly clerical. In 1827, 
with the death of the bishop of Yucatán Pedro Agustín de Esteve, his post was left vacant for 
occupation. The right to name ecclesiastical posts – or the patronato – had been previously 
held by the Spanish monarchy, but since independence, Mexicans had been arguing that with 
sovereignty, their governing institutions should be allowed to possess the patronato. This in 
itself was a problem because the Vatican had refused to recognise the independence of 
Mexico. Nevertheless, on 17 December 1833 the Gómez Farías administration granted this 
right to the civic authorities ruling Mexico; bishops would forward their lists of potential 
ecclesiastical post holders to the government, for the ruling authorities to choose the best 
contender.
537
 The vacuum left by bishop Esteve in Yucatán now meant that someone had to 
be nominated to occupy his position. There were then two potential candidates for the seat: 
José María Meneses (supported by the Liga) and José María Guerra (brother of camarillero 
leader Pedro Marcial Guerra and supported by the Camarilla). Both men represented the 
views of their parties, with Meneses being more radical and a supporter of liberal reform of 
the Church, while Guerra represented the views of the Yucatecan elite and hombres de bien, 
who believed in maintaining the respect for the Roman Catholic religion and the preservation 
of the colonial vestiges of power (principally the Church and the army).
538
 In 1827, the 
ligados – who were then in power – named Meneses as governor of the mitre, but the 
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Carvajal regime replaced him in 1832, proposing Guerra for bishop instead.
539
 Nevertheless, 
the return of the Liga in late 1832 led to Local Congress declaring on 25 November 1832 that 
it refused to recognise Guerra as bishop (claiming that his nomination was made during the 
anti-constitutional government of Carvajal and was consequently invalid), and on 23 
February 1833, the post was opened to candidacy once more.
540
 The National Congress acted 
in accordance, as on 16 April it refused to admit the papal bulls which had designated Guerra 
as bishop of Yucatán.
541
 The Yucatecan administration then expelled Guerra to Veracruz 
(where he was consigned to being a simple clergyman) and named Meneses as bishop.
542
   
The harmful decrees and proposals of Congress had agitated the army, the clergy and 
the hombres de bien in Yucatán, but the replacement of Guerra by Meneses as bishop was an 
outright insult to the Camarilla. Their outrage was more than manifest to the rest of 
Yucatecan society, and their sentiments were shared by the Campechean centralists who had 
also noted with alarm the radical tendencies of the national administration (with which the 
federalist ligados in power seemed fully intent to comply). The nervous army, the insulted 
clergy, the elite camarilleros, and the uneasy centralists thus all united under a common 
cause: regain local political, administrative and clerical power and halt (or reverse in some 
cases) the harmful decrees which were destabilising their power and hold on Yucatecan 
society. Principal camarilleros such as Lieutenant of the First Active Battalion Domingo 
Cantón (who was also a publisher),
543
 the Escudero brothers (Néstor who was a military 
figure, and Pedro who was a merchant) and politician José María Gutiérrez de Estrada joined 
forces with centralists Felipe Codallos (who was a member of the regular army) and priest 
José Mariano de Cicero. Clerical elite figures such as Vicente Solís and José María Guerra 
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himself (who had returned in early 1833 from Veracruz) along with other camarillero 
military elite including José Julián Quijano (Commander of the Permanent Cavalry 
Squadron), José Martín Calderón (Commander of Artillery), Joaquín María Mendoza 
(Second Lieutenant of the Third Active Battalion), Pedro de la Cámara (Captain of the First 
Active Battalion), and José Julián Aquilano (member of the Permanent Cavalry) also joined 
in, disgusted with Congress‟ intentions to “acabar con el Ejército.”544 Many hombres de bien 
such as businessmen and factional political leaders Pedro Marcial Guerra and Pedro Manuel 
de Regil were not to be left out of the coalition, which was given the name La Rochela, a title 
derived from the family nucleus of the Escudero de la Rochas.
545
  
Meetings were quickly organised among the rochelistas to discuss the possibility of – 
according to ligado infiltrator and spy José María Torreblanca – “secundar el 
pronunciamiento de los traidores Escalada, Durán y Arista.”546 The Ley del Caso intensified 
the need to pronounce as among those decreed to be expelled were the Escudero brothers, 
Castellanos, Carvajal, Gutiérrez de Estrada, Codallos and Marcial Guerra.
547
 López, informed 
of the pronunciamiento plans, ordered sections of the First Active Battalion to enter into 
service to smother any spark of revolt. With Mérida under guard, Juan Gómez Hinojosa – 
Colonel of Artillery – who had assumed leadership of the planned pronunciamiento de 
adhesión, transferred to Campeche in order to “agenciar el pronunciamiento” of Arista and to 
save the “sagrada causa de la Independencia” (in his words).548 On 7 September, he and his 
fellow military officers Francisco Javier Verna (Colonel of Artillery), Pablo Antonio Lenard 
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(of the Second Active Battalion and former patriota campechano), politician Blas Vallardes, 
and clerical member José Clemente Ortega, assuming the name of Junta Libertadora Num.14, 
seconded the pronunciamiento of Arista (it should be noted that Verna had actually 
participated in the federalist junta de Guerra of 13 July 1831 against Carvajal and for 
reunification with Yucatán). Just as in previous military pronunciamientos, the pronunciados, 
ignoring the fact that they were the elite of society and that their movement was serving 
purely their interests, claimed to be the saviours of the nation as they rescued the patria from 
ills which its peoples did not wish to suffer (as Carvajal had done in 1829, and Toro in 1832). 
This was only bolstered by the title of the pronunciamiento “Viva la Religión y el Ejército”, 
as the act denounced the “destrucción de nuestra Religión y del benemérito Ejército” stating 
that its purpose was of course to “salvar la cara patria.”549  
Similar to the plan of Arista, the plan demanded the maintenance of the military and 
religious fueros. Nevertheless, there was no call for Santa Anna to be dictator as Arista had 
declared, but instead he was heavily criticised, condemned as a “hipócrita” who was 
“escudado con la observancia de la Constitución y de las leyes” with “parricidas miras a la 
destrucción de nuestra santa religión y el benemérito ejército.”550 Even though Santa Anna 
had nothing to do with the radical proposals of Congress (indeed he had been in Veracruz in 
his hacienda all this time), the military camarilleros and the centralists had not forgotten his 
direction of the Toro-headed pronunciamiento of 1832 which had ultimately paved the way 
for the Liga to regain local power. The plan instead proposed that the dictator of Mexico 
would be elected by the state congresses which the pronunciados of 1832 had deposed. This 
dictator would hold the right of the patronato, and would be responsible for assigning 
Yucatecan ecclesiastical posts, as well as naming the governing administrations for the 
regions. Pronunciados once more combined local demands with national rhetoric, as they 
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demanded the imprisonment of Toro, Cosgaya and Méndez (the commander of arms, 
governor and vice-governor respectively); just as in 1829, pronunciados were using the 
practice to not only implement but justify unlawful and borderline authoritarian measures. 
They also tacked on the local demand of naming of José María Guerra as bishop of 
Yucatán.
551
 This pronunciamiento de adhesión to that of Arista consequently resulted in only 
having one thing in common with the original: the protection of the fueros of the army and 
the Church. The pronunciados had adapted every other decree to local desires. Although it 
seems that local pronunciados had hijacked a nationally oriented pronunciamiento to give 
their own local movement strength and validity, it must be noted that their pronunciamiento 
de adhesion still had a distinct connection to the centralist ideology permeating throughout 
Mexico. Consequently, one should refrain from viewing this pronunciamiento as a mere local 
power grab, which used a national pronunciamiento as an excuse. It should also be taken into 
account that these pronunciados had clear centralist ideals which they were determined to 
enforce and protect. 
In Mérida, the news of the Campechean pronunciamiento brought joy among the 
centralist conspirators. News was slow moving due to the severe outbreak of cholera plaguing 
the region; on 5 October, almost a month later, Domingo Cantón came to ligado spy 
Torreblanca‟s house, “dando saltos de alegría diciendo: „Venga un abrazo mi amigo ya 
Campeche se pronunció a favor de Arista […] es menester que hagamos lo mismo […] 
vámonos a pronunciar ahora mismo.‟” Pedro de la Cámara who was present then asked “¿Y 
cómo nos pronunciamos?” with Cantón replying “que no tuviese cuidado que todo se 
vencería” as he explained that they had the support of sufficient army forces.552 This was a 
clear manifestation that by now, many knew that popular opinion was not the force behind 
the success of a Yucatecan pronunciamiento, but military strength was. Nevertheless, the 
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pronunciamiento was never realised; spy Torreblanca had quickly informed the López 
administration of the plans, with Joaquín Muñoz and Felipe de la Cámara and their battalion 
in Mérida disarming and arresting all the potential pronunciados before they could put their 
plans into action. Meanwhile, Toro had apprehended the principal pronunciados in 
Campeche. Governor López then decreed the expulsion of all pronunciados and potential 
pronunciados, denouncing them as “fautores unos y otros principales promovedores del plan 
exterminador que con criminalidad inaudita quisieron plantear en nuestro estado prevalidos 
de sus posiciones militares y con engañador de sostener sus fueros, así como los de la 
iglesia.”553 When Cosgaya took over the governorship in October, he revoked the decision to 
expel all the potential pronunciados, with the exception of Verna, due to “insufficient 
evidence.”554 It is possible that he was well aware that a decree as radical as expulsion would 
only provoke further opposition among the centralists, and he was simply attempting to keep 
the peace.   
The pronunciamiento was thus developing an interesting trend with regard to both 
pronunciamiento rhetoric, as well as the reaction of the ruling administrations which the 
pronunciados targeted. The same ligado pronunciados of 1832 were now condemning the 
current pronunciados (coincidentally members of their opposing faction the 
centralists/camarilleros) as disruptive agents of chaos. These same ligados had nevertheless 
called themselves the saviours of Yucatán when they had pronounced in 1832; apparently, a 
pronunciamiento was only something positive when you were the one pronouncing, not being 
pronounced against. Similarly, the centralist pronunciados in this instance were condemning 
the local government for being despotic and tyrannical, disregarding the fact that they 
themselves had been the oppressive regime in 1829. In the words of Ortega y Gasset, in 
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reference to the opposition of the pronunciados, “¿Y los demás, los que no coincidían de 
antemano con él? ¡Ah! Esos no existían, y si existían, eran unos precitos. En vez de atraerlos, 
persuadirlos o corregirlos, lo urgente era excluirlos, eliminarlos, distanciarlos, trazando una 
mágica línea entre los buenos y los malos.”555 The pronunciamiento and the rhetoric which 
surrounded it had thus established a standard which was to be followed in nineteenth-century 
Yucatán and Mexico: pronunciados were viewed by themselves as beneficial; convinced of 
their cause, a pronunciamiento was something necessary to save society from the ills of a 
harmful administration. Yet when these same pronunciados gained political power, they 
deemed any pronunciamiento against them as a destabilising and negative, unnecessary force.  
In Mexico, with Santa Anna repressing the pronunciamientos of Escalada, Durán and 
Arista, the National Congress, having grown in confidence, began issuing more radical 
decrees. On 18 October it ordered the auction of the goods of the Philippine missionaries, 
with the abolition of the tithe decreed on 27 October. On 3 November, it annulled the federal 
law of 16 May 1831, and consequently all cathedral chapter appointments which had been 
made since then. As noted, on 17 December National Congress decided that state governors 
would name all clerics.
556
 The decrees against the Church continued into February 1834, as 
Congress approved a bill forcing the Church to auction its nonessential property in order to 
fill the desperately low treasury.
557
 In Yucatán, Cosgaya bolstered the attack on the Church 
decreeing that ecclesiastical members were no longer allowed to interfere in political matters 
as they contributed to the “perversión de las conciencias […] para sublevar a los súbditos 
contra las autoridades políticas.”558  
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Bishops reacted throughout Mexico against the delegation of the patronato to the 
State, arguing that it was an Episcopal, and not a civil right.
559
 Despite the clergy‟s outrage, 
there was no official movement against the Farías administration. This was largely due to 
Santa Anna‟s refusal to head any movement against him; Santa Anna had no opposition to 
taxing the Church in order to fund the treasury (and consequently the army); in fact, he 
“sympathised” with it, according to Fowler.560 There was in his opinion no official reason to 
halt Congress yet; but he was nevertheless becoming uneasy about the increasingly radical 
decrees being ordered. He was an advocator of reform, but not as rapid or extreme as 
Congress was trying to achieve. Frank Samponaro has pointed out that the alliance between 
Santa Anna – a moderate liberal – and the radical federalists in 1832 “fue básicamente un 
acuerdo de conveniencia [...] No compartían principios políticos.”561 Additionally, he was not 
unaware of the growing opposition of the hombres de bien, the traditionalist elite, and the 
religious popular classes to National Congress.
562
 Unless the brakes were applied, he would 
soon be forced to take action. He thus returned to the presidency in October 1833 to 
temporarily take over the reins.   
 This period would mark the turning point of Santa Anna, and would consequently 
dictate the events in Mexico for the next year. Congress now began to push not only for 
ecclesiastic, but also military reforms. This was one thing that Santa Anna, a military man 
himself – and whose support base consisted of key figures in the regular army – did not want; 
he believed in preserving the power of the army. In order to pacify both Congress and the 
national army, on 16 December – with the help of his advisor and Minister of War José María 
Tornel – he proposed his own moderate military reforms: the reduction of the regular army 
from 12 to 10 battalions and from 12 to 6 regiments, and the abolition of the mounted 
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artillery brigade. There could now only be 8 generals and 12 brigadiers in the entire regular 
army.
563
 Congress accepted the reforms, but upon Santa Anna‟s departure from Mexico City 
once more at the end of 1833, they reassumed their own radical measures. In early 1834, they 
proposed more extreme reductions to the regular army and increases in the state civic 
militias, with the latter to instead be responsible for internal security. They proposed to halve 
the 12 regular battalions of infantry, reducing the regiments of cavalry from 12 to 10. 
Additionally, they would also abolish the artillery brigade and the general commandancies.
564
 
Santa Anna was more than unimpressed with Congress‟ disregard of his proposals and its 
attack on the army; on 12 March he wrote to Farías cautioning him on the disrespect of his 
authority and ordering restraint.
565
 One should note that Santa Anna did not want the 
opposition of 1828, 29 and 32 to return to power. He was a liberal federalist republican, and 
had been heavily opposed to the Bustamante administration‟s policies. The radicalism of 
Congress and the proposals to reduce the army nonetheless meant that he now had to do 
something before a revolt erupted against the administration.
566
 On 22 April 1834, Santa 
Anna travelled to the capital, and there was no doubt of his intentions; on 24 April he forced 
the resignation of Gómez Farías,
567
 and Minister of War José María Tornel then began to plan 
the end of the Farías administration.   
 In Yucatán, Commander General Francisco de Paula Toro, never far behind his 
brother-in-law, was sure to once more mirror the actions taken by Santa Anna on a local 
level. Toro had not appreciated the decrees which had attempted to reduce the army (in 
particular the proposal of the abolition of his own post), which the Cosgaya administration 
had heartily supported. Indeed, the local government had dissolved the squadron of cavalry in 
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Mérida,
568
 and had ordered increases in the civic militias stationed in Mérida, Izamal, and 
Motul.
569
 Santa Anna had once more been maintaining a correspondence with Toro, this time 
concerning the establishment of a formal opposition (which of course would manifest itself in 
a pronunciamiento) against the Farías and Cosgaya administrations.
570
 Toro now began to 
take measures to prepare for the pronunciamiento which would lead to the downfall of the 
Cosgaya administration, and hopefully simultaneously contribute to the national call for the 
dissolution of National Congress. At the end of April 1834, Lieutenant Colonel Marcial 
Aguirre, military adjutant to Santa Anna, arrived in Campeche from Veracruz with a sizeable 
force, and entered into talks with Toro and the other principal pronunciados of 1829.
571
 
Following the assurance from Aguirre that Santa Anna was indeed about to start a 
pronunciamiento, “con el objeto de echar abajo al partido de los sansculotes” which made up 
National Congress, Toro was in.
572
   
The commander began to make extensive preparations for his own local 
pronunciamiento. He worked on gathering the full support of the military, as he instructed the 
distribution of “millares de pasquines” with “vivas y fueras opuestos,”573 along with the 
newspaper of the opposition, El Mosquito, among the army and the active battalions.
574
 The 
regular army then began to speak publicly of the “inmediata variación del actual sistema, bajo 
el velo de sostener al ejército y al clero,” wearing red ribbons “en los sombreros como 
distintivo del centralismo.”575 Toro also began to take military action. He supplied the 
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Thirteenth Permanent Battalion (now known as the Galeana Battalion) and the Second Active 
Battalion (stationed in Campeche) with war material.
576
 He ordered his adjutant José María 
Covián to occupy Sisal and prevent the arrival of Colonel Martín Peraza, who had been sent 
by President Farías (in an emergency counteractive measure) as the new commander of the 
Galeana Battalion.
577
 With the local artillery in Sisal presenting considerable opposition to 
Covián, claiming “que era llegada la época de sostener las instituciones federales,”578 Toro 
then ordered Captain of the Permanent Infantry and temporary Commander of Arms of Sisal 
Eulogio Rosado to Campeche (where he would be imprisoned).
579
 He subsequently sent 
Second Lieutenant José del Carmen Bello to command and supervise the detachment of the 
Battalion of Artillery in Mérida in order to transfer it to Maxcanú. He doubled the war 
ammunitions of the companies of the camino real, and ordered Felipe de la Cámara, 
Commander of the First Active Battalion to hand over command to Gerónimo López de 
Llergo
580
 and then called for all the sergeants of the First Active Battalion to meet in 
Mérida.
581
 Finally, he seized the ammunition of the civic militias, and ordered the 
Commander of Cavalry Joaquín Muñoz to the Campechean prison, with Felipe Montero as 
his replacement.
582
 
 
 
The local administration was more than alarmed at Toro‟s unsupervised and unilateral 
actions. After Governor Cosgaya continually asked Toro for an explanation for his behaviour, 
Toro eventually replied, declaring, “Mi amigo, ahora es tiempo de la chismografía, y si usted 
hace caso de ella […] no faltarán esos movimientos sospechosos en esa y en otros 
                                                          
576
 Ibid.  
577
 Ibid.  
578
 Ibid., 13 and 15 May 1834.   
579
 Ibid., 19 June 1834.  
580
 Letter from the Colonel of the National Body of Artillery Felipe Montero to the Governor, in ibid, 10 June 
1834. 
581
 Joaquín Muñoz to the Governor, in ibid., 28 May 1834; Juan de Dios Cosgaya to the Commander of the First 
Active Battalion, in ibid., 19 June 1834.  
582
Juan de Dios Cosgaya to the Commander General, in ibid., 19 June 1834.  
188 
 
partidos.”583 Of course no one believed him, and in a heated altercation on 7 May with Vice-
Governor Santiago Méndez, Toro boasted that he would end the local government and 
congress “tan pronto como le llegase una noticia que esperaba” of the president, and he was 
not intimidated by the civic militias, claiming that “con cuatro soldados y un cabo la 
acabaría.”584 He then declared to Cosgaya that being a soldier, he would always be 
subordinate to the will of the president of the republic, and that he would support Santa Anna 
if a pronunciamiento was about to begin.
585
 Cosgaya, panicked, ordered the Commander of 
Sisal (Rosado) to keep his position and segregate it from the authority of the general 
command. He also ordered Muñoz in Mérida to remain where he was stationed.
586
   
Cosgaya subsequently unleashed a tirade at Toro for his actions, accusing him of 
operating “de acuerdo con su cuñado” to grow the “germen de la rebelión” in Yucatán and 
thus “sobreponerse a la soberanía del estado.” He was criticised for encouraging among the 
garrison of Campeche and the pronunciados of 1829 the idea of the “resurrección del 
centralismo,”587 thus fomenting “un ataque al sistema federal y a la soberanía del estado, 
quizá más cruel que el del mes de noviembre del año de 29.”588 Cosgaya denounced Toro for 
influencing the people to think that “tienen derecho no solo a desconocer, sino a deponer al 
jefe que los manda,”589 (even though this is exactly what had happened in 1832 when the 
ligados had supported Toro‟s movement). Cosgaya then condemned Toro‟s replacement of 
the “jefes adictos al federalismo” by the commander general‟s own men.590 He additionally 
criticised Toro for the supervised distribution of El Mosquito, a paper which, according to 
Cosgaya, “ataca las instituciones federales, pone en ridículo a los supremos poderes de la 
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nación, insulta las soberanías de los estados.”591 So enraged was Cosgaya that the ugly 
Mérida-Campeche divide of the 1820s flared up once more in his rhetoric, as he denounced 
that: 
Sr Toro y media docena de hijos espurios de la patria […] existe en el oprimido 
Campeche. Aquel pueblo, digno de la mejor suerte, es sobre quien más 
inmediatamente pesan los actos despóticos de un mando militar, escandaloso y 
arbitrario […] el juego, la disipación y el enriquecerse a toda costa, son y han sido los 
exclusivos objetos de que se ha ocupado.
592
  
 
 Cosgaya ended with the call that “federación o muerte han proclamado los estados […] al fin 
el triunfo será del pueblo.
”593
 Congress then issued a proclama to the state, bolstering 
Cosgaya‟s claims that Toro “se trata revivir en nuestro suelo los acontecimientos criminales y 
escandalosos del año de 1829 […] enteramente destructivas del actual orden de cosas.”594   
Cosgaya‟s and Local Congress‟ reprobation of Toro was just the beginning; now the 
authorities fell back on the fail safe option: a pronunciamiento. For the first time in 
Yucatecan pronunciamiento history, the plan had not even the slightest pretext of having a 
national cause. On 30 May 1834, the local authorities (including economic, ecclesiastical and 
administrative figures), and some members of the active battalions, taking into account “las 
disposiciones hostiles que el Sr Comandante general D Francisco de Paula Toro intentaba 
poner en ejecución contra la soberanía del pueblo y sus instituciones,” demonstrated by 
placing in Mérida “oficiales cuyas ideas […] están en oposición diametral con las de los 
dignos jefes de esta guarnición” and seizing the ammunition of the civic militias, decided that 
it was time to “desconocer al Comandante general.” Cosgaya, Meneses, senator José Luis 
Lavalle, former Interim Governor Basilio María de Argaiz, Alderman Simón de Vargas, 
Commander of Arms Joaquín Muñoz, José Tiburcio López, Felipe de la Cámara, politician 
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Joaquín García Rejón and Commander of the First Active Battalion Eusebio Molina (who 
had actually been arrested after his pronunciamiento against Carvajal on 4 June 1831) were 
among the most important figures signing the act.
595
 Cosgaya then issued a manifiesto to the 
state on 31 May declaring the actions of Toro had implied “una emergencia política,” and this 
measure was necessary for the “conservación de la libertad federal.”596 Congress supported 
him with its own statement that: 
su [Toro] pretensión no es otra que quitar á los Poderes del Estado todos los recursos 
con que felizmente cuentan para sostener su soberanía y dejarlos indefensos, 
despojando a los que los ocupan de los puestos a que han sido elevados por la 
Constitución y el voto general de los pueblos.
597
 
The ruling administrations had thus (ironically) used a pronunciamiento to officially 
denounce future opposing pronunciados as agents of instability; indeed, now even the 
authorities in power were issuing a pronunciamiento to counteract a potential opposing 
pronunciamiento. A simple decree would not have worked as the local government had no 
constitutional power over the appointment and dismissal of commander generals; these 
figures were controlled by the national government. They consequently had to issue 
pronunciamiento (anti-constitutionally), in order to protect the constitution from dangerous 
opponents. The First and Third Active Battalions, the Permanent Cavalry, the Infantry, the 
local Cavalry, and the garrison in Sisal all quickly seconded the pronunciamiento.
598
 On 31 
May Local Congress granted the governor the power to arm forces and to punish those who 
were trying to disturb public order. Pronunciados had again used the practice to depose an 
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individual (as in 1829 and 1832), no doubt learning from the Plan of Perote in 1828. 
Moreover, this pronunciamiento was purely local; there was only the desperation to maintain 
the federalist system and ligado political power in Yucatán. 
This pronunciamiento had yet another novelty to it: it was about to inspire civil war 
for the first time in nineteenth-century Yucatán, thus mirroring on a smaller scale the events 
of the Plan de Veracruz in 1832 in Mexico. Toro, enraged at the pronunciamiento of 30 May, 
began to prepare his forces for war, seizing the profits in the state treasury, and arming and 
moving the permanent Galeana Battalion and units of the First and Second Active Battalions 
(commanded by brothers Gerónimo and Sebastián López de Llergo respectively) to 
Hecelchakán.
599
 In defence, Commander (and former Yucatecan governor) José Tiburcio 
López and the Inspector of local militias Felipe de Jesús Montero ordered the civic militias 
(stationed in Tixkokob, Izamal and other towns) to Mérida, to march to Hecelchakán.
600
 Toro 
then strategically pretended to withdraw his troops to Campeche, leaving in Hecelchakán a 
fraction of his forces commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Sebastián López de Llergo. In 
Hecelchakán, the unsuspecting Meridian troops arrived on 29 June, and there was bloody war 
for more than 8 hours, in which Llergo triumphed.
601
 A pronunciamiento had, for the first 
time in Yucatán, spiralled out of control, causing blood to run.   
Meanwhile, the news which Toro had been waiting on arrived; Tornel had organised a 
successful pronunciamiento by the garrison of Cuernavaca on 25 May protesting against 
National Congress, calling for revocation of all its radical decrees, and for the protection of 
the privileges of the Church and the army. The pronunciados gave Santa Anna leadership of 
the movement, and it was inspiring pronunciamientos de adhesión across the nation.
602
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Moreover, Santa Anna ordered Toro on 25 June to arrest López and the principal heads of the 
resistance in Yucatán.
603
 Civil war was temporarily suspended for Toro and his troops to 
issue their own pronunciamiento on 5 July. Signed by members of the regular army, the 
Second Active Battalion, the Campechean ayuntamiento, and clerical figures such as Justo 
Vargas, Vicente Méndez and José María Regil, the text condemned the local government for 
being “una facción desafecta a la unión nacional.” The government‟s implementation of 
radical reforms and its refusal to recognise Toro as commander general had proven to the 
pronunciados that the Cosgaya administration was operating “exclusiva no de la voluntad de 
los pueblos” and thus “excediendo los límites de las facultades constitucionales.” The 
government had thus violated “los inalienables derechos de su [el pueblo] soberanía.” Typical 
pronunciamiento rhetoric: the pronunciados were now the saviours, and the government was 
the tyrannical administration which the pronunciados had no choice but to remove.
604
 
The pronunciados thus demanded the revocation of all religious reforms taken since 
1832 and declared the cease of recognition of all local authorities, along with anyone who 
had supported the act of 30 May. They reinstated the congress of October 1832, named jefe 
político of Campeche Rafael Montalvo y Baranda as temporary governor, and granted José 
María Guerra the position of bishop of Yucatán. Finally, in anticipation of protest, the 
pronunciados declared that their faction “desconocerá todo pronunciamiento que se niega en 
este Estado.”605 Noticeably, there was absolutely no mention of the Plan of Cuernavaca, nor 
any protest against National Congress; indeed, although the move was ordered by Santa 
Anna, the pronunciamiento itself was purely local, a retaliation by Toro directed against the 
Cosgaya administration. Nevertheless, there was still national ideology present, as the 
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objective of the pronunciados was to reverse the radical decrees of federalism and defend 
their centralist interests.   
This pronunciamiento led to the resumption of civil war, with Toro‟s supporters 
determined to crush any resistance from the federalists. Toro ordered Nicolás de la Portilla to 
head the vanguard of the Campechean forces, and Sebastián López de Llergo (Llergo was a 
professional switcher of pronunciamientos, he had supported Carvajal‟s pronunciamiento in 
1829, had then taken part in the junta de Guerra of 13 July 1831 against the same Carvajal, 
and was now supporting centralist Toro) to command those of the centre, directing them to 
Calkiní. Toro, in charge of the reserve forces, remained in Campeche. On Cosgaya‟s side, 
Eduardo Vadillo led the Third Active Battalion camping in Calkiní with 300 men. While 
awaiting reinforcements from some of the First Active Battalion (commanded by Francisco 
Peraza) on 26 July, the Campechean army of 1500 men attacked and defeated Vadillo and his 
forces, wounding him and taking him prisoner. The victorious troops of Toro advanced on the 
capital, with the federalist authorities fleeing to Izamal in the east on 27 July. A great number 
of Meridian civilians also left, paying no heed to Llergo‟s declaration that they would be safe 
if they obeyed his orders.
 
Once more, the Commander General had easily conquered the 
governor through the practice of the pronunciamiento, along with civil war this time; civilian 
rule was no contest for military force.
606
  
The pronunciados occupied Mérida without resistance, as their carriages rolled in 
with their flags emblazoned with “¡Viva Santa Anna! ¡Viva la religión!” They re-established 
the deposed Local Congress of 1832, with Toro of course assuming the position of 
governor.
607
 The pronunciados – or “agentes de tiranía”608 as they were called by the 
opposition – went beyond the boundaries of their text and the orders of Santa Anna, expelling 
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federalists Governor Juan de Dios Cosgaya, Vice-Governor Santiago Méndez, and Eduardo 
Vadillo from Yucatán, and imprisoning others.
 
José María Meneses (the federalist-nominated 
bishop) took to hiding in the east, and federalist and former governor José Tiburcio López 
fled to Belize.
609
 The 1829 and 1832 pronunciamientos had succeeded through the threats of 
the violence of the army, but now triumph had been ensured through outright battle and 
repression. In the space of 12 years, the pronunciamiento had degenerated from a peaceful 
form of negotiation into a pretext for war in the local political battle between Mérida and 
Campeche and federalists and centralists. In the words of Pani, “Because its [the 
pronunciamiento‟s] success depended on strength – whether it was actually used or not –, it 
reinforced the importance and the autonomy of those wielding armed force [...] [and] it 
unhinged those politicians bent on consolidating a modern liberal nation-state.”610 One of the 
most original intentions of the pronunciamiento – to avoid violence through negotiation – was 
gone; in this instance it served the opposite pretext of provoking violence, of justifying it. 
Indeed, Báquer has stated that “El pronunciamiento nace en una situación entendida como 
mala, por anárquica, y promete otra mejor en evitación de la guerra civil,”611 asserting that “el 
derramamiento de sangre era, en la técnica de los clásicos pronunciamientos, un accidente 
abominable.”612 Additionally, according to Josèp Fontana, the pronunciamiento, which had 
originally been a Spanish “fórmula alternativa a la de una revolución con participación 
directa de las masas urbanas y campesinas” carried out by “liberales europeos […] que no 
deseaban la repetición de una guerra civil como la vivida en Francia”613 had now evolved into 
simply another way of excusing military force, all under the justifiable phrase which was 
dominating early nineteenth-century Mexico: the “derecho de insurrección.”   
 The bloody civil war and the punishment of the federalists had warned all other towns 
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of the potential situation in the case of protest against the pronunciamiento. After Toro signed 
the decree granting Campeche the title of “heroica” for supporting the institutions “contra el 
gobierno demagógico” of the reformists,614 the pronunciamiento was seconded throughout 
the region. In Valladolid the troops adhered, flying white flags with blue fringes with the 
logos “Morir con honor por Santa Anna y Religión”, and “¡Viva Santa Anna! ¡Viva la 
Religión!”615 On 3 August, the ayuntamiento of Mérida seconded the pronunciamiento, with 
centralists Domingo Cantón, José Guzmán (son of Pedro), Benito Aznar, Manuel Carvajal 
(brother of José Segundo), Joaquín Castellanos, and Vicente Solís all signing.
616
 Realising the 
impending region-wide success of the pronunciamiento, federalists who had actually signed 
the pronunciamiento which had ceased to recognise Toro earlier that year – such as José 
Antonio Zorrilla, Manuel José Espejo, Domingo López Somoza, Domingo Campos and 
Joaquín García Rejón – also signed the adhesion to Toro‟s act. Throughout July and August, 
the ayuntamientos of Peto, Tekax,
617
 Izamal, Conkal, Uman, Maxcanú, Villa del Carmen, 
Ticul,
618
 Xul,
619
 Valladolid, Cenotillo, Kaua, Dzitás
620
 and Caucel all seconded the 
pronunciamiento. Toro then issued a proclama ironically declaring “me congratulo en haber 
contribuido destrozando el imperio de los tiranos que habían sofocado la soberanía y 
libertades públicas.”621 Through the success of their pronunciamiento, Toro and his 
supporters thus became representative of Yucatecan sentiment, despite the heavy federalist 
presence in the region. In the words of Pani: 
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Faced with a context in which the rule of law was absent […] and where it was 
customary to employ violence to achieve political aims, the regional military warlords 
became the channel through which the relationship between society and the national 
and state levels of government was articulated. They were, in essence, political-
military operators of a kind.
622
 
 
Despite the violence of the military pronunciados, this is not to say that the exercise 
was exclusively militaristic. The pronunciados – who were also in their majority political and 
financial actors – had been heavily motivated by a centralist ideology, and had a tangible fear 
that radical federalism would harm their economic, clerical, and social security. This was thus 
not a case of military actors intervening in politics and causing extensive chaos; it was 
essentially a clashing of federalist and centralist political factions, who had both chosen to 
defend their ideologies through using armed force which was available to them. As Medina 
Peña has highlighted:  
el primer ejército de México independiente fue reorganizado y dirigido por parte de la 
clase política de origen miliciano. Esta fracción de la clase política nacional veía su 
corporación como una institución plenamente legitimada para participar en política 
porque había jugado un papel central en la consumación de la independencia nacional 
[…] en el imaginario político de esos años, la fortaleza en el ejército iba de la mano 
con la idea de un gobierno nacional también fuerte y consolidado […] Así pues, el 
ejército nacional es un actor político que en aquel escenario solo tenía a su disposición 
el pronunciamiento, el plan y la revuelta como formas de acción política y 
corporativa.
623
 
 
Moreover, one should note that this use of arms was an exception in the Yucatecan case; for 
almost 15 years, the military had been pronouncing in Yucatán without ever resorting to 
violence. One should therefore be cautious in using this pronunciamiento as an example for 
Yucatecan pronunciamiento typology.  
The pronunciados carried out manipulated elections in order to give the customary 
constitutional gloss to the unlawful overtake of power. The new congress was installed on 6 
November, and on 7 November Francisco de Paula Toro became governor, with Pedro Sainz 
de Baranda elected as vice governor. On 25 July José María Guerra became bishop of 
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Yucatán.
624
 The pronunciados then waited once more for events in Mexico in order to take 
the next step. Throughout the summer of 1834, Santa Anna ensured the fulfilment of the Plan 
of Cuernavaca, annulling the majority of decrees of the previous congress, with the exception 
of the abolition of the tithe. Elections were held for a new national congress in autumn 1834, 
and with pronunciados deposing the federalists in almost every state, the centralists and the 
hombres de bien prevailed, meeting on 4 January 1835 for the first time.
625
 In Yucatán, 
centralists Néstor Escudero, Pedro Marcial Guerra, Gerónimo López de Llergo, José Quijano, 
and Tomás Requeña were elected to represent Yucatán.
626
 On 28 January, Santa Anna named 
Miguel Barragán as interim president, and he would rule for the next year.
627
   
There was a general consensus among the hombres de bien in National Congress that 
federalism was not the system best suited to the needs of the country. Eleven years of 
federalism had witnessed the forceful overthrow of the presidencies of Gómez Pedraza, 
Guerrero, Bustamante, and Gómez Farías through pronunciamientos.
628
 In their opinion, 
pronunciamientos were constantly destabilising society, deposing and replacing local and 
national authorities. They blamed federalism for causing political and factional rivalries, the 
general breakdown of law and order, the empowering of the masses and the states, the critical 
economic situation, and the weakening of the Church and morality. Federalism had also 
permitted the over-empowerment of the regions through the fortification of the civic militias 
in a “frenzy of provincialism”. Regional leaders had lost sight of the duty of obedience which 
they owed to national authority, refusing outright to obey national decrees and threatening 
secession (and even seceding – Yucatán was a case in point). There was no hope of progress, 
and the existence of the Republic itself was in danger. In the words of Costeloe, “fortunes, 
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properties, individual freedom, public morality, law, religion, everything had been 
destroyed.”629 
Change therefore had to be made at the root of the problem; Mexicans needed a 
modification of the political system, one which limited suffrage, curtailed the autonomy of 
the regions, ensured the respect of the Catholic religion, restored law and order and political 
stability, ended factional warring, and provoked economic growth and social progress.
630
 
Centralism was clearly the answer; all these things could only be ensured if the upper social 
classes and the centre exclusively held political power, with all domains and regions under 
the strong control of the hombres de bien.
631
 In March 1835, the new congress thus approved 
a motion to amend the 1824 constitution, with the intention to introduce a centralist republic.  
An avalanche of pronunciamientos across the country then started calling en masse 
for a centralist regime, and Yucatán was no exception; the coalition which had come to power 
as a result of Toro‟s pronunciamiento had privileges and interests to maintain and protect. On 
22 June, the ayuntamiento of Campeche (with centralists Norberto López de Llergo, 
Alejandro Duque de Estrada and Leandro Poblaciones ruling) constituted the first 
pronunciados of that year to call for a centralist system (demonstrating once more the 
Campechean centralist tendencies which had been illustrated in the 1821, 1824 and 1829 
pronunciamientos). They admitted in their act that “en abstracto todas las instituciones 
liberales son buenas, pero la mejor en general puede ser perniciosa a un pueblo determinado,” 
and the federal institutions “cubiertos con su manto engañador” had caused a “serie continua 
de trastornos, sacudimientos, turbulencias y guerras civiles.” They consequently called for a 
popular, representative centralist government as “la unión concentrando las fuerzas, da vigor 
y enérgica preponderancia” could be the only reliable and secure type of government.632 They 
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also stipulated that Santa Anna was to be president. The ayuntamiento of Mérida seconded 
the pronunciamiento on 25 June, stating that a “larga y dolorosa experiencia” had 
demonstrated that “el actual sistema que nos rige no es el más conforme y adaptable a la 
nación mexicana” as in Yucatán particularly it had caused “el continuo choque de los bandos 
y partidos para sobreponerse unos a otros.”633 These pronunciados made sure to retain 
political power as they stated that they would continue to rule locally even in the case of the 
change of the national political system.  
The rest of the region seconded the plan of Campeche, with juntas in Valladolid,
634
 
Sisal, Seibaplaya, Villa del Carmen, Hool, Calkiní, Cauich, Hecelchakán, and Kopomá all 
supporting the call for centralism.
635
 It is important to note the influence which the powerful 
pronunciados in the principal cities had on the smaller ayuntamientos in terms of 
commandeering support; regardless of whether the members of these ayuntamientos were 
federalist or centralist, the fact remained that it was pointless for them to even try to resist the 
pronunciamiento wave (and the military force which was reinforcing it) which was washing 
over the peninsula. This had been the case for every single pronunciamiento so far; the 
ayuntamientos merely played the role of passive supporters of the larger movements which 
were dictated by the elite military and political figures in the two main cities of Mérida and 
Campeche. Thus, according to Rugeley: 
In some ways, for the southeast ayuntamientos every pronouncement came from 
without [...] For that reason, ayuntamiento secondings have to be taken with 
considerable scepticism [...] pueblo adhesions were necessary to reassure political 
actors that what they were doing was somehow legitimate [...] precisely because their 
legitimacy was so dubious.
636
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Approximately 400 pronunciamientos supporting centralism were issued throughout 
Mexico between May and October 1835. On 9 September, National Congress declared that it 
was now invested with the powers needed to create a new constitution. Meanwhile, in late 
1835, centralists Pedro Escudero de la Rocha, Vicente Solís, José Luis de Meléndez, Joaquín 
Calixto Gil, and priest Manuel José Pardío constituted the junta departamental which was to 
rule Yucatán.
637
 On 3 October, National Congress decreed that states were to be converted 
into departments, with limited fiscal and administrative autonomy; additionally, the national 
administration was to appoint departmental governors. On 23 October, future conservatives 
Manuel Sánchez de Tagle, Lucas Alamán, and Carlos María de Bustamante in the Chamber 
of Deputies created a provisional centralist constitution. It consisted of further measures such 
as restricting suffrage to men who had a minimum annual income of 100 pesos.
638
 On 30 
December 1836, National Congress accepted the constitution, henceforth known as the Siete 
Leyes.  
The pronunciamientos which had erupted between 1833 and 1835 in Yucatán were 
undeniably destabilizing practices, provoking the unconstitutional change of administration 
once more, and inspiring Yucatecan civil war for the first time since independence. Indeed, 
these pronunciamientos, while being national exercises, were simultaneously local political 
tools, as the pronunciamientos from 1833-1834 had objectives of removing state power from 
the ruling authorities. In fact, only the pronunciamiento of 1835 did not involve dismissing 
governing bodies (and individuals) from power. The dominance of the use of military power 
in political matters also became apparent; pronunciados had forgotten one of the original 
reasons behind the pronunciamiento – the avoidance of violence and disorder – as they used 
the pronunciamiento of 1834 to provoke, preempt, and justify civil war. This is not to say that 
the practice lacked ideological basis or political aim. Instead, the pronunciamiento illustrated 
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factions which were deeply committed to the defense of their ideologies and the protection of 
their interests. Proclaiming either federalism or centralism in the pronunciamiento was no 
coincidence; they were real ideals and ideas which these groups took seriously, and were 
prepared to take whatever measures necessary in order to defend them. 
Finally, the founding of institutions through pronunciamientos based on “public 
opinion” had demonstratively led to the extreme fragility of institutional order and the “crisis 
de legitimidad” in both Mexico and Yucatán during this period; if it was accepted to establish 
an administration based on the voluntad del pueblo, then the “will of the people” could just as 
legitimately replace it whenever pronunciados desired. Whatever the case was, it remains that 
by the early 1830s, the pronunciamiento was seen as the solution to all political and 
administrative worries in the two main cities of the peninsula; it was now the established and 
accepted way to get things done by the elite of Mérida and Campeche. It is evident that the 
most significant pronunciamientos throughout independence had until now been restricted to 
these two main cities; nevertheless, the men of eastern Yucatán had not been unaware of 
these pronunciamientos, and they would wait, watch, and learn. The next and largest 
pronunciamiento in the history of Yucatán was soon to hit the peninsula, and it would be by 
the landowner and captain of the Third Active Battalion from the east: Santiago Imán.  
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7 
The Forgotten Hero:  
   The Santiago Imán Pronunciamiento of 1836-1840 
 
Perhaps a revolution can overthrow 
autocratic despotism and profiteering or power-
grabbing oppression, but it can never truly 
reform a manner of thinking; instead, new 
prejudices, just like the old ones they replace, 
will serve as a leash for the great unthinking 
mass.
639
 
 
Revolución: Movimiento político que 
ilusiona a muchos, desilusiona a más, incomoda a 
casi todos y enriquece extraordinariamente a 
unos pocos. Goza de firme prestigio.
640
 
The pronunciamiento of Santiago Imán was the most significant and exceptional 
pronunciamiento in Yucatecan history. This pronunciamiento was the epitome of the 
fluctuating relations which existed between the Yucatecan and Mexican authorities during the 
early nineteenth century, as it was the only pronunciamiento which resulted in Yucatán‟s 
complete independence from Mexico, with Yucatán creating its own constitution (the 1829 
pronunciamiento had only brought about Yucatán‟s conditional secession from Mexico, but 
not the province‟s independence). Nevertheless, the pronunciamiento‟s initial origins would 
not stem from separatist desires, but would arise from the discontent of the military, or more 
specifically, the Third Active Battalion which was stationed in towns throughout the remote 
east of the peninsula (the battalion to which Imán belonged). This pronunciamiento thus 
highlighted the now defined importance which had developed throughout the 1830s with 
regard to the military‟s role in inspiring and realising the pronunciamiento. Furthermore, the 
majority of those participating in Imán‟s pronunciamiento were middle-class military 
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officers, campesinos and Mayas from the east of the peninsula, endowing it with an 
unmistakeable element of popular participation which had evidently been absent in the 
previous Yucatecan pronunciamientos (where the elite from the cities of Mérida and 
Campeche had lobbied for regional political power). The elite federalists in Mérida would 
nevertheless be responsible for seconding the pronunciamiento and would consequently 
ensure its region-wide success, emphasising the everlasting significance of the role of these 
politicians in the Yucatecan pronunciamiento. These federalists did not just second Imán‟s 
pronunciamiento, but hijacked it and recreated it to serve their own elite purposes, thus 
highlighting the continued and determined dominance which they had when it came to 
controlling pronunciamientos (and consequently political power). The adaptation from a 
relatively popular movement to an exclusive pronunciamiento and the elites‟ disregard of the 
demands of the pueblo would lead to a final significant factor: the curious way in which 
pronunciamientos in Yucatán were memorialised. There was a determination by the federalist 
elite to forget the inexperienced and dangerous figure of Imán as a pronunciamiento leader, 
as he was a virtually unknown man from the east who had dangerously armed the Maya. Yet 
simultaneously, there was a conscious elite effort to recognise and remember his 
pronunciamiento as the Yucatecan prototype of the perfect pronunciamiento: one 
representing the people and the voice of the pueblos, which endowed it with the legitimacy 
needed to justify the federalists overthrowing the centralist governing administrations at the 
time.  
Before analysing Imán‟s pronunciamiento, it is useful to briefly examine this unlikely 
pronunciamiento figure. Who was Santiago Imán and why did he feel compelled to 
pronounce against all odds? Born in 1800, Santiago Imán Villafaña was from a family who 
had achieved certain importance in the Maya-dominated east of the peninsula (a place known 
as the oriente), and more specifically in the towns of Tizimín and Espita. The Imán family 
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was relatively wealthy, owning many properties, with investments in the dyewood industry 
and maintaining a trade with Havana.
 
More importantly, Imán was an army officer: as early 
as 1825, he is found in documents gathering men from Tizimín to form the then-newly 
established Third Active Battalion, soon becoming Captain of its Fifth Company.
641
 He also 
had a penchant for pronouncing; he had seconded the pronunciamientos for the federal 
constitution in 1824, and again in 1832. When his time for leading the biggest Yucatecan 
pronunciamiento came, he already had more than a decade of military experience, and was 
practised in the art of seconding pronunciamientos. 
Santiago Imán  
 
 
 
 Yet Imán was not a political figure, unlike the majority of the military men in the 
cities of Mérida and Campeche. His main reason for pronouncing was not to be politically 
related, but was much more concrete (once more contrasting with the traditional political 
pronunciamientos of early nineteenth-century Yucatán). From as early as December 1835, 
the Mexican administration‟s sorteo method of compulsory recruitment of Yucatecan soldiers 
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to fight the wars against secessionist Texas had begun. The sorteo had specifically targeted 
the Third Active Battalion – of which Imán was a member – whose soldiers were stationed 
mainly in the eastern towns of Tizimín, Espita, and Izamal,
 
and in the city of Valladolid in the 
east (see Map 2).
642
 In total, then-Commander General Joaquín Rivas Zayas reported that 
more than 3,000 Yucatecan troops were sent to Texas between 1835 and 1839. The sorteo 
solely affected the criollo sector (which constituted only one-third of the Yucatecan 
population), as laws had until then forbidden the Maya to enlist in the active battalions.
643
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      Map 2: Yucatán 
 
The sorteo recruitment had several disastrous effects on Yucatecan society. The 
constitution of the Third Active Battalion was unlike that of the First and Second Active 
Battalions. The Iturbide administration had created the latter in 1821, taking members from 
the regular army to form this “reserve” army. These soldiers thus had some sort of training, 
Source: Nelson Reed, The                
Caste War of Yucatán 
(Stanford CA: Stanford 
University Press, 2002), p.22.  
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and although their occupations became more focused in other domains (economic and 
political), they nonetheless had some military experience. On the other hand, the Yucatecan 
administration had created the Third Active Battalion in 1824, and the majority of its 
members had never been part of the regular army. They were civilians for the most part, and 
the local government had offered them positions to maintain the peace of the towns in the 
east of the region. The Third Active Battalion was thus made up of labourers or aged and 
inexperienced vecinos in their majority (Imán himself was an hacendado with no military 
training). These men were consequently not trained or equipped to fight a war; according to 
then-Commander General Joaquín Rivas Zayas:  
Por la exigencia de sus costumbres y por la peculiar situación de la gente de que se 
componen los cuerpos […] los batallones de esta clase están formados de artesanos y 
labradores, casados generalmente y establecidos en sus respectivos pueblos, de donde 
solo se les saca para el servicio en un caso extraordinario.
644
 
His opinion was echoed throughout the east of the region, as the prefecto of Izamal, Justo 
María Burgos argued that these soldiers were only used to “cuidar el cuartel […] [para la] 
conservación del orden, en custodiar caudales del erario público a esa capital, y en conducir 
presos.”645 Criollos also protested against the sorteo in Sucopó,646 Motul,647 Tema, 
Valladolid, Espita, Tizimín,
648
 and even Mérida, where the members of that ayuntamiento 
pointed out that the law of 1767 stated that the Mexican administration should only recruit 
these battalions (according to their character of “reserve army”) if the regular army was 
otherwise occupied; in Campeche there was still stationed the fully able national Veteran and 
Galeana Battalions.
649
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Aside from the obvious reason that these troops did not want to leave their homelands 
to fight in distant wars, another cause for dissent was that the uprooting of these “artesanos y 
labradores” had a detrimental effect on the industry and agriculture of the eastern regions. 
Hacendados and business owners were thus equally as disgusted as those who were being 
recruited, as criollo elites from Izamal and Valladolid complained of the decline in 
production, commerce, and industry, and asked the government to exempt their labourers 
from the sorteo.
650
 Pedro Baranda, Subprefect of Valladolid and owner of La Aurora 
Yucateca – a cotton factory located in Valladolid – denounced “la sentencia de exterminio” 
afflicting the region, as “habiendo sido arrancados de la agricultura los pocos brazos que la 
fomentaban que colocarlos en la milicia activa […] la industria se encuentra en una 
retrogradación tan triste como lamentable.
651
 The hundreds who had fled the troop 
recruitment, going to either live in the mountains, or even escaping as far as Belize, were 
equally useless to Yucatecan society. Baranda estimated the loss to be “en cada partido 
doscientos o trescientos hombres, que emigrarán a los campos desiertos y a los 
establecimientos ingleses de Walix [Belize] […] para librarse del sorteo,”652 with Rivas 
Zayas claiming the numbers to be “en quinientos los prófugos en los montes y perdidos para 
la sociedad.”653  
How did this affect Imán more directly? Imán was heavily preoccupied about the 
draining of his own workforce by the forced recruitment; indeed, his employees were all 
members of the Third Active Battalion, targeted for enlistment to Texas. Commanding a 
company of 124 men, he used his position to manage a sufficient labour force, as soldiers 
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repaid money which he loaned to them by working in his cornfields.
654
 With the national 
government ordering his men to Texas, there was no one to tend to Imán‟s lands, and military 
authorities ignored his complaints about the “incalculables perjuicios, porque pasada la época 
en que las milpas deben quemarse.”655 Of equal significance was the fact that he was now 
also a captain of a regiment destined for Texas. His previously respected military position 
(pre-1836) now became unpopular, as he had the villainous responsibility of gathering his 
very troops for the far-away war. When on 6 June 1836, Governor Francisco de Paula Toro 
demanded a further two hundred soldiers from the Third Active Battalion to go to 
Tamaulipas, Imán knew it was time to pronounce.
656
  
Imán was not alone; he had allies in important Yucatecan cities, namely Mérida and 
Campeche, where the concerns were not about the sorteo, but lay among the pro-federalist 
elite who were looking for a way to topple the central government which had replaced them 
in 1835. These federalists were namely José Tiburcio López, Juan de Dios Cosgaya (both 
former ligados and governors), newcomers to politics Manuel and Miguel Barbachano, and 
former camarilleros Benito Aznar, the Llergo brothers (Sebastián and Manuel), Santiago 
Mendez, José Encarnacion Cámara, and the Gutiérrez de Estrada family. Indeed, it is 
significant to note that in response to the centralist coalition of Francisco del Paula Toro and 
the chief members of the La Rochela faction – such as Pedro and Néstor Escudero, Vicente 
Solís and Joaquín Calixto Gil – the majority of the Camarilla and the entire Liga had united to 
form a large federalist coalition called the Unión.
657
 The federalist presence in the main cities 
was thus still a very strong factor to contend with.  
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In order to gather support for his pronunciamiento, Imán consequently planned to 
pronounce in the name of federalism. One should note that this was not the main objective of 
Imán: his demands were economic and militaristic, not political. He was nevertheless aware 
that the military elite in Mérida and Campeche had always had political rather than 
militaristic objectives in their pronunciamientos (as has been demonstrated). As a result, 
Imán needed to broaden the aims of his act so as to incorporate the ideological interests of the 
elite in the West, thus increasing his pronunciamiento‟s appeal to the most important 
members of society who could potentially adhere to his cause. To pronounce for the end of 
the sorteo or the dissolution of the Third Active Battalion could not garner nearly enough 
endorsement or mobilisation, or amass the core constituent support which he needed in order 
to give his pronunciamiento a chance of success. He was also aware that until then, the 
principal Yucatecan pronunciamientos had been realised among the political and military 
elite of Mérida and Campeche. No one from the east – much less a mere captain with no 
political experience – had carried out a major successful pronunciamiento. He consequently 
needed the support of the powerful pronunciado elite in Mérida and Campeche in order to 
inspire the domino effect of the pronunciamiento, and thus create opportunities for its 
victory.   
Imán‟s inclusion of federalism was not only to garner adhesion from the federalists in 
Mérida and Campeche, but he also needed a political/ideological slant in order to give his 
cause some sort of legitimacy. He had to follow the standard pronunciamiento rhetoric that 
his pronunciamiento could save the nation from the evils of a despotic regime, as previous 
pronunciamientos had done. Significantly, centralist Tomás Requeña would later remark that 
Imán‟s pronunciamiento did not have political origins in spite of invoking the federal 
constitution “como una de tantas palabras mágicas usadas en tales ocasiones”; he recognised 
that the problem was located in the extraction of troops in the east of the republic, and that 
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Imán was using federalism to acquire support as well as grant validity to his movement.
658
 
Thus, in the words of Van Young, “some political crises begin to look invented, almost 
conspiratorial”659 in contexts such as this. One should note that this was an exception in the 
standard Yucatecan pronunciamiento typology: all pronunciados previous to this had 
possessed a genuine political ideology and had formulated pronunciamientos to implement or 
protect their political beliefs. Imán, despite having much more concrete objectives, 
consequently still had to give the impression that he was following in the footsteps of the 
traditional pronunciados. 
The Imán pronunciamiento therefore undeniably began as an elite movement; Imán 
himself was a criollo and of the provincial upper-class in the east, a respected figure in 
Tizimín society, and his main reason for pronouncing was because his workers and soldiers 
were being taken away from him. The federalist taint of the pronunciamiento was also elitist; 
it was included in order to persuade the political upper crust of Mérida and Campeche to 
protest against a government which had issued a series of damaging property and business 
taxes, along with harmful trade decrees and tariffs, affecting their businesses and hacienda 
production. The call for the end of the sorteo would nevertheless not only be serving the 
needs of the elite, but would also unintentionally be satisfying the demands of the lower 
classes; indeed, the majority of those protesting against being sent to Texas were the hacienda 
and industry workers. Imán would add a further element of popularity to the pronunciamiento 
when, in the need for manpower in his exercise, he would include demands in his movement 
which answered the needs of the indigenous sectors, in order to encourage them to take up 
arms with him. Imán would thus widen the objectives of his pronunciamiento, encompassing 
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the needs of several sectors of society, and consequently transforming it into a popular 
movement, as shall be discovered.  
  Imán‟s first attempt at pronouncing has been recorded as early as June 1836, when 
after hearing the news that Santa Anna‟s army had been defeated by U.S. troops – resulting in 
the capture of the Mexican president – the 36-year old Imán pronounced. His endeavour, 
referred to as “el pronunciamiento intentado por el capitán D Santiago Imán,”660 was quickly 
discovered and quashed, ending in his capture by centralist Colonel and Commander in Chief 
of the Third Active Battalion, Roberto Ildefonso Rivas, on 29 June 1836.
661
 A local jury then 
tried Imán on a “causa de sedición”662 and imprisoned him. In jail, without proper food or 
shelter, Imán‟s resentment against his circumstances only deepened, strengthening his 
determination to pronounce. After two years in prison, authorities released him in the custody 
of a herb doctor (following his plea that his haemorrhoids were giving him too much trouble), 
and with his “salud en absoluta decadencia.”663 
Upon his release, the rebel established his revolutionary headquarters – named the 
cuartel general del libertador del Oriente – in a secret location in the east, and recommenced 
planning with the Meridian and Campechean federalists.
664
 They agreed that he, along with 
others in “Sisal y en los pueblos del Camino de Real de Campeche”665 would all 
simultaneously pronounce on 29 May 1839, so as to cause a nationwide pronunciamiento, far 
from the control and watchful eye of the repressive centralist governor and former 
camarillero Pedro Marcial Guerra. One should note that while the federalists had attempted 
to protest through civilian pronunciamientos (without any threat of violence) throughout the 
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end of 1837 and beginning of 1838,
666
 Governor Guerra had quickly repressed them.
667
 This 
had led to the federalists‟ realisation of two key strategies: if the pronunciamiento was to 
succeed, it had to be away from the main cities, and it had to include a military threat. 
Due to constant bickering among the federalists on how to proceed with the planned 
pronunciamiento – “en disputas interminables se iba pasando el tiempo sin adelanto”668 – 
they decided to cancel their plans at the last minute. Either Imán did not get word of the 
cancellation, or he proceeded anyway in his audacious manner. On 29 May, eight of his 
armed men appeared at the house of Rivas in Espita. The men brought a letter from Imán 
himself, dated the 19
th
 of that month, and addressed from his headquarters, in which he 
invited Rivas to take part in “el grito glorioso de la libertad,” asking that he provide soldiers 
and arms as soon as possible. He assured him that he had 400 supporters, including the 
majority of San Fernando Aké (a black community originally formed by refugees of the 
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Haitain revolution of 1791). In a similar letter, Imán proclaimed himself in favour of the 
federal republic and called on interested parties to take up arms with him.
669
 
Why Imán advised and invited a clear centralist rival (and moreover the very same 
figure who had arrested him two years earlier when he had attempted to pronounce for 
federalism) to uphold his pronunciamiento demonstrates one dynamic aspect of the 
pronunciamiento in nineteenth-century Yucatán (and Mexico). In many cases 
pronunciamientos had the ability to incorporate self-proclaimed federalists or centralists into 
the rival or opposing faction, as long as these supporters were guaranteed to be on the more 
powerful side. In several cases, there were chaqueteros who switched factions, joining the 
group with a winning pronunciamiento in order to ensure their political survival; these were 
evident cases of opportunism. Examples were pronunciamiento leader Sebastián López de 
Llergo who was centralist in 1829, but federalist in 1832, centralist again in 1834, and was 
now federalist; self-proclaimed centralist Governor Pedro Marcial Guerra was himself a 
former camarillero who had plotted for Yucatecan independence from Mexico several times, 
and had simply rode on the victorious centralist wave in 1835. This should of course not 
detract from the fact that the majority of the Yucatecan elite did have faith in their political 
ideals, using the pronunciamiento to promote and protect them, (such as federalists Manuel 
Crescencio Rejón, José Tiburcio López, and Juan de Dios Cosgaya, or centralist Joaquín 
Casares de Armas). In fact, Vázquez believes that to refer to any of these figures as 
chaqueteros is “absurdo”.670 
Rivas was one of those men who were committed to their political ideals, and Imán 
was not able to persuade him to join his federalist cause. On the contrary, Rivas wasted no 
time in suppressing the uprising. When Imán pronounced on 29 May 1839 in Tizimín, his 
pronunciados made a sorry sight: some 70-80 (the promised 400 had never shown up) men 
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made up of some deserters of the Third Active Battalion, vecinos of the town, and some 
former Haitian slaves from the ranch of San Fernando and from San Felipe, as Imán 
“tumultariamente exclamó la Federación.”671 His forces then went to Espita, where Rivas‟ 
forces roundly defeated the pronunciados in the mere space of two hours.
 
The rebels fled, 
abandoning their arms, as well as a flag which Imán had prepared for the occasion.
672
  
The pronunciado elite ridiculed the pitiful and solitary attempt and lack of prestige of 
the event and actors, thus highlighting yet another aspect of the traditional Yucatecan 
pronunciamiento. The pronunciamiento in Yucatán – as has been demonstrated – was not a 
movement of the pueblos, despite the fact that it constantly claimed to be representing the 
voices of “the people” and the voluntad general. The pronunciamiento in this area of Mexico 
was instead a tool employed by the elite of Mérida and Campeche, as they used the practice 
in their constant struggle for local political power. These elite figures – including even Imán‟s 
former conspirators – embarrassed by the whole spectacle of Imán‟s failed pronunciamiento, 
turned away from him, claiming to have no connection to the man or the movement, and even 
criticised him. He was a nobody, some cowboy from the east who had most likely disobeyed 
their orders, and was now trying to play their game of pronouncing, without having the 
faintest idea of what he was doing. Federalist and Commander of the First Active Battalion 
Felipe de la Cámara, who had been involved in the conspiracy for the planned 
pronunciamiento, remarked in his diary that he was shocked that Imán had dared to head a 
pronunciamiento without any other points of support in the peninsula: 
No dejé de extrañar sobremanera que un Capitán miliciano depuesto de su empleo, sin 
conocimientos en el arte de Guerra, conocido por su carácter quieto y tranquilo, sin 
opinión ni antecedentes que lo abonasen, en fin, para decirlo de una vez, una 
inutilidad bajo todos conceptos, se echase sobre si, el enorme peso de un 
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acontecimiento de tan graves consecuencias [….] desde entonces desconfié del buen 
éxito [del pronunciamiento].
673
  
 
Governor Pedro Marcial Guerra called Imán‟s first attempt to pronounce a “Ruidoso, 
temerario e insignificante pronunciamiento” and a “ridículo grito.” In his words, “Don 
Santiago Imán no es un militar de carrera. Sin talento ni instrucción: sin relaciones ni 
prestigio: sin concepto ni recursos, ha obrado como un bandido: acaudillando […] los más 
desertores y algunos morenos idiotas del pueblo.”674 In the eastern town of Tihosuco, the 
authorities reported his pronunciamiento attempt as “El descabellado e insignificante 
pronunciamiento acaudillado por Imán de unos pocos revoltosos de Tizimín.”675 
Imán was indeed without arms, resources, men, prestige, and connections: the things 
needed to make a pronunciamiento work. He himself was not the most impressive 
pronunciamiento leader: a mere captain from a small town in the east, the Campechean and 
Meridian elite ridiculed him for the Mayan accent of his Spanish. He was not the best 
prototype of a soldier, as riding on horseback irritated his haemorrhoids, while migraines, 
provoked by loud noises from cannons, gun fire, or even military music, sidelined him in the 
midst of battle.
676
 As Fowler has pointed out, a pronunciamiento needed the element of, in 
Max Weber‟s terms, “charismatic domination”, a hero-type figure who commanded respect 
and inspired mobilisation, a military man in most instances, with experience and 
demonstrated success in starting – not just seconding as was in Imán‟s case – 
pronunciamientos.
677
 Yucatecans had to view him as a figure with – in Báquer‟s words – the 
“prestigio necesario”678 which would inspire them to support him and second his act, not to 
look on in surprise while he put on such an embarrassing show. In nineteenth-century 
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Mexico, you only really “existed” politically and militarily if you had led a victorious and 
significant pronunciamiento. Imán had not done this, and consequently did not exist in this 
sense; the consequence was that “people would not know who you were, what you stood for, 
or how resourceful you were at summoning support and/or succeeding in effecting shifts in 
government policy.”679  
Imán evidently lacked many things, but he did not lack audacity. To him, his defeat 
was a mere stumbling block. He took refuge in the coast, establishing himself in the casa 
principal of San Fernando, while he worked on getting more men and resources. The fact that 
he could attract more recruits after such an embarrassing and disheartening defeat 
demonstrated the level of local resentment for the sorteo. Still, his resources and men were 
extremely meagre. According to the account of Felipe de la Cámara, whose brother Camilo 
went to visit Imán:  
toda la artillería del Sr. Imán se componía de una pieza de a 8 medio desfogonada y 
montada sobre unos polines, situada en el andén de una noria y por todo parque, 
cuatro tiros de metralla, otra pieza estaba servida por seis negros […] la pieza no tenía 
gente de infantería que la sostuviera, y mi hermano hizo notar al Sr. Imán todas estas 
fallas pero éste le contestó con la mayor sangre fría “qué le vamos a hacer, no hay 
gente.”680 
In comparison, government forces of more than 300 men, heavily equipped and commanded 
by Manuel Eusebio Molina and Tomás O´Horán, together with Rivas, attacked Imán in San 
Fernando on 19 June, with the battle lasting about 10 minutes,
681
 causing the rebels to 
disperse among the forests and environs of the towns of Sucopó and Chancenote, while the 
government troops established barracks in Espita.
 682
 
 While in refuge, Imán recruited even more support, this time more significant. He 
received arms and money from discontented hombres de bien such as Alfonso Vásquez of 
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Tihosuco
683
 and Ignacio Medina of Campeche.
684
 His wife María Nicolasa Virgilio provided 
him with news of events in Valladolid, Espita, and Tizimín; many said that she was the one 
who directed the early stages of the revolution. She sought out supporters and directed them 
to Imán, among them soon-to-be rebel heads Vicente Revilla (a deserter from the Galeana 
Battalion of Campeche), and Vito Pacheco (who was fleeing from an assassination which he 
committed in Ascensión Bay). Pacheco had contacts in the contraband trade, and assisted in 
getting arms and resources for the revolt.
685
 Soon after, José María Vergara, “un pobre 
hombre que andaba descalzo en esos tiempos”, and Pastor Gamboa, a “soldado desertor del 
batallón 3º activo”686 joined the heads of the pronunciamiento.  
More supporters joined when in mid-June 1839, 150 recruited soldiers from the Third 
Active Battalion (destined for Texas) sailing from Sisal to Veracruz revolted on the ship and 
forced the captain to disembark in Celestún, a short distance from Sisal. There, a sergeant 
gave the order that “Compañeros, no tenemos más recurso que el Sr Imán, vamos a 
incorporarnos a sus tropas,”687 as they made their way to the “montañas de Tizimín.”688 The 
pronunciamiento was thus truly taking the character of a popular movement; actors from all 
backgrounds were now involved: the military, campesinos, slaves and vecinos. It is 
significant to note that this was the very first pronunciamiento in Yucatecan history which 
was beginning to live up to the constant claim that it was indeed justly representing the 
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desires of the people. In the words of Báquer, a true pronunciamiento involving “una síntesis 
de Ejército y Pueblo que reclama el cambio”689 was forming.  
With Imán‟s forces now bolstered and numbering between 500 and 700, they attacked 
Tizimín on 22 August. They defeated government forces commanded by Eduardo Vadillo, 
Rivas, Andrés Deniz and Tomás O‟ Horán.690 It was their first victory and Imán finally issued 
his long-awaited pronunciamiento text on 12 November, which self-proclaimed him as “el 
Libertador del Oriente,”691 and which was limited to calling for the federation, the dissolution 
of the Third Active Battalion and the reimposition of the authorities of 1834.
692
 The 
pronunciados, many of them experiencing their armed empowerment for the first time, lost 
control. They looted and sacked Tizimín, with Imán threatening to shoot anyone who refused 
to sign his act. They murdered Francisco Torre, justice of the peace of the nearby town of 
Kikil, for harbouring centralist sympathies. The rebels seized supplies from the haciendas 
surrounding the town, and constructed defences on all roads leading to the centre, awaiting 
government forces. As in 1834, the pronunciamiento had given way to violence (that time 
through civil war). Once more, the pronunciados thought their actions justified, because of 
their official declaration that they were carrying out a pronunciamiento, not a revolt. The 
experience of 1834 had demonstrated that violence could “legitimately” be used, as it was all 
in aim of serving the needs of the patria. Thus, the practice of the pronunciamiento was now 
being used for legitimising the unlawful, “as a means of institutionalizing the wilderness, 
civilizing barbarism”, as bureaucratic form excused the behaviour of pueblo and mob rule.693 
                                                          
689
 Báquer, El modelo español, p.41. 
690
 Letter from Pedro Marcial Guerra to the Excmo. Sr. Secretario del Estado y del Despacho de Ministro de lo 
Interior, AGEY, Correspondencia Oficial, Vol.8, Exp.19, 7 September 1839; Letter from ibid. to ibid., AGEY, 
Correspondencia Oficial, Vol.9, Exp.8, 29 August 1839. 
691
 Información practicada por el subdelegado de Ichmul, sobre un tumulto provocado por varios vecinos de 
Tiholop, Peto, AGEY, Poder Ejecutivo, Gobernación, Vol.12, Exp.21, 6 August 1840. 
692
 Campos García, Que los yucatecos, p.167.   
693
 Fowler, “I pronounce thus I exist”, p.258. 
220 
 
It is of note that Imán only now issued his text after revolting for the better part of 
1839. Certain pronunciamiento critics such as Guerra and Vázquez maintain that in the 
established process of a pronunciamiento, the text is issued before the mobilization of the 
participants of the revolt. This initial circulation and official publication of dissent is in their 
view one of the key ritualistic and defining elements of a pronunciamiento. Indeed, according 
to Guerra, the first step in a pronunciamiento is “una declaración programatica de principios 
y propuestas” which is then followed by an appeal to supporters, a propaganda campaign, and 
finally the revolt itself.
694
 The fact that Imán issued his text after revolting for such a long 
period nevertheless implies that his was initially a simple campesino “revolt”, which only 
issued a text to “legitimize” its existence, and convert it into a pronunciamiento.  
When one takes into account the very first successful pronunciamiento known in 
history, this argument may not seem as valid. General Rafael de Riego was the first person to 
ever refer to his 1821 revolt as a pronunciamiento, as he believed it was more a method of 
representing the will of a people attempting to forcefully negotiate with the authorities in 
power, than a simple coup d’état. However, as Fowler points out, although Riego issued two 
proclamas (official announcements), “he did not actually produce one single 
pronunciamiento text.”695 If this was indeed what one considers to be the very first 
pronunciamiento, then it seems somewhat invalid to argue that the lack of an initial 
pronunciamiento text makes it “not a pronunciamiento.” Added to this is the fact that Imán 
never had time to issue his pronunciamiento text: every time that he attempted to pronounce, 
government forces quickly defeated the pronunciados. Nevertheless, upon his very first 
success, he did not hesitate to issue his acta. This would then imply that the Imán revolt was 
indeed a pronunciamiento all along. 
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The issuing of a text did not prevent government troops from defeating Imán‟s forces 
in Tizimín, as a new force of 200 men commanded by Tomás Requeña triumphed over the 
rebels on 12 December, with the pronunciados once more dispersing.
696
 One should note the 
attitude of the federalists in the main cities during this period of continual defeats of Imán. 
They manifested no connection with him, and had not acknowledged his pronunciamiento in 
Tizimín. Felipe de la Cámara, Commander of the First Active Battalion stationed in the port 
of Sisal, was eager to issue a pronunciamiento de adhesión to Imán‟s act, but the federalists 
in Mérida ordered him to wait; in his words “nos calmaban con protestas de que por otro lado 
se estaba trabajando en la revolución, y que llegaría el tiempo de que se utilizasen nuestros 
servicios.”697 This attitude needs to be taken into consideration; the federalist “allies” of 
Mérida had every intention of letting Imán do all the hard work, until the time was right for 
them to take over the pronunciamiento. This was just the beginning of how the faction would 
exploit Imán for the realisation of their pronunciamiento, not his. 
After defeating Imán, Requeña established a small garrison of 200 men commanded 
by Carlos María Araoz in the city of Valladolid, to ensure that the rebels could not succeed 
there.
698
 The pronunciados fled to the immediate forests of Chemax, where they worked to 
reinforce themselves. Imán‟s movement now acquired its definitive proportions as the leader 
began to mobilise a previously unused force in the pronunciamiento: the Maya. The decision 
made sense: they numbered in the thousands, and while Imán was aware that he did not have 
elite support, he decided that would he have manpower instead. His need for followers 
obligated him to incorporate truly popular demands. He used typical pronunciamiento 
cooption: if he won his pronunciamiento with the support of the Maya, he would eliminate 
their most dreaded tax – the obvention. There could not have been a more powerful way of 
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rousing the Maya; the heavy burden of the annual tax – of 12 ½ reales for men and 9 for 
women – had led to constant and increased numbers of Maya fleeing from the towns to the 
mountains as they tried to evade collection by the local clergy.
699
 After Imán‟s proclamation 
to the Maya, he was soon surrounded by thousands of them armed with machetes and 
whatever other weapons they could amass.
700
 The number of his new followers will never be 
known; Imán insisted that he had 80,000 supporters, but this was surely an exaggeration; later 
reports would number the pronunciados between 5,000-7,000 men, still an impressive and 
frightening force to contend with.
701
  
The news of the integration of the Maya had a dual effect: the vecinos in the east, 
knowledgeable of the horrors which had taken place in Tizimín and worried at thousands of 
armed Maya at their doorstep, saw a real threat of a Caste War if they resisted Imán‟s forces. 
Simultaneously, the federalists in Mérida, aware of the swelling of Imán‟s army and the 
intimidation which it provoked, saw hope for a lasting and successful pronunciamiento. They 
instructed federalist Pablo Castellanos, who was then juzgado de primera instancia of 
Valldolid, to advise Imán to occupy Valladolid and issue his pronunciamiento. There was 
another important ally on Imán‟s side in Valladolid giving instructions: Agustín Acereto, the 
premier caudillo of Valladolid, a powerful and dangerous man. He had occupied various 
political positions, he had multiple properties, and he had a network of support perhaps 
without rival in the east.
702
 Although a centralist, there were several things which had 
annoyed him lately: the central government‟s implementation of property and business taxes 
had damaged his finances, and the sorteo had affected his workforce. He also did not permit 
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anyone contesting his authority in the east: recently installed centralist and Commander of the 
Third Active Battalion Roberto Rivas was that man. Additionally, Acereto was fearful of 
what armed Maya in their masses could do to those who supported the centralist government; 
he also was not unaware of what had happened in Tizimín. Consequently, he and his 
powerful eastern network of Roque Rosado, Francisco Esquivel, Luis Rivero, Pantaleón 
Carrillo, Severo Villamil, Manuel Rosado, Victoriano Ruz, Paulino Vivas, Julián Alcalá, 
Antonio Heredia and Esteban Ruiz all quickly began proclaiming their adhesion to 
federalism, and negotiating for the success of Imán and his federalist pronunciamiento in 
Valladolid.
703
 Imán accepted the propositions, and with his Mayan forces he made for 
Valladolid.
704
 
On 8 February 1840, Imán‟s men occupied the barrio of Sisal of Valladolid without 
resistance.
705
 Upon notice of the occupation, government troops left the main plaza of 
Valladolid to battle them; but upon seeing the sheer number of Maya, simply joined the 
rebels. Leaders Miguel Cámara and Tomás O‟ Horán entered the Imán camp to negotiate, 
where they were informed that if they did not pronounce immediately they would be shot;
706
 
they immediately became supporters of the federalist pronunciamiento. The pronunciados 
shot and killed leader of the government troops Araoz, and Valladolid remained at the mercy 
of the rebels. Imán entered the city of Valladolid four days later, in an almost royal manner in 
his inhis koché (a type of Mayan portable carriage) on the shoulders of his Mayan 
supporters.
707
  
On the same day of 12 February, he issued his definitive pronunciamiento text. 
Claiming to serve “el clamor general” and considering what would be “más conducente al 
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bien de la patria” (standard pronunciamiento rhetoric) and apologising for the previous lack 
of an extensive text due to “las aflictivas circunstancias” which “no se lo habían permitido 
hasta ahora: pero que ya la suerte le proporciona momento tan favorable,”708 the 
pronunciamiento explicitly denounced the 1837 centralist system and called for the 
reestablishment of the 1824 federalist constitution. In the words of the pronunciamiento 
itself, its aim was “el restablecimiento del sistema Federal; y considerando que esta medida 
salvadora debía poner en efecto un término a los innumerables males que gravitan sobre los 
pueblos de este Estado, cuya miseria y escasez toca al extremo.”709 Imán added in a 
manifesto issued on the same day the essentiality of the preservation of union with Mexico, 
as it was important to maintain “los sagrados vínculos” and “identifican nuestros intereses 
con el resto de la República Mexicana, a que juramos pertenecer […] nuestro objeto no es 
sustraernos de la obediencia del Supremo Gobierno.”710 Additionally, the pronunciados 
demanded the restoration of the authorities and Congress of 1834, the invalidity of the 1837 
government and consequently all its officials and decrees, and the cessation of all 
contributions, taxes, and tariffs imposed by the central government. The eastern 
pronunciados had manifestly incorporated regional demands in order to provide national 
legitimacy, and to create the opportunity for the federalists in the cities to second the 
pronunciamiento. 
While the pronunciamiento had incorporated broad political ideology to incite support 
from the federalists, it did not ignore the local factors which had been plaguing the provincial 
elite sector of the east, and more specifically, Imán himself. The text highlighted the broad 
spectrum of society which had been included in Imán‟s movement, as it denounced the 
“continuadas y multiplicadas exacciones con que la actual administración ha afligido a los 
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propietarios y a todas las demás clases.”711 Of equal significance, the pronunciados‟ 
condemnation of the “ominoso decreto del sorteo” pervaded throughout the text. They 
criticised the practice for daring to “ultrajar la dignidad de los hombres en un pueblo libre, y 
que tenga término la deportación de los hijos de esta Península a sostener en países insanos 
una guerra ruinosa para la República.”712 The solution, according to the pronunciados, was to 
completely dissolve the Third Active Battalion, “cuya organización y existencia ha sido hasta 
aquí tan perjudicial, impolítica y ruinosa a los partidos de Izamal, Valladolid y Tizimín.”713  
The pronunciamiento also reflected Imán‟s cooption of eastern civilian support from 
both the higher and lower classes. It demanded, as promised to the Maya, the abolition of the 
indigenous obvention tax, making this pronunciamiento the first of its kind (in Yucatán) 
which included popular – and moreover indigenous – demands instead of just elite 
concerns.
714
 The deals struck with the elite civilians – particularly Acereto and his circle – 
were also evident, as the pronunciamiento declared the establishment of a temporary junta to 
rule the peninsula, constituting of Pablo Castellanos, Agustín Acereto, Miguel Cámara, 
Buenaventura Pérez and José Antonio García.
715
 These very same figures, along with men 
from the rest of Acereto‟s group, such as Roque Rosado, had signed the pronunciamiento 
text. This was the manifestation of the cooption of elite civilian support which Imán had 
desperately needed to bolster the pronunciamiento‟s strength. As has been mentioned, it was 
essential that the Yucatecan pronunciamiento demonstrate the presence of powerful and 
influential figures in order to have a chance of being seconded and thus succeeding. The Imán 
movement had been deeply lacking in this aspect; indeed, he had been the most elite figure of 
the movement until recently, and the ridicule which he had undergone had been evident. The 
support of the true caudillos of the east consequently gave the pronunciamiento the necessary 
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status in order for the Meridian and Campechean elite to recognise it as an exercise which 
they could relate to, and thus second.   
Imán was to also attempt to fulfil more personal ambitions in the pronunciamiento. 
Previous Yucatecan pronunciamientos had demonstrated that the practice could allow 
pronunciados to leap to the top of the political and military ladder, and Imán did not intend to 
be excluded. The constant defeats, disregard, and contempt which he had undergone 
throughout his struggles would have no doubt affected him, and he intended to correct this 
situation, to finally “exist” politically and militarily. Imán‟s text thus stated that he was to 
maintain the title of Comandante general de las armas del Ejército libertador,
716
 and would 
have ultimate say in all political decisions made by the established junta, as well as extensive 
military power. 
The pronunciamiento, with its elite civilian support, had finally secured the respect of 
the elite in the capital of Mérida. The news of the success of the pronunciamiento led to a 
meeting among the federalist faction of the Unión in Mérida as they decided how to second 
the act. It is significant to note that with the increasing success of the Imán movement, many 
important centralists who had been affected by the damaging economic decrees (such as 
Pedro and Nestor Escudero de la Rocha and Vicente Solís) had united with the federalist club 
in Mérida to get rid of the centralist system. Now, however, differences hampered the 
seconding of Imán‟s pronunciamiento as the two groups had their own “intereses e 
intenciones”, to keep in mind, with each faction demanding “la dirección y gobierno del 
movimiento”717. On the one hand, Pedro Escudero, chief of the Rochela faction, claimed that 
if he did not head the pronunciamiento de adhesión, he would turn over his support to 
centralist Governor Guerra; he wanted conditional separation of Yucatán from Mexico 
“mientras se logra el cambio de las instituciones.” On the other hand, López, Cosgaya, José 
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Encarnación Cámara and the Barbachano brothers proposed a permanent “Gobierno 
independiente”, with the establishment of Yucatán‟s own constitution, and the reimposition 
of the authorities of 1834.
718
 
With the bickering in the capital seeing no end, Imán was losing patience and 
announced his intention to march on the city. Fearful of a Mayan army heading into the west, 
military men José Encarnación Cámara and Anastasio Torrens abandoned the junta and in the 
ciudadela of San Benito in Mérida carried out the plan in accordance with the pro-absolute 
independence group, excluding La Rochela from the movement.
719
 The Acta de la 
Guarnición de Mérida of 18 February 1840, claiming to represent “una inmensa mayoría del 
pueblo” but carried out by the Meridian elite, called itself a pronunciamiento de adhesión, but 
in reality had very little in common with Imán‟s act.720 It called for federalism and the 
reimposition of the authorities of 1834, and the cessation of all economic decrees of the 
centralist administration. It then however declared that “El departamento de Yucatán se erige 
en estado libre e independiente y en tal virtud restablece la Constitución de 1824 […] 
mientras que este no vuelva al orden del régimen federal en los términos que establece el 
artículo de esta acta.”721 Imán had never wanted independence from Mexico; in fact, he had 
been explicitly clear about the necessity of preserving the union with it. The Meridian 
pronunciamiento moreover made no mention of the dissolution of the Third Active Battalion, 
the abolition of the obvention, or the empowerment of Imán, no doubt the elements closest to 
Imán and his supporters‟ hearts, and farthest from those of the political elite in Mérida and 
Campeche. 
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The powerful Meridians and Campecheans had consequently hijacked Imán‟s 
campesino-backed movement voicing the needs of the people, and had transformed it into a 
traditional Yucatecan elite pronunciamiento. History more or less repeated itself, as the 
Meridians had taken over the Campechean pronunciamiento for independence in 1821, the 
camarilleros had commandeered the centralist pronunciamiento of 1829, and now the elite 
had usurped the Imán pronunciamiento. This business of taking a local pronunciamiento and 
making the pronunciamiento de adhesión even more powerful than the original act was thus 
not uncommon in Yucatán. This time, however, it was not one elite faction commandeering 
another elite faction‟s pronunciamiento. This was the political elite taking over a movement 
which had included concerns of and had triumphed because of the people. The same 
Yucatecans who had been trumpeting for more than a decade – and still were – that the reason 
for the very existence of their pronunciamientos was to serve the needs of the people and 
protect their sacred rights, had dismissed a movement that had truly represented the voices of 
the middle class, the campesinos and the Maya. No pronunciamiento in their minds had any 
business empowering the lower classes, or even Imán; that was simply too dangerous. A 
Yucatecan pronunciamiento was, to them, simply an excuse and a justification for the elite to 
gain power in the capital and implement the decrees which they liked. They (the elite) thus 
casually disregarded the objectives most desired by Imán and his supporters.   
The federalists, conscious of the clear discrepancies between their pronunciamiento 
and Imán‟s, were nevertheless careful to mask their pronunciamiento as one of “adhesión” so 
as to maintain the heroic appearance of Imán‟s act which had been motivated by the true 
voluntad del pueblo. The elite had simply used Imán and his people (after they had struggled 
for years) as a platform to stand on and issue their own act, which dealt with their own 
interests. This only serves to highlight the real dynamic of the Yucatecan pronunciamiento: 
an elite instrument used to gain political power, as it shifted back and forth from camarilleros 
229 
 
to ligados, from meridanos to campechanos, and now from centralists to federalists. The elite 
had quickly corrected any illusions about a pronunciamiento ever serving the needs of the 
people; the pronunciamiento would maintain its traditional use.  
A well coordinated elite military machine ensured that Imán‟s pronunciamiento was 
seconded throughout the western region almost immediately. Lieutenant Captain Eulogio 
Rosado raised the adhesión in the barracks of the First Active Battalion in Mérida on the very 
same day, with Felipe de la Cámara and Antonio Palma seconding it in Sisal, Motul, and 
Hunucmá.
722
 In the east and the south, Imán‟s forces commanded by Lieutenant Colonels 
Pacheco and Revilla ensured that the towns of the districts of Izamal and Tihosuco 
pronounced in support.
723
 Even though the region seconded Imán‟s pronunciamiento in 
name, those in power knew that it was their Meridian pronunciamiento which they would 
realise. With all communities seconding the pronunciamiento – with only the exception of 
Campeche, where Commander General Zayas and the regular army remained steadfastly 
stubborn – Governor Guerra was isolated and found himself unable to combat the 
revolutionary advance. The authorities of 1834 – including Governor Juan de Dios Cosgaya – 
resumed their positions on the same day of 18 February, with no resistance from the 
centralists in Mérida.  
 Despite the sidelining of Imán‟s act, and the ridiculing and disregard which he had 
undergone in previous years, he now for a moment enjoyed the satisfaction of being a 
Yucatecan hero. The re-established federalists held festivals in his honour and proclaimed 25 
July as a day to celebrate “el caudillo del Ejército Libertador del Oriente”; adornments 
decorated Mérida‟s citadel of San Benito and the government palace; guns were fired, church 
bells were rung, all these celebrated the Liberator and his pronunciamiento.
724
 The official 
discourse, which had formerly denounced the “faccioso Imán”, rapidly changed its tune and 
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recognised him as chief of Valladolid.
725
 Newspapers such as Los Pueblos proclaimed “El 
hijo predilecto y benemérito Santiago Imán” as “Héroe de la libertad! Salvador del pueblo!”, 
advising him and his fellow pronunciados “Marchad cubierto de los inmarcesibles laureles 
que habéis granjeado.”726 When describing the pronunciamiento, the editors of the same 
newspaper praised that “La simple voz del animoso caudillo del Oriente, del inmortal IMÁN, 
se levantó en masa, y con semblante sereno, actitud noble e imponente, exclamó: “No más 
sufrimiento.”727 Somehow the humility of his military status was now something to be 
praised instead of ridiculed, with the ayuntamiento of Dzibalchen exclaiming admiringly, “no 
es más que un simple teniente, emprendió su valor desnudado, nos han dado patria y 
libertad.”728 Finally, it was claimed that “El héroe del Oriente” was responsable for restoring 
“la libertad de Yucatán” as “no hay yucateco que no le tribute agradecido los más justos 
homenajes de respeto y veneración, y que no le mire como la salvaguardia de sus 
derechos.”729  
 Actions and words soon clashed, however, in a most ambiguous reaction. Despite the 
praise of Imán, it was soon made clear that no man from the east without military prestige 
and who was inexperienced in politics – despite his heroic act and his social status in Tizimín 
– deserved to mix in Meridian elite politics. He would not be taking any position of power as 
his pronunciamiento had called for. As Cosgaya reclaimed his post of governor, the junta 
gubernativa erected by Imán‟s pronunciamiento was quickly demolished, with the Congress 
of 1834 recommencing on 28 February.
730
 Imán was to be continually excluded; the first 
instance was in the battle to second the pronunciamiento in Campeche. The regular army 
which was stationed there – headed by Commander General Rivas Zayas – had issued its own 
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pronunciamiento on 25 February, declaring its loyalty to Mexico and refusing to recognise 
the reinstalled authorities of 1834; they claimed that this government, being restored through 
popular will, was invalid and consequently had no power over constitutional bodies. In their 
words:  
Que no existiendo en ningún pueblo el derecho de dictar leyes a la nación, no debe 
verse en tales pronunciamientos sino un crimen digno del más severo castigo por 
cuanto trastornan las instituciones, violan los más sagrados principios y relajan los 
lazos de la obediencia y subordinación.
731
 
 
Imán was not even invited to the expedition to second the pronunciamiento in Campeche. 
The Meridian elite did not want the eastern caudillo and his campesino and Mayan contingent 
in western territory. Instead, they sent Lieutenant Colonel and long time pronunciado 
Sebastián López de Llergo to do the act, much to the disgust of Imán. While Llergo raised the 
pronunciamientos de adhesión of the towns of Tenabo, Hecelchakán, and Calkiní in his 
transit to Campeche, Imán arrived in Mérida with his troops on 15 March, asking the 
governor if he could take part in the Campechean project, only to be told that the government 
would request his services if they were needed.
732
 Imán insisted, and after numerous pleas, 
Governor Cosgaya eventually relented; the Liberator was already scrambling to retain his 
spotlight. In the meantime, a contingent of 600-700 men had arrived from Veracruz to aid 
Rivas Zayas and the garrison in Campeche.
733
 After months of negotiations and several 
battles between the pronunciados and government forces, Imán and Llergo triumphed over 
Campeche on 16 June.
734
   
 The actions of exclusion of the hero were to nevertheless continue. The hombres de 
bien did not fail to recognise that Imán‟s movement was not of “opinión política” but had, in 
Rivas Zayas‟ words, the “carácter de una revolución de castas,”735 and they wanted Imán and 
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his armed Maya – or as Cosgaya called them, “la bizarra tropa del patriota general Imán”736 – 
back in their eastern towns where they belonged. As Rugeley has pointed out, the dictatorship 
in Guatemala of Rafael Carrera – who was supported by an army of Maya – was well known 
in Yucatán, and the political elite had no intention of the pattern repeating itself here.
737
 Elite 
alarm increased when a group commissioned by Imán visited the governor to complain that 
the Meridian pronunciamiento had not fulfilled the most important articles of Imán‟s act, 
mainly, naming Imán as maximum military authority, the dissolution of the Third Active 
Battalion, and the abolition of the obvention.
738
 To quieten Imán, he was offered the rank of 
Brigadier General as an honorific title, which was, in the opinion of Felipe de la Cámara, a 
title which avoided “ultrajando la distinguida clase de oficiales generales, con un 
nombramiento a todas luces extemporáneo e inútil.”739 With regard to the other demands, on 
23 August 1840 the obvention tax was abolished, but was immediately replaced by a 
religious contribution of one real every month for men aged between 14 and 60. The 
dissolution of the body of the Third Active Battalion, claimed to be “una medida que exige 
hace mucho tiempo la equidad, la política, y la rigorosa justicia”740 was to be postponed until 
further notice, and the east and its people had been ignored and shoved aside by the federalist 
elite.   
Imán nevertheless refused to return to Tizimín, and remained in Campeche throughout 
the summer of 1840, stubbornly considering his political options. The press now began 
turning against him, repeating with frequency that Imán had no intention to take any power or 
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reward for himself, and that he only wanted to return to his lands in the east.
741
 The refusal to 
grant him any power was also manifest, as after elections in late August, – with Santiago 
Méndez becoming governor and Miguel Barbachano being elected vice-governor – Imán did 
not even get the role of diputado of Tizimín, as this post was for the priest Buenaventura 
Pérez.
742
 On 24 September the Campechean newspaper El Anteojo published a poem of 36 
lines called “Al ciudadano Santiago Imán”. Even though signed by “Un Amigo”, the message 
of the poem was undoubtedly to persuade Imán to return to Tizimín. The poem presented two 
models for his consideration: Simón Bolívar, rejected by his own people because of his 
personal ambitions, and George Washington, loved by all for heading a revolution, but then 
rejecting the title of dictator or king. The verses ended “Atiene, amigo Imán, y de la historia// 
las justicieras páginas mirando,// procura meditar profundamente,// y entre los héroes fórmate 
un dechado.”743 The editors then reminded him that the other liberator, Sebastián López de 
Llergo, had returned to his own home without any demands. Governor Cosgaya had also 
declared that while all owed “una eterna gratitud […] a los campeones y demás obreros que 
nos han sacado de la opresión y esclavitud” he added firmly that it was time for them to 
return to the east, “Soldados ilustres de la patria: ya habéis concluida vuestra gran obra.”744  
It was time for Imán to leave. His army had been dissolved, with the majority of his 
campesino and Maya supporters returning to their lands to plant their fields, the traditional 
elite had reclaimed their positions, and he was being criticised. His inexperience in public and 
administrative affairs had allowed the old-time politicians to easily manipulate his cause to 
their advantage, and to now dispose of the original hero. On 15 October he published his 
farewell, and assured that he and his 80,000 followers would always be ready to defend 
Yucatán against “la orgullosa Metrópoli […] si el despotismo osare amenazarnos, se 
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presentará entre vosotros para escarmentar a los traidores.”745 Perhaps it was a threat to the 
Mexicans, or perhaps it was his manner of reminding all what he and his force were capable 
of. He then disbanded what remained of his forces and returned to Tizimín.  
 Governor Cosgaya had assured the pronunciados of the east that “se trasmita su 
memoria a las generaciones futuras para que sus nombres se pronuncien con regocijo y placer 
[…] vuestro nombre será eterno en los anales de la historia de Yucatán, por haber hecho 
triunfar el voto general y las sagradas causas de la libertad y de la federación.”746 This was 
not to be the case for Imán. He was not a model pronunciamiento figure: a pronunciamiento 
in Yucatán was meant to be led by a respected powerful elite military figure who was 
experienced in politics – preferably from the western cities of Mérida and Campeche – who 
one could remember with pride. His elite status in Tizimín did not matter in the capital; 
Meridians simply saw him as some unknown soldier from some small pueblo in the east who 
had somehow been catapulted into the spotlight. In their minds, he had no right to pronounce 
for any power or causes; that was their territory. Imán was to them an embarrassment, and 
moreover a danger for arming and coopting the campesinos, the slaves, and the Maya into a 
pronunciamiento. After trawling through countless newspapers, letters and impresos, it is of 
no coincidence that after Imán‟s return to Tizimín in 1840, there was not one reference to his 
name whenever the heroic pronunciamiento of 1840 was mentioned. While Governor 
Cosgaya had crowed about “las manos diestras y patrióticas que han sabido con acierto 
escoger los pueblos para el desempeño de los altos poderes públicos,”747 the exact opposite 
had happened to Imán and his demands. He was consciously excluded from collective 
memory, a figure to be ashamed of, a figure to be forgotten.  
Imán was not unaware of this and tried to remain in the public eye. On 22 December 
1841 he pronounced in Valladolid condemning the local government for delaying the 
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complete independence of Yucatán (independence which he had initially claimed to be 
against; this was perhaps an excuse to criticise the government which had pushed him aside), 
and also asking that those against the current institutions be expelled from the peninsula.
748
 
His pronunciamiento was ignored, only receiving a small write-up in the paper. The Méndez 
government subsequently declared Yucatán‟s independence anyway, even hoisting its own 
flag, until Mexico decided to return to a federalist system.
749
 In response, the Mexican 
government declared the closure of the ports of Campeche and Sisal, and all Yucatecan boats 
as pirates.
750
 A new Yucatecan constitution was then approved in 1842; the nation formed its 
own bicameral legislature, and was completely in control of its senators, deputies, and 
governor.  
 The independence of Yucatán would lead to plans in 1842 for a Mexican invasion of 
Yucatán by the Santa Anna administration. Imán once more attempted to be included; in 
1842, he wrote to the governor offering his services in the imminent war, reminding López 
that: 
V.E y todos los yucatecos son testigos, que fui el primero que despreciando los 
riesgos, burlando la astucia y vigilancia de nuestros opresores, menospreciando sus 
amenazas y ofertas, en tiempo que disponía de todos los recursos del Estado, y 
confiado únicamente en la razón y justicia de nuestra causa, di en el pueblo de 
Tizimín el grito de libertad en Mayo de 1839, que sostuve por espacio de un año, 
hasta que felizmente terminó la revolución gloriosa que hizo desaparecer en nuestro 
suelo el monstruoso y abominable sistema de administración.
751
 
 
He then added that “regresé al seno de mi familia, no a disfrutar de los bienes y felicidades 
que proporcionan el retiro y la vida privada, sino a esperar con noble inquietud el momento 
feliz de salir nuevamente a la campaña, como ahora se nos prepara.”752 He did not enjoy 
being excluded, that was clear. The government had other intentions for him; Governor 
Santiago Méndez replied that he would be called on if he was needed, but the local 
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administration did not invite him to one single battle during the year-long war against Mexico 
from 1842-1843. The message was evident: you did the hard work for us, now you need to 
return to where you came from, and allow yourself to be forgotten. 
Despite the determined disregard and blotting out of Imán and the popular demands of 
his revolt, the pronunciamiento of 1840 was consciously to be remembered as a movement 
by the pueblos. Ironically, not one pronunciamiento in Yucatán previous to 1838 had ever 
been of “the people”, but as has been discovered, the iconic symbol of the pronunciamiento 
in celebration and in memory was one which was precisely of the pueblos, the people, as they 
fought against the despotism and tyranny of an oligarchy, or in this case as was claimed, 
against the “poder tiránico”753 and “el negro pendón de la tiranía”754 of the central 
government. Yucatecans were thus to continually remember the Imán pronunciamiento as 
one fought by the people for their rights, not as an elite act hijacking a popular movement. In 
the one-year anniversary of the pronunciamiento, Yucatecans celebrated the “grito unísono 
de los yucatecos, que con la rapidez y sublimidad del trueno se produce en todas las 
extremidades del Estado.”755 
In the same year, the editors of the newspaper El Siglo XIX praised the 
pronunciamiento which had embodied “la irresistible fuerza moral” and “la voluntad 
general”756 of “las masas […] las secciones populares que en un momento, con asombro 
suyo, triunfaron unánimes.”757 Vice-Governor Miguel Barabachano in 1842 remembered “La 
sangre de los libres derramada en los campos de Tizimín, Valladolid y Santa Rosa […] la 
libertad y los sagrados derechos de los pueblos fueron plenamente reconquistados”,758 with 
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the president of Congress also commending the “admirable revolución […] de los 
pueblos.”759 The pronunciados were proclaimed as “los inmortales autores de nuestra libertad 
e independencia” and by former Governor Cosgaya as the “héroes que más se han distinguido 
en el sostenimiento de la causa santa de los pueblos” and the “dueño y señor de todo 
Yucatán.”760  
Why ignore Imán and suppress his pronunciamiento‟s demands, yet memorialise the 
very same movement as being the prototype of pronunciamientos in nineteenth-century 
Yucatán, i.e. to remember it as being a true popularly-motivated exercise? It is because the 
true movement of the pueblos is what theoretically embodied the pronunciamiento; it was 
supposed to represent the people, their will, their desires, their needs, their rights. Indeed, the 
actual derecho de insurrección against the ruling authorities was justified by the very fact that 
it was a liberal expression of the voluntad del pueblo. It therefore had to be preserved and 
memorialised as just this in order to be legitimate in memory. Nevertheless, the figure of 
Imán was embarrassing when compared to the military and political elite who had previously 
headed pronunciamientos in Yucatán: figures such as Sebastián López de Llergo, José 
Segundo Carvajal and Francisco de Paula Toro. Moreover, to grant Imán and his campesino 
and indigenous followers any success was dangerous: any demonstration of the 
empowerment of the popular classes would only show them that maybe they could pronounce 
from now on for their demands. Indeed, the inclusion of a Mayan demand in the 
pronunciamiento had been something more than perilous; in 1847 the Mayan protest against 
taxes would have the suspicious beginnings of a pronunciamiento, with extensive planning 
and liaising occurring. When the Maya were discovered and subsequently executed for their 
conspiracy, they would retaliate in a revolt which would spiral out of control, becoming the 
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bloody Mayan rebellion known as the Caste War. This war between Mayas and criollos 
would last from 1847-1853, provoking severe instability in the region. 
The participation of the Maya and the popular aspect of the pronunciamiento should 
thus be commemorated, but the pronunciamiento itself should not serve the needs of the 
lower classes. Additionally, its leader who had incited the lower classes to practice 
insurrection should also be ignored in practice and memory. Imán not only lacked in the 
esteem needed to be praised in pronunciamiento memory, but he was also a dangerous figure 
to be commended for triumphing in his movement, as he had consciously encouraged the 
Maya to revolt. The Imán pronunciamiento would thus simultaneously be remembered as 
serving the needs of the masses, to uphold its validity in memory, while ignoring the fact that 
the elite had disregarded the demands of the lower classes. There would also be a conscious 
attempt by the elites to forget the shameful pronunciamiento leader of Imán, who they saw as 
an undeserving example of a pronunciamiento head. 
During the next decades, the figure of Imán was slowly forgotten; he disappears from 
newspaper and correspondence records, only surfacing in contexts of acquiring property or 
loans. He was also denied playing any role in the Caste War of 1847 -1853, and as records 
go, he died in 1854, of causes that have not yet been discovered. The memory and figure of 
Imán, rejected by the Yucatecan elite, did not linger either in his hometown, as by the late 
1870s the name of Imán had been forgotten; asked to choose a namesake (a person 
representative of the legacy of their town) in 1878, the locals opted for Manuel Francisco 
Mezo, an unremarkable local military officer. No recollections or obituary have been found 
of Imán, and he has disappeared from collective Yucatecan memory.
761
 He, and his 
pronunciamiento, were a lost cause. 
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It is unfortunate that the most significant pronunciamiento in Yucatán‟s history had to 
be by a man doomed to be rejected by the elite of Yucatán. His movement was evidently the 
most extraordinary pronunciamiento to ever occur in Yucatán; it did not initially arise from 
the federalist powers in opposition to the centralist government, or from the resentment 
engendered by harmful economic reforms affecting the wealthy, as had been usually 
depicted.
762
 The actual initial origins of the Santiago Imán pronunciamiento resided in a 
relatively small faction for a very specific reason: Imán had hardly any workers left, and his 
soldiers did not want to go to Texas. The Imán movement was thus not – as it has been 
categorised – one of the many regional pronunciamientos which arose as a reaction to the 
oppressive Bustamante centralist government. The pronunciamiento was instead a product of 
much more intimate and personal concerns. Van Young has proposed the theory that regional 
(and even national in some cases) conflict in nineteenth-century Mexico was originally 
sparked by and rooted in more local than large-scale factors.
763
 Concentration on the “hyper-
localist” atmosphere (involving local conflict, attitudes, and actors)764 and the micro factors 
(rather than the macro factors) behind the pronunciamiento is essential if one wants to 
effectively understand not only this pronunciamiento, but perhaps the majority of 
pronunciamientos in nineteenth-century Mexico. This would then prevent one from 
generalizing the pronunciamiento as simply a regional reaction to a federalist/centralist 
government, and instead places the pronunciamiento into a more realistic context: with real 
people, having real (even personal) problems, and choosing this phenomenon as the avenue 
to do something about it. 
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The recruitment of civilian support and the widening of Imán‟s pronunciamiento‟s 
demands were thus mechanisms included to incite support and gain resources and prestige in 
a revolt which had been constantly failing for years. This explains the many sympathies 
which come together in the pronunciamiento text. The text not only includes the complaints 
of an indignant military corps, but also contains demands of the federalists, merchants, 
hacendados, and the Maya. The incorporation of civilian demands in Imán‟s 
pronunciamiento would not only lead to its success, but to its hijacking by greater powers in 
the capital. A popular movement was turned into an elite pronunciamiento, serving the 
interests of purely the big-time federalists, evading any empowerment of the pueblos. The 
irony here cannot be underestimated: the pronunciamiento was initially formed as claiming to 
serve the rights of the people. Indeed, this liberal element justified its anti-constitutional 
existence as it overthrew constitutional authorities. The sidelining of the Imán 
pronunciamiento was the exact opposite of what the pronunciamiento claimed to be: it erased 
the pueblos‟ demands and replaced them with an elite agenda. Yucatecans nevertheless strove 
in future years to remember Imán‟s movement as the greatest ever pronunciamiento in 
Yucatecan history, one which was started by and served the needs of the people, while 
simultaneously forgetting its leader and his desires. For the man who had dared to change the 
history of a region through countless struggles and despite having all the odds stacked against 
him, it was indeed a sad end; and all because, in the eyes of some, he was not good enough, 
or too dangerous a role model, to be remembered as a hero. 
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Conclusion 
 
Through the practice of the pronunciamiento, Yucatán came full circle within the 
space of twenty years, using the exercise to become independent in 1821 from Spain, and 
then again in 1840 from Mexico. Moreover, as has been demonstrated, every single major 
political event which took place in the peninsula during this period was realised through, or 
was a consequence of, a pronunciamiento. Evidently, the practice became the dominating 
factor and almost a ritual of local politics; though unconstitutional, it was simply seen as the 
way to express oneself politically and to engage in local and national politics. After exploring 
the practice with reference to origins, actors, experience, and even memory, several aspects 
have been demonstrated about the pronunciamiento in Yucatán. It was 1. Not exclusively a 
military practice for the most part, but a political practice, involving extensive civilian 
participation, 2. It was moreover a practice of political representation and negotiation, 
especially with regard to the national context, 3. These pronunciamientos demonstrate that 
Yucatán was much more deeply connected to Mexico than has been previously claimed, 4. 
Even those Yucatecan pronunciamientos which had as their objective the overthrow of local 
administrations, still had a distinctly ideological character, with factions using the exercise in 
their attempts to better their economic and political future in Yucatán, and this meant that 5. 
The pronunciamiento was not always a destructive practice, but one which political factions 
extensively used in their struggle to protect their interests and to construct the political system 
of the newly-independent region and nation.  
This work has shown that it is impossible to deny the role of the military and armed 
force in instigating and realising Yucatecan pronunciamientos. Throughout the period 
discussed, the threat of violence (and violence itself on several occasions) by the powerful 
active battalions and the permanent army was the dominant element behind the success of the 
242 
 
Yucatecan pronunciamiento. It cannot be disputed, then, that the main actors in the exercise 
of the pronunciamiento were the military. Nevertheless, this should not lead one to classify 
the pronunciamiento as a militaristic practice. As has been illustrated, in nineteenth-century 
Yucatán – and Mexico – among the most important figures in politics and business were also 
figures who had been granted military rank. These individuals used their military status to 
carry out pronunciamientos not with militaristic demands, but with political and economic 
objectives. Additionally, civilians who had no associations with the military (such as 
merchants and politicians, campesinos and even the Maya) also instigated and/or participated 
in pronunciamientos in order to address their own concerns. In the Yucatecan case, the 
pronunciamiento was therefore not a militaristic practice whereby the military intervened in 
political life on the occasion that political institutions could not govern effectively. Although 
in their pronunciamientos, many military officers claimed that this was the case, the fact 
remains that they themselves were politicians with their own agendas and ideologies, using 
their military rank to their advantage. The pronunciamiento was thus clearly a political 
exercise more than anything else. Indeed, according to Medina Peña, “En cuanto a objetivos, 
los miembros del ejército se proponían en cada uno de sus pronunciamientos fines claramente 
políticos,”765 with Guerra stating that, “Solo […] los cuerpos militares desde la guerra de 
independencia, poseen simbólicamente la propiedad de la representación política.”766 
Additionally, it may be over-simplified to classify the pronunciamiento as a purely violent 
practice, equating it with revolts and rebellions. With regard to the Yucatecan 
pronunciamientos, they only resulted in violence in 1834 and 1839; every single other 
pronunciamiento was successful because of the indirect or direct threat of military force. This 
means that before ever resorting to armed action, pronunciados always sought to negotiate 
forcefully before employing their military advantage.  
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This attempt at negotiation was most apparent in the national context of the 
Yucatecan pronunciamientos. Throughout the early nineteenth century, the Yucatecan 
political elite continually used the pronunciamiento to directly bargain with the Mexican 
administration for political change, or to simply support larger pronunciamientos in their call 
for a modification of the Mexican political system. The constant presence of national 
objectives of the Yucatecan pronunciamiento heavily imply that Yucatecans felt and were 
much more politically connected to Mexico than general previous historiography has 
claimed; indeed the pronunciamientos examined in this work demonstrate the enduring and 
evident connection between Yucatán and the mainland in terms of politics and 
pronunciamientos. As Rugeley has highlighted, there were three main elements of this 
undeniable connection: firstly, the power and resources of Mexico were so strong (in 
comparison to Yucatán‟s) that it was impossible to ignore the political situation there. 
Additionally, it cannot be denied that many Yucatecans shared the same fundamental 
concerns with those in “mainland” Mexico, be it federalism, centralism, or the role of the 
Church. Finally, the need to adhere to national movements and thus provide local 
pronunciamientos with strength, along with a gloss of national ideology and legitimacy was 
essential for Yucatecan success.
767
  
The necessity for Yucatecan pronunciamientos to adhere to larger national 
movements in order to create chances for local pronunciamiento success merits further 
comment. It firstly highlights the weakness of the region when it came to attempting to 
pronounce for national change solitarily. Indeed, on the two occasions in which Yucatecan 
pronunciados attempted to call for a national change of system on its own (1829 and 1840), it 
remained stranded in its cause for both cases, with the peninsula ending up being partially 
separated from Mexico on the first occasion, and completely independent in the second. 
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Yucatecan pronunciamientos in many instances thus had no choice but to follow the general 
pattern of Mexican politics, as it was useless for Yucatecan pronunciados to hope for support 
from distant Mexico in their movements. According to the editors of the Yucatecan 
newspaper El Constitucional: 
¿Cuándo hizo Yucatán su independencia? Después que la hizo Méjico. ¿Cuándo 
proclamó su libertad? Después que Méjico. ¿Cuándo aceptó el sistema del año de 24? 
Después que Méjico. ¿Cuando se pronunció por el de 36? Después que Méjico. Solo 
en el año de 1829 se adelantó Yucatán a pronunciarse y establecerse bajo un gobierno 
central unitario: ¿y qué sucedió? Quedarse solo, porque en Méjico (entiéndase en el 
resto de la nación) no se adoptó con anterioridad, y al fin en 33 tuvo que restituirse al 
curso ordinario que seguía la República.
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Why were the Yucatecan pronunciamientos so weak when it came to attempting to 
forcefully lobby for national objectives? The principal answer lies in the type of negotiating 
force which Yucatecans used with the centre. In early independent Mexico, when negotiating 
with the national administration, the usual type of bargaining power used through a 
pronunciamiento was the threat of – or even outright use in some cases – military force. This 
had been most evident from the late 1820s through to the 1830s, as military power had been 
employed in the national-oriented Plans of Iguala (1821) La Acordada (1828) and of 
Veracruz (1832). The use of force nevertheless did not make sense in the Yucatecan context 
of national lobbying: the region was 1,500 kilometres away from the centre, and it never had 
any money to maintain its troops anyway. Yucatecan powers therefore attempted to use 
distance as a beneficial tool rather than a disadvantage: in its pronunciamientos of 1821, 
1823, 1829 and 1840, pronunciados used the threat of secession and independence if the 
national administration did not bow to the region‟s demands. The fact that these demands 
were almost always inclined to federalism – and even centralism on two occasions – clearly 
demonstrated that through the pronunciamiento, Yucatecans were looking to unite with 
Mexico (not separate from it) on favourable terms. Indeed, the pronunciados of 1823 really 
did want to become part of Mexico under a federalist system, not declare Yucatecan 
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independence. The centralists of 1829 (with the exception of the camarilleros who hijacked 
their plan) really did want national centralism, not secession. Imán, along with a healthy 
majority of the Yucatecan politicians, wanted national federalism, not independence. As 
Vázquez has pointed out, even though there was a “grupo independentista” in Yucatán (the 
regionalist sector of the camarilleros), she rightly states that “la mayoría era federalista y solo 
resistía las limitaciones al comercio exterior, el control hacendario del centro y, dada su 
escasa población, el contingente de sangre que exigía el ejército.”769 Wells agrees with her, 
stating: 
That some Yucatecan elite politicians advanced the cause of Independence or 
annexation to the United States [...] reflected their singular political projects and the 
peculiar constellation of forces at the state and national levels at a given historical 
moment much more than any deeply felt aversion to mexicanidad shared by the 
majority of the Yucatecan pueblo.
770
   
 
Secession was thus meant to be by many as a bargaining tool through the pronunciamiento. 
Only when the attempt of negotiation failed, was when the pronunciamiento was turned into 
an act of disobedience and insubordination. Negotiation was quickly transformed into a type 
of mutiny when pronunciados‟ demands were not heard.  
The interpretation of secession as a mechanism of negotiation used by a good portion 
of Yucatecan pronunciados nuances the historical interpretation of Yucatán as a pro-
independent and regionalist state. While it is true that the relationship between Mexico and 
Yucatán was rockier than most other regions, and local politicians disagreed with many of the 
national administration‟s policies – especially when it came to trade regulations – it is unfair 
to classify the peninsula as strictly pro-independent, attempting to secede from Mexico 
whenever the local powers were displeased (1823, 1829 and 1840). Yucatecans heavily 
depended on Mexico for economic aid, as well as trade; as a result, every time that 
Yucatecans threatened independence (1821), or actually seceded (1823, 1829, 1840) from 
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Mexico, they always eventually rejoined the mainland (indeed, subsequent to the Imán 
pronunciamiento, Yucatán would reunite with Mexico once more in 1843). The national 
administration consequently never bowed to Yucatecan demands, probably knowing that the 
peninsula‟s powers would reunite sooner or later with it anyway.  
One cannot deny that when the pronunciamiento was used locally, more often than 
not, the pronunciados‟ objective was to overthrow the authorities in power. There was no 
attempt to bargain at a local level; simply the formality of an announcement that the ruling 
authorities had to step down and be replaced by the pronunciados, with of course military 
force as the veiled or outright threat. This suggests that the local factor was the more 
powerful and significant with regard to the Yucatecan pronunciamiento; indeed, even when a 
Yucatecan pronunciamiento failed in its national purpose (1829 and 1840), it was still 
proclaimed as a success in Yucatán, as it had accomplished the local objectives of 
overthrowing the local ruling administrations.  
Yucatecan pronunciamientos thus demonstrated a severe crisis of constitutionality; 
respect and obedience to ruling authorities were almost completely absent in the early 
nineteenth century. In order to reinforce the pronunciamiento‟s power over constitutional 
procedures, pronunciados never failed to claim that they represented the people, embodying 
la voluntad del pueblo against despotic, inefficient and unfair governments. In several cases, 
this was not hypocrisy; many pronunciados did believe that they represented what was best 
for their homeland, and were just in contesting ruling authorities who were not serving the 
needs of the people. In the view of Meridian pronunciado Felipe de la Cámara in 1839:  
¿podrá inculparse justamente a los hombres si propenden a revoluciones y trastornos 
públicos, en los que, creen encontrar el remedio de sus males y un mejor estar para 
sus familias? ¡Oh! No, decididamente no, el hombre está en su derecho de reclamar la 
justicia que le asiste.
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This idea is reinforced by the opinion of then-editors of the Yucatecan newspaper Los 
Pueblos, “La soberanía, que es toda del pueblo, se da el derecho de recobrar la autoridad que 
había conferido a sus magistrados y distribuirla bajo un régimen más ventajoso.”772 The 
pronunciamiento was thus seen, in Alfonso Noriega‟s words, as a legitimate “derecho de 
insurrección […] Los principios de la soberanía del pueblo, de su libertad, de su felicidad y 
de su propia conservación, son el origen del derecho de insurrección, o bien del de resistencia 
de la opresión.”773 According to Pani, the pronunciamiento was thus “founded on a radical 
conception of national sovereignty, in which those who spoke for “the people” [...] expressed 
the sovereign‟s will, which was beyond institutional representation and above constitutional 
law.”774 
As has been demonstrated with the Yucatecan case, “la voluntad del pueblo” 
proclaimed in the pronunciamiento was not representative of the general sentiment (with the 
exception of the Imán revolt), but was in fact the embodiment of the ideology of a very 
specific faction of Yucatecan society: the political and military elite. In this sense, the 
pronunciamiento was used by small, hyperactive, and disaffected elite factions to represent 
their own political values and intentions, or in the words of Comellas, the pronunciamiento 
was an expression of “el descontento de una minoría.”775 It is probable that to some extent, 
pronunciados only included the illusion of serving the needs of the patria in their 
pronunciamiento rhetoric in order to make the practice legitimate and acceptable. This was 
the claim of the editors of the newspaper El Siglo XIX; in their words: 
Siempre que hay partidos existentes, facciones populares e impotencia de fundar la 
medida o resolución que se desea, en razones sólidas y en los eternos principios de la 
equidad y la justicia, se apela a la opinión pública: se grita cuanto más a los se puede, 
el pueblo quiere esto, el pueblo desea aquello; y siempre la facción clamoreante se 
procura identificar con la generalidad del pueblo y programa de la administración, 
para obtener con seguridad sus miras, o al menos para imponer a los que fueren 
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contrarios y tienen arbitrio para oponerse a ellos […] pero vemos con sentimientos 
que a veces una mínima parte de las asociaciones particulares se atreve a denominarse 
pueblo […] ¡sirvan de instrumento a pronunciamientos y asonadas provocadas por 
dos o tres caudillos, con el fin de llevar al cabo sus proyectos! […] los malvados, 
inquietos y perniciosos, que con la capa de vox del pueblo, voluntad del pueblo y 
conveniencia pública se presentan de cuando en cuando a perturbar el orden, 
trastornar los principios, y dar tristes ejemplos de inmoralidad e insubordinación.
776
 
Nevertheless, the pronunciamientos‟ exclusive representation of elite interests and 
lack of respect for constitutional procedures does not mean that it was not a genuine practice 
of political representation. On the contrary, it was a manifestation of real political ideologies, 
and was seen as the most effective way of manifesting one‟s political views at the time. As 
Comellas has pointed out, in this sense, the pronunciamiento was the way of “manifestar una 
opinión, decidirse, tomar partido por alguna cosa.”777 It must be kept in mind that it was the 
elite (and not the lower classes) of Yucatán who were the most politically active, the most 
educated, and the most associated with the political ideologies permeating through Mexico at 
the time. Consequently, when they claimed to be representing “the people”, it is more than 
likely that this was not a hypocritical statement, as they were representing their people (with 
the obvious exception of the Imán movement). The fact that pronunciamientos did really 
represent political ideologies and beliefs thus challenges the traditional idea that it was 
simply a method and exercise of tawdry caudillismo and power-grabbing. This questions 
views such as that of nineteenth-century Yucatecan historian Juan Francisco Molina Solís, 
who claimed with reference to the Liga and the Camarilla, “Los ideales políticos persistían 
idénticos en ambos partidos y los disociaban solamente afectos personalistas, intereses 
locales [...] circunstancia que, mermando el espíritu elevado, agriaba las discusiones, 
convirtiéndolas en rencillas.”778 His interpretation is overly cynical, and moreover simplistic, 
as Solís does not grant Yucatecan politics and pronunciamientos the serious reading and 
analysis which they deserve.   
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Consequently, what should be focused on, is not that pronunciamientos produced 
instability, but that they were used profusely by Yucatecans and Mexicans to cope and 
govern themselves at a time of weak government, constitutional crisis and institutional 
disarray. It was a practice seen as the solution not only to represent political beliefs of 
factions, but also to try and construct the political system of a nation which was newborn, 
inexperienced, and desperately trying to find the answer which would bring stability and 
economic progress to its citizens. Yucatecans in particular used the pronunciamiento to 
protect their interests and the economy of their region, while simultaneously trying to form a 
beneficial relationship with the Mexican administration. The pronunciamiento was not just a 
destabilizing practice, but also represented the efforts of Mexicans in the nineteenth century 
at political construction and evolution. The nineteenth century was therefore not, as Edmundo 
O‟Gormán claimed, strictly “un espectáculo de indecible tristeza [...] un tedioso rosario de 
pronunciamientos y de golpes de Estado que no parece mostrar sino la congénita incapacidad 
de nuestro pueblo para gobernarse y para establecer las bases de una convivencia 
civilizada.”779 It was about groups using the pronunciamiento to promote their political 
ideologies, and to try to achieve social, political and economic progress. Additionally, while 
one cannot deny that the pronunciamiento did cause instability, pronunciados never allowed 
Mexico to descend into anarchy or long-term disorder; they always established a new 
administration in place of the ones which they dismissed. 
Finally, what needs to be noted is that in any case, the pronunciamiento would not 
always remain restricted to the elite. The practice gradually became extended to the lower 
classes, as demonstrated in the final and most significant pronunciamiento discussed in this 
work. Santiago Imán was the very first pronunciado to broaden the practice‟s popular 
participation, through appealing to the lower classes, the campesinos, and the Maya. 
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Yucatecan pronunciados throughout the 1840s would capitalise on this idea, continually 
coopting the Maya into their pronunciamientos and insurrections. This signified an 
unmistakably important development of the practice into a multi-class civilian vehicle of 
political protest and identity. The cooption of the Maya in the Imán pronunciamiento cannot 
be underestimated with regard to its importance in nineteenth-century Yucatecan history. 
Imán was the first to overtly include and encourage the Maya in insurrectionary ideology; and 
the Maya would increasingly become politically active through the pronunciamiento into the 
late 1840s, as pronunciados would incorporate them into every major pronunciamiento 
during these years. In 1847, it was consequently only natural for the Maya to think that they 
could now negotiate through insurrection. Indeed, it is highly probable that the Caste War 
began as a Mayan protest against taxes; not a spontaneous revolt, but as an indigenous 
pronunciamiento, with evidence of extensive planning, conspiracy, and liaising before 
government authorities discovered them. The execution of a Mayan conspirator would trigger 
off the Mayan retaliation which would spiral out of control and become the Caste War, an 
indigenous rebellion which ripped apart Yucatán until the 1850s. This was an example of 
severe instability. For now, the pronunciamientos of the period discussed were exercises of 
elite attempts to mend the political system. It is the historian‟s duty to give them the fair 
interpretation which they deserve, as exercises in a time where constitutional procedures were 
rejected, not only because the pronunciados believed that the government always won 
elections, but because they were devoted to the liberal idea that their political ideologies 
should be protected and promoted. And one should keep in mind, these were times of 
confusion and change; pronunciados used the pronunciamiento in their determined efforts 
not to create chaos, but to continually try to establish the best political system for the country. 
As Vázquez has most aptly put it “Y no debe resultarnos raro; eran tiempos de 
transformaciones, en donde los hombres debían responder a una realidad cambiante. Ellos no 
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observaban los acontecimientos como nosotros, los vivían, los sufrían y ante todo no los 
entendían.”780 
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